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From 2000 to 2013, Israel had the second highest number of deaths from suicide attacks 
and was on the list of countries that may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing 
conflicts. Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency professionals. Using Freeman, Tucker, and Merton’s framework of 9 
preattack phases as the primary theoretical construct, the purpose of this multiple case 
study was to explore specific patterns that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for 6 successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Secondary, archival 
data were acquired through a data use agreement with a private security organization in 
Israel and a maximum variation sampling procedure was used to identify cases.  These 
data were subjected to Straus and Corbin’s open and axial coding procedures.  Coded 
data were analyzed using Merriam’s cross case analysis procedure. Findings indicated 
that although the nine preattack phases emerged in both the successful and unsuccessful 
attacks, they were more consistently present in the successful bombing cases. For the 
successful attacks, general planning, financing, and operational preparation received the 
most occurrences. The implications for positive social change are directed at 
counterterrorist decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases 
of a terrorist attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism in which attackers’ or 
adversaries’ coercive actions may anger both the targeted community members as well as 
other individuals (Pape, 2008). In this study, adversaries are individuals or organizational 
members who use suicide terrorism tactics against civilians or government officials 
(Martin, 2003). Pape (2008) reported that what distinguishes suicide terrorists from other 
terrorists is that the attackers do not expect to survive their mission as they often use a 
method of attack that requires them to die in order to succeed. Pape related that suicide 
attackers may use methods such as car bombs, suicide vests, or flying airplanes into 
buildings; for example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), where 2,997 
people died as a direct result of al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks (Miller & Smarick, 2011, para. 
2).  
Like the United States, the threat of terrorist attacks is a major national security 
risk for many countries, such as Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordon, and 
Turkey (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2014). In Israel, since September 3, 
2015, 40 people have been killed in terrorist attacks and 511 people, including four 
Palestinians, have been injured (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, para. 2). The 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) reported that there have been 155 stabbing 
attacks, including 76 attempted attacks, 96 shootings, 45 vehicular ramming attacks, and 
one bus bombing (para. 2). Hassan (2009) shared that the main motive for many suicide 
bombing attacks in Israel is revenge for acts committed by Israelis. The IEP (2014) 
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identified Israel, along with 12 other countries, as being at risk for increased terrorist 
activity.  
Using Medby and Glenn’s (2002) intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) 
analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) modified intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (ModIPB) framework, and Freeman, Tucker, and Merten’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of 
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. The implications for positive 
social change stemming from this multiple case study are directed at counterterrorist 
decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist 
attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks 
from occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This knowledge and 
action will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law enforcement officials. In 
Chapter 1, I include the background of the study, problem statement, purpose of the 
study, research question, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definition of terms, 
assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a 
summary. 
Background of the Study 
Two main purposes of terrorism are to gain supporters and to coerce opponents 
(Pape, 2008). Pape (2008) reported that terrorists often seek both outcomes as they want 
to change the target state’s policies while obtaining support and recruits for their cause. 
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The author discussed three forms of terrorism, which are as follows: (a) demonstrative, 
(b) destructive, and (c) suicide terrorism. Pape described demonstrative terrorism as 
political with the aim of gaining publicity to recruit more activists, gain attention to 
grievances from others on the other side, and to gain attention from third parties who 
might place pressure on the other side. The author noted that destructive terrorism is 
more aggressive than demonstrative terrorism as the goal is to coerce opponents with 
injury or death threats and obtain support for the cause. Pape noted that suicide terrorism 
is the most aggressive form of terrorism as coercion is pursued that angers both target 
community members and other individuals as well. With suicide terrorism, Pape shared 
that the attackers do not expect to survive and often employ lethal methods of attack. The 
author reported that suicide terrorism has occurred in numerous attacks, such as when the 
Palestinians invade Israeli settlements on the West Bank with guns and grenades with the 
goal of killing residents and few of these suicide attackers escape alive.  
In comparison to other types of terror attacks, suicide attacks are fewer, but there 
is a higher casualty rate (Wigle, 2010). Dolnik (2007) related that to achieve their goal, 
terrorists study potential targets in order to understand community vulnerabilities and use 
exploitable opportunities for attacks. Syed (2010) reported that Israel, Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are regions that have frequent suicide attacks. 
Sterman and Gross (2016) reported that compared to 2014, the number of Israelis injured 
by terrorism increased 284% in 2015 (para. 1). The authors noted this increase despite a 
slight decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, from 1,793 in 2014 to 1,719 terrorist 
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attacks in 2015 (para. 5). Sterman and Gross noted that 28 people were killed in terrorist 
attacks in 2015 compared to 20 fatalities in 2014 (para. 3). The authors related that the 
majority of the 2015 fatalities occurred in attacks in Southern West Bank and Jerusalem. 
Sterman and Gross noted that people were also killed in Beersheba, Tel Aviv, and 
Northern West Bank.  
Recent attacks against Israelis are due to incitement of radical Islamist and 
terrorists who have called on Palestinian youths to murder Jews (Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2016). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) noted that terrorist 
attacks have been concentrated in greater Jerusalem, but attacks have spread to other 
locations in Israel, including Kiryat Gat, Tel Aviv, Afula, Gan Shmuel, and Raanana. In 
addition, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs related that the attacks have been carried 
out by young lone wolf terrorists who are mainly from East Jerusalem, while some are 
from Judea and Samaria. Attacks have also been carried out by Israeli Arabs, Palestinians 
who were in Israel illegally, women, and children. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reported that suicide attackers were mostly motivated by the lies that were spread by the 
Palestinian media that Israel threatened Al-Aqsa mosque, as well as youths being 
frustrated, desperate, and angry.  
Researchers have focused on resilience, acute stress, and psychological responses 
in citizen’s after suicide attacks in Israel (Amital, Amital, Shohat, Soffer, & Bar-Dayan, 
2012; Shalev, Tuval, Fenkiel-Fishman, Hadar, & Eth, 2006). While a few researchers 
have focused on patterns in preattack terrorist activities using a range of global terrorist 
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events (Fox, 2014; Freeman et al., 2010), there is a gap in the literature that specifically 
explores specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases 
that consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed 
suicide bombing cases in Israel. In this study, I addressed this gap by adding new 
knowledge to the field. This multiple case study was needed as understanding the general 
pattern of preparation before a suicide attack is useful in preventing subsequent attacks.  
Problem Statement 
Terrorism is a major national security problem for many countries (IEP, 2014). 
The IEP (2014) noted that most terrorist-related deaths (66%) in 2013 were claimed by 
four terrorist organizations, which are Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram, Taliban, and al-
Qa’ida (p. 2). In asymmetric warfare, where the military power differs significantly 
between two rivals, suicide bombings are often used as the smaller weaker group attacks 
the stronger one (Saxton, 2016). The IEP reported that from 2000 to 2003, most suicide 
attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (p. 34). The IEP found that 13 
countries were at risk for an increase in terrorism, which includes Israel. In Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, from 2000 to 2013, the 
United States had the highest number of deaths from suicide attacks with 3,042, with 
2,996 deaths attributed to 9/11 (IEP, 2014, p. 35). The IEP found that Israel had the 
second highest number of deaths with 841 or 17% of all fatalities (p. 35). In 2013, Israel 
had 24 fatalities from terrorist attacks (p. 35). Israel was also on the list of countries that 
may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing conflicts.  
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Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and 
COIN professionals (Butterworth, Sholev, & Jenkins, 2012; Freeman et al., 2010; 
Greenhill & Staniland, 2007; IEP, 2014; Kennedy, 2006; Landree et al., 2007; McCaul et 
al., 2014; Medby & Glenn, 2002; Paul & Landree, 2008; Shaked, 2016; White, 2011). 
One limitation is that studies have been conducted that examined global terrorist attacks 
and mass school shootings (Freeman et al., 2010) and which of Freeman et al.’s (2010) 
nine phases to focus operational resources on (Fox, 2014). However, research is lacking 
on the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that 
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed 
suicide bombing cases in Israel. By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist 
attack, decision makers and counterterrorist operators (CTOs) are better able to identify 
essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from occurring (Fox, 2014). Paul and 
Landree (2008) related that the more individuals involved in counterterrorism strategies 
are able to understand adversary strategies, the better equipped they are to identify risks 
and execute defensive strategies. The authors argued that any planning process involved 
in an attack should be studied, which provides unique insights into various phases of the 
attack such as selecting a target, selecting the mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist 
operatives, and developing an operational plan. In addition, numerous constraints are 
involved in any decision to focus counterterrorism and intelligence collection efforts such 
as budgetary constraints, infrastructure, and capability (Fox, 2014). Thus, findings from 
7 
 
this study may help CTOs narrow the field of options while filling the operational need to 
detect terrorist attacks before they occur.  
A second limitation is that past studies have not explored suicide attacks in Israel 
through the conceptual lens of Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, 
Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack 
phases. Using these conceptual frameworks, a multiple case study was needed that 
explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases 
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each adversary success or 
failure in Israel suicide bombing cases. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within 
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the 
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases 
in Israel. A multiple case study research design allows the researcher to explore 
differences within and between cases, and the goal is to replicate findings across cases 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008). Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et 
al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases were used as 
the conceptual frameworks of this study. Data were collected using a researcher-created 
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, a researcher-created site data collection 
worksheet, and a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Data 




In this multiple case study, I addressed one central research question: What are 
the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that 
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or 
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel?  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework is used to show how the researcher’s study fits into 
what is already known or the relationship to existing theory and research (Maxwell, 
2005). In addition, the conceptual framework shows how the study contributes to the 
field; specifically, the researcher’s intellectual goals (Maxwell, 2005). Rockinson-
Szapkiw and Knight (2012) related that the conceptual framework informs the research 
questions and methodology and helps the researcher justify his or her research problem; 
thus, showing why the study is important. Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic 
framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases served as the conceptual frameworks of this study. A brief overview of 
the frameworks is provided in this section with a more detailed explanation provided in 
Chapter 2. I organized this section in the following subsections: intelligence preparation 






Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
IPB is an analytic framework that the United States military uses to collect, 
organize, and process intelligence with respect to terror assaults in rural and urban areas 
of operation (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that IPB gives 
commanders and their staff information on the conditions within their operational area, 
such as areas of operation, interests, and battlespace that could affect the outcome of their 
mission. The researchers noted that identified conditions include relevant characteristics 
of the weather, terrain, population groups and subgroups, media, infrastructure, and 
threats. In addition, Medby and Glenn related that IPB provides a method of collecting 
information to describe and depict how each relevant characteristic influence the friendly 
unit, enemy unit, and other groups in the operational area. Hence, commanders use IPB to 
make timely and accurate decisions. The authors noted that IPB is an ongoing cyclical 
process that involves four steps, which are as follows: (a) define the battlefield area, (b) 
describe the battlefield’s effects, (c) evaluate the threat, and (d) develop enemy courses of 
action (p. 13). I discuss these four steps in further detail in Chapter 2.  
Modified Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
The ModIPB basic framework is derived from the U.S. Army IPB (Landree et al., 
2007). Landree et al. (2007) reported that due to the abundance of information in the 
public domain, being able to identify all the information that are essential to a potential 
target and evaluating its possible value to terrorist planners is overwhelming. Therefore, 
Landree et al. created the ModIPB to define the kinds of information most likely to be 
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useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets. In the ModIPB, Landree et al. 
identified four main categories of information where all possible relevant information 
requirements are grouped: (a) approach avenues and ease of access (b) target features, (c) 
security, and (d) threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations (p. 19). The researchers 
noted that the first two categories pertain to IPB concerns with battlefield environment 
and effects, which are the first two IPB steps. The third category is drawn from the third 
IPB step, evaluate the threat. The fourth category is based on the threat evaluation and the 
development of the enemy COAs, which are the third and fourth IPB steps. I discuss 
these four categories in further detail in Chapter 2.  
Nine Preattack Phases 
Before a terrorist attack, individuals who are involved join a terrorist group; get 
training; plan the attack; obtain finances, weapons, and other materials; and prepare or 
rehearse for the final attack (Freeman et al., 2010). To incorporate these activities, 
Freeman et al. (2010) created nine different phases. Freeman et al. shared that each of the 
phases was created to be distinct as possible from the others; however, they recognized 
that some of the phases may overlap or that it may be challenging to differentiate when 
actual cases are coded. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases are as follows: (a) 
networking and indoctrination, (b) terrorist training, (c), general planning, (d) 
recruitment, (e) financing, (f) operational planning, (g) weapons procurement, (h) 
logistical preparation, and (i) operational preparation (p. 77). I discuss these nine 
preattack phases in further detail in Chapter 2.  
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Nature of the Study 
I used a multiple case study research design because it enabled me to delve into 
the topic and explore specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of 
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I used a combination or 
mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation sampling and purposeful 
random sampling. Patton (2001) related that using more than one sampling strategy meets 
multiple interests and needs. Using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful 
random sampling, the six cases were chosen based on the study’s selection criteria. The 
cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location, size of the attack, and 
successful and failed attacks.  
I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the 
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 
35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then 
using purposeful random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide 
attack cases from the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. The researcher-created 
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) 
nine preattack phases, was used to collect archival data from the private intelligence 
company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researcher-
created site data collection worksheet to collect data at each site of the three successful 
and three failed suicide bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-
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created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open source information or 
public data that is written or on the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). 
Data were managed with NVivo. Coding categories that were used for the central 
research question are Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases. Data analysis for this 
case study were conducted at two levels. The first stage was a within-case analysis or 
single-case analysis in which each case was treated as a comprehensive case (see 
Merriam, 2009, p. 204). For this study, each successful and each failed suicide bombing 
attack case were analyzed separately. Level 1 analysis of the six cases included coding 
and categorization of all data from the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection 
worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-
created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The second level of data analysis 
involved a cross-case analysis. Yin (2009, 2014) and Merriam (2009) believed the second 
level of data analysis is dependent on theory development or the development of 
theoretical propositions that helps to focus on certain data and ignore other data. Coded 
and categorized data were examined across all sources of data for the three successful 
suicide bombing attack cases and the three failed suicide bombing attack cases to 
determine themes and discrepancies. Therefore, the three successful suicide bombing 
attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. Then the three failed suicide 
bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. I conducted the study in 
accordance with Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines. I 
discuss the nature of the study in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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Definition of Terms 
 Adversary: Individuals or organizational members who use suicide terrorism 
tactics against civilians or government officials (Martin, 2003).  
Adversary failure: In this study, adversary failure or failed attacks is when the 
suicide attacker was not killed, no civilians were killed (Freeman et al., 2010), or the 
suicide attacker was killed before any civilians could be killed. 
 Adversary success: In this study, adversary success or successful attacks includes 
the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at least one civilian victim 
(Freeman et al., 2010). 
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): “IPB is an analytic process used 
to organize and analyze information on terrain, weather, and the threat within a unit’s 
area of operations and associated area of interest” (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. xiv). 
Command members and intelligence staff use the IPB four-step approach to predict how 
an adversary will act within a certain area of operations (AO).  
Lone wolf terrorism: Terrorist attacks that are carried out by individuals who 
operate alone, who are not affiliated with an organized terrorist group or network, and 
whose methods are created and directed by the individual without any direct outside 
command or hierarchy (Spaaij, 2010). 
Modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield (ModIPB): The ModIPB is 
derived from the IPB and is a way to define the kinds of information most likely to be 
useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets (Landree et al., 2007).   
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Nine preattack phases: Freeman et al. (2010) created the nine preattack phases to 
depict the phases that occur before a terrorist attack. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases 
are (a) networking and indoctrination, (b) terrorist training, (c), general planning, (d) 
recruitment, (e) financing, (f) operational planning, (g) weapons procurement, (h) 
logistical preparation, and (i) operational preparation.  
 Suicide attack: The aim is “to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use 
is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public 
audience” (Atran, 2003, p. 1534).  
Suicide terrorism: This is “the targeted use of self-destructing humans against 
noncombatant-typically civilian populations to effect political change” (Atran, 2003, p. 
1534).  
Target selection: Target selection and reconnaissance is the phase where the 
teams assigned by the adversary will be dispatched to the field to choose and learn about 
the target (Drake, 1998). This is a phase in which the adversary is vulnerable to 
identification and being stopped by counterterrorism experts in their plot to attack 
(Drake, 1998). 
Terrorism: This is defined as “a violent action, or threat of violent action, aimed 
at intimidating and coercing a government or sections of the public, typically for 
political, religious or ideological ends” (Alrajeh & Gill, 2015, p. 2). 
Terrorist: An individual who seeks to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical 
infrastructure and key resources within a country in order to threaten national security, 
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cause mass casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence in 
the national economic and political institutions (White House, 2003). 
Assumptions  
 Assumptions made for this study were the following: 
• The researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the 
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events were appropriate to explore 
specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that 
consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six 
successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. 
• The adversary was targeting only civilians within the target site and not the 
property. 
• Within the case studies that were chosen based on the selection criteria, there 
were no high-profile targets within the civilian population.  
• While the findings cannot be statistically generalized, the findings may be 
analytically generalized (Yin, 2010). This is discussed further in the 
limitations section.  
• The results of the study will lead to positive social change as understanding 
the general pattern of preparation of suicide attackers before a suicide attack is 




Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this multiple case study included specific patterns within each of 
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary 
planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. 
Only suicide attack cases that met the selection criteria were included in this study. 
Therefore, using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful random sampling, the 
six cases met the following selection criteria. One criterion was successful and failed 
suicide attacks that occurred from 2000 to 2010 in Israel. The criteria for successful 
attacks included the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at least one 
civilian victim. The criteria for failed attacks were that the suicide attacker was not killed, 
no civilians were killed, or the suicide attacker was killed before any civilians could be 
killed. The attack site for each of the case studies were a soft target, such as in urban 
settings and civilian population. Soft targets can include commercial and private sectors 
as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are under 
minimal security, such as schools and open public marketplaces. Soft targets exclude 
military-related settings and bases, convoys, or checkpoints. The cases chosen had 
sufficient data available so that I was able to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine 
phases. The cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location, size of the 






Factors that I considered in relation to the trustworthiness that arose from the 
execution of this multiple case study include the type of study, the chosen case studies, 
types of data sources, assumptions, and analysis of the results. There were several 
limitations of this study. Even though I used different kinds of cases, one possible 
limitation was generalizing the results since a maximum variation sampling and 
purposeful random sampling of only six Israel suicide bombing cases were used and the 
results of the study were limited to suicide attacks cases in Israel. Therefore, the results of 
the study may not be generalizable to other forms of terrorist attacks or to terrorist attacks 
in other countries as the majority of the cases were targeted towards locations in and 
around Jerusalem. Yin (2012) related that a single or small set of cases cannot be 
statistically generalized as that is not the aim of such studies. Instead, Yin noted that case 
studies tend to generalize to other situations based on the basis of analytic claims. Yin 
discussed a conceptual claim where researchers show how the findings from their study 
have informed the relationship among a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, 
or sequence of events. Yin related that the second step pertains to researchers applying 
the same theoretical propositions to implicate other situations outside the completed case 
study where similar concepts, constructs, or sequences might be relevant. Hence, 
although the findings from this multiple case study cannot be statistically generalized, 
they could have implications for other situations based on analytical claims.  
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A second possible limitation was issues of missing or incomplete data on the 
suicide bombing cases. However, this possible limitation was addressed by only 
including cases that had sufficient data available from multiple sources so that I was able 
to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine phases. A third limitation pertained to bias in 
the selection of the suicide bombing cases. I am the chief executive officer (CEO) of the 
private intelligence company in Israel where the case study data were obtained. I 
addressed this limitation by obtaining the community partner’s cooperation and data use 
agreement. I used purposeful random sampling in selecting the three successful and three 
failed suicide attacks. I also used specific strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed 
any experiences, biases, and values pertaining to the adversary planning process for each 
adversary success or failure in the Israel suicide bombing cases. 
A fourth limitation was the difference in timeframe for successful suicide attacks 
and unsuccessful suicide attacks. As noted in Chapter 4, the successful attacks occurred 
in 2001 and 2002, whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The 
differences in years might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators 
having a better understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their 
counterterrorism strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the 
successful and unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes, 
such as suicide attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but 
a barrier or wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when 
major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012; 
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Zonszein, 2014). Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as 
a measure to protect Israelis from Palestinian suicide bombers. Thus, future research 
could focus on factors that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening 
years that may explain the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases. 
A fifth limitation was related to the assumption that the adversary was targeting 
only civilians and not the property. As such, the results only focused on the casualties and 
did not discuss damages to property. Hence, future research could focus on the aftermath 
of terror attacks to gain a better understanding of how to prepare against serious damages.  
Significance of the Study 
The biggest threat to peace in Israel and other countries is terrorism by entities 
such as ISIS, Boko Haram, Hezbollah, Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (Fox, 2014; IEP, 2014). 
Fox (2014) emphasized that the detection of terrorist attacks before they occur is critical, 
but difficult when efforts are unfocused and misaligned. Determining the general 
timeframe in which each preattack phases occur will provide a valuable warning to 
intelligence analysts (Freeman et al., 2010). Freeman et al. (2010) argued that findings 
could also assist counterterrorism decision makers in creating policies to arrest those 
suspected of plotting an attack as soon as their activity is noticed.  
The implications for positive social change stemming from this study are directed 
at counterterrorist decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases 
of a terrorist attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent 
suicide attacks from occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This 
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knowledge and action will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law 
enforcement officials. Findings from this research study added further knowledge to the 
public policy and administration literature on patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s 
(2010) nine preattack phases prior to suicide attacks. Along with the public policy and 
administration field, a wide array of other fields might be interested in the study’s 
findings, to include the fields of criminal justice, public safety, and emergency 
management. The findings from the study are also applicable to many public and private 
agencies and organizations to include Israel’s Homeland Security; federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies; and intelligence centers. 
Summary 
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Data were 
collected using a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, a 
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and a researcher-created questionnaire 
into suicide bombing events. Data analysis for this multiple case study were conducted at 
two levels: (a) single-case or within-case analysis and (b) cross-case analysis. Findings 
from this study added new knowledge to the field and increased further understanding of 
the general pattern of preparation for suicide attackers before the attacks take place.  
In Chapter 1, I included the background of the study, problem statement, purpose 
of the study, research question, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definition of 
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terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a 
summary. In Chapter 2, I include the introduction, literature search strategy, conceptual 
framework, background of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack, lone wolf 
suicide attacks, lessons learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism operations and 
methodologies, and a summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the introduction, 
research design and rationale, role of the researcher, methodology, issues of 
trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I include the setting, demographics, data 
collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 
5, I include the interpretation of findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, 
implications, and a conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within 
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the 
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases 
in Israel. Terrorism is a rational tactic that is utilized by individuals or groups with 
inferior military capabilities (Schweitzer, 2000). The intent of terrorism is to cause 
destruction to life and property by terrorizing individuals and generating publicity of the 
attack (Mazumdar, 2012). The IEP (2014) reported a 5-fold increase in the number of 
terrorism-related deaths since 2000, increasing from 3,361 in 2000 to 17,958 in 2013 (p. 
2). Hassan (2009) reported that the almost daily reports of deaths caused by suicide 
attacks rarely explain what motivates the suicide attackers. Hassan related that the suicide 
terrorism database in Flinders University in Australia, the most comprehensive database 
in the world, contains information on suicide bombings in Palestine, Israel, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; countries which accounted for 90% of all suicide 
attacks between 1981 and 2006 (para. 3). Hassan noted that analysis of data contained in 
the database indicated that politics, more than religious fanaticism, led to suicide 
terrorism. Hence, Hassan argued that religion may play a key role in recruiting and 
motivating potential future suicide bombers; however, the driving force is mainly 
attributed to politics, humiliation, revenge, retaliation, and altruism. 
Terrorism, specifically suicide terrorism, offers a unique platform that is 
challenging to interpret (Atran, 2006). Atran (2006) related that rarely are suicide attacks 
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unmethodical or the targets unsystematically selected as individuals interested in carrying 
out a suicide terrorist attack perform hours of preoperational surveillance, tactical 
training, firearms and explosives training, as well as detailed planning of the clothing 
they will wear for the attack. In addition to its strategic advantages, suicide bombing has 
tactical advantages over more conventional terrorist attacks because it is very difficult to 
detect and stop such attacks (Cronin, 2003). In addition, because the death of the 
perpetrator is a desirable or acceptable outcome of the attack, more complex missions can 
be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route was needed (Paz, 2005). 
Thus, Paz (2005) related that the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the 
escape, which is unnecessary in a suicide attack. With no need for an escape plan, route, 
or means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise might 
be too difficult. Furthermore, Paz noted that suicide terrorism allows for precision in the 
location and timing of the attack and gives the bomber the option of selecting alternate 
targets if the original target is heavily defended or inaccessible.  
Part of the difficulty of organizing counterterrorism operations is the 
unpredictable nature of suicide bombings, which allow bombers maximum accessibility 
to high volume targets (Cronin, 2003). Cronin (2003) stated that attackers are intent on 
hurting or killing; therefore, they are willing to kill themselves in the process. As a result, 
decision makers and CTOs face many challenges in combating suicide terrorism (Fox, 
2014). By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack, decision makers and 
CTOs are better able to identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from 
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occurring (Fox, 2014). In Chapter 2, I include the introduction, literature search strategy, 
conceptual framework, background of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack, 
lone wolf suicide attacks, lessons learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism 
operations and methodologies, and a summary and conclusions. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Literature search strategies for this research included a comprehensive search in 
Walden University Library databases to include ProQuest Criminal Justice, Thoreau 
Multi-Database Search, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, 
Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism 
Reference Center, LexisNexis Academic, and SAGE Premier. In addition, I conducted 
searches through Google Scholar and relevant organizational websites such as the private 
intelligence company’s website that I used in this study. Key search terms included 
adversary planning, adversary strategy, suicide bombings, suicide attacks, and 
exploitable opportunities. Additional articles were examined after I reviewed the 
reference section from each article, book, dissertation, or thesis. 
Conceptual Framework 
By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack, decision makers and 
CTOs are better able to identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from 
occurring (Fox, 2014). Paul and Landree (2008) related that the more individuals 
involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand adversary strategies, the 
better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive strategies. The authors 
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argued that any planning process involved in an attack should be studied, which provides 
unique insights into various phases of the attack such as selecting a target, selecting the 
mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist operatives, and developing an operational plan. 
Paul and Landree noted that these decisions do not need to be made in a particular order. 
Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB 
framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases served as the conceptual 
frameworks of this study. This section is organized in the following subsections: 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, research application of intelligence preparation 
of the battlefield, modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield, research application 
of the modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield, nine preattack phases, and 
research application of the nine preattack phases.  
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
IPB is an analytic framework that the United States military uses to collect, 
organize, and process intelligence with respect to terror assaults in rural and urban areas 
of operation (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that IPB gives 
commanders and their staff information on the conditions within their operational area, 
such as areas of operation, interests, and battlespace that could affect the outcome of their 
mission. The researchers noted that identified conditions include relevant characteristics 
of the weather, terrain, population groups and subgroups, media, infrastructure, and 
threats. In addition, Medby and Glenn related that IPB provides a method of collecting 
information to describe and depict how each relevant characteristic influence the friendly 
26 
 
unit, enemy unit, and other groups in the operational area. Hence, commanders use IPB to 
make timely and accurate decisions.   
IPB is an ongoing cyclical process that involves four steps, which are as follows: 
(a) define the battlefield area, (b) describe the battlefield’s effects, (c) evaluate the threat, 
and (d) develop enemy courses of action (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. 13). In regard to Step 
1, define the battlefield area, Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that focus is placed on 
battlefield areas and characteristics, which shape the commander’s mission. Attention is 
also placed on obtaining the necessary intelligence to finish the IPB process in order to 
support the military decision-making process. Hence, specific environment features or 
activities within it, as well as the physical location that may influence friendly and enemy 
courses of action (COAs) or the commander’s decisions, are identified for additional 
analysis.  
In Step 1, four tasks are normally conducted: (a) define the AO, (b) define the 
area of interest (AOI), (c) define the battlespace, and (d) gather available intelligence and 
identify intelligence gaps (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. 14). For the first task, Medby and 
Glenn (2002) noted that the AO is a geographical area that includes the above airspace, 
which is assigned to a commander for military operations. The size of the AO depends on 
the “mission, enemy terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-
TC)” (p. 14) and “the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)” (p. 14) that are used by 
the unit. Most of the unit’s assets are deployed in the AO; thus, a lot of the intelligence 
effort is placed on this area. In Step 1, in relation to the AOI, which is the second task, 
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Medby and Glenn related that information and intelligence are obtained from a 
geographical area in order to allow planning or successful conduct of the command’s 
operation. The aim of the AOI delineation is to assist the command staff with predicting 
the elements beyond the AO that might influence the mission. The authors recommended 
that the AOI include combatant and noncombatant assets that could influence the friendly 
operation. Medby and Glenn noted that systems used to influence the AOI and 
battlespace goes beyond weaponry, such as civic affairs, public affairs, psychological 
operations, and other assets.  
In Step 1, the third task is defining the battlespace, which pertains to the 
conceptual physical volume where the commander plans to win against the enemy 
(Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted that the battlespace in 
influenced by time, tempo, depth, and synchronization. The battlespace pertains to the 
ability of the friendly unit to influence activities outside of the assigned AO; therefore, it 
might be very different from the AOI. During the fourth task, while the limits of the AO, 
AOI, and battlespace are determined, analysts begins to collect data on important aspects 
of their area of responsibility (AOR), which includes a combination of the AO, AOI, and 
the battlespace. Materials include maps, geographical surveys, demographic information, 
threat order of battle (OB), personality profiles, and the area’s historical accounts of 
activities. Using the information collected, analysts are able to identify important 
information gaps and work with their commanders to develop relevant questions called 
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commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) that guide the operation’s 
intelligence collection. 
In regard to Step 2, describe the battlefield’s effects, analysts show how the 
weather, terrain, and other battlefield factors can affect friendly and enemy operations 
within an AO, AOI, and battlespace (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) 
noted that the aim of this step is to allow commanders the ability to quickly choose and 
exploit the terrain as well as other factors such as whether, politics, and economics, in 
order to best support the friendly mission. The authors noted that two tasks are involved 
in this step. The first task is identifying the military aspects of the operational area, such 
as what is in the area that can affect the mission. Medby and Glenn shared that being able 
to discern the military features of the terrain normally includes identifying how the relief, 
structural, and vegetation features of the area serve or interfere with the military purpose. 
Medby and Glenn noted that military purposes include “observation and fields of fire, 
concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach,” (p. 18) which 
are also called OCOKA factors. The terrain features are examined to establish how they 
might be included in each of the OCOKA categories. The authors related that the second 
task is describing how identified characteristics will affect a unit’s operation in the area. 
The authors noted that after the military aspects are identified, they are used to illustrate 
how military operations are affected.  
In regard to Step 3, evaluate the threat, a profile of the enemy is developed 
(Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted that using information that was 
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obtained from national intelligence agencies and the unit’s intelligence assets, analysts 
determine enemy composition, strength, tactics, goals, and vulnerabilities. The authors 
related that despite the threat, an evaluation must include in-depth investigation of how it 
affects the friendly unit and how it will successfully achieve the assigned mission. In 
regard to Step 4, develop enemy courses of action, Medby and Glenn shared that this step 
combines the first three steps of the process in order to portray how the enemy will use 
terrain, whether, and current assets to obtain their goals within the chosen AO, AOI, or 
battlespace. Thus, analysts create templates to depict predicted enemy behavior 
throughout the AO. In addition, during this step, the authors noted that a consolidated list 
of all possible adversary COAs should be created.  
In summary, during the first three steps, information is compiled about certain 
features of the operational area (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted 
that the information compiled during the first three steps are consolidated during the 
fourth step and used to predict enemy COAs. The authors reported that the during each of 
the four steps, questions are asked and answered that help with coordinating 
reconnaissance and surveillance, managing intelligence-collection efforts, supplying 
location and asset information for the targeting process, and integrating battle damage 
assessment (BDA) into the execution of follow-on missions. When the operation has 
started, it is imperative that the IPB process continues in order to obtain additional 




Research Application of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
 Research is lacking on the application of Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic 
framework to suicide attacks; however, authors have written scholarly papers on this 
framework in relation to suicide attacks. On November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, India, 10 
armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), used military assault-style tactics 
to attack businesses, including restaurants and hotels (O’Rourke, 2010). O’Rourke (2010) 
reported that the attackers targeted one of India’s economic and social hub where at least 
172 people died, which generated a lot of media attention. The researcher noted that this 
attack showed a significant shift in tactics using suicide bombers and the placement of 
improvised explosive devices, which has important lessons for contemporary law 
enforcement agencies. O’Rourke reviewed the emergent challenges for policing 
organizations as a result of this attack.  
 The tactics used by terrorists have continuously evolved from the 1970s when 
groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took people hostage and 
made demands, thus, getting media coverage for their cause (O’Rourke, 2010). O’Rourke 
(2010) reported that police response to terrorism continues to be determined by the 
pattern where terrorists take hostages and use media to make terrorist demands to a 
worldwide audience. However, law enforcement officers are now challenged with the rise 
of suicide bombers as police officers are not able to isolate individuals or groups, and use 
negotiation tactics to obtain a resolution. Instead, police officers now have to deal with 
individuals or groups who place explosive devices on themselves or in places, denoting 
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them without making any demands. Lia (2007) posited that if the loss of lives and the 
atrocity committed are high, then there will be a lot of media coverage.  
 Terrorist or extremist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to 
have the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out 
similar attacks like the one in Mumbai, India (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke, 
2010). Sullivan (2008) related that societal changes are resulting in new models to collect 
and analyze intelligence that is needed for public policy and national security operations. 
O’Rourke (2010) discussed the need for predictive analysis or warning intelligence, 
which gives law enforcement agencies the ability to take action before a terrorist attack. 
Sullivan and Wirtz (2008) reported that the IPB military model can be adapted into a new 
approach called intelligence preparation for operations (IPO) and used by law 
enforcement officials.  
The IPO approach is a four-step process, which is as follows: (a) situational 
recognition, (b) analysis, (c) divining course of action, and (d) rehearsals (O’Rourke, 
2010, p. 50; Sullivan & Wirtz, 2008, p. 16). Sullivan and Wirtz shared that the first IPO 
step is to define the operational space, which may include planned events or targets that 
terrorists or criminal networks have identified. The second IPO step is to give basic 
information about operational spaces that are known in an easy to use format called target 
or response information folders that include information about the local populations, 
terrain, whether, and historical information about infrastructure and cultural areas. The 
third IPO step is identifying and evaluating threatening groups or people in relation to 
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weapons that they may use, such as chemical weapons, small arms, and explosives; as 
well as the tactics they may use in their planned activities, such as suicide bombing. In 
the fourth IPO step, potential courses of action are created for opposing and friendly 
units. The IPO model provides numerous scenarios; therefore, it can also be used to 
bridge the divide between deliberate and emergency response planning (O’Rourke, 
2010). O’Rourke (2010) noted that commanders are then able to create different 
responses and assess their suitability  
When discussing war with Iran, such as the use of limited air strike or full 
invasion, proponents for war often overstate the benefits, such as a preventing a nuclear 
disaster with Israel while concealing the costs, such as the number of fatality that would 
occur among U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines (Cummings & Cummings, 2012). 
Cummings and Cummings (2012) described possible Iranian responses to American and 
Israeli air strikes. The researchers used the Army’s IPB analytic tool to examine the 
operational war environment with Iran and broadly described Iran’s terrain. In addition, 
the researchers discussed how Iran’s military adopted asymmetric tactics to defeat their 
enemies, such as the United States. The researchers discussed a course of action that is 
available to Iran at sea, air, ground, in other countries, and the use of terrorism around the 
world.  
The United States could become involved in a secret war of terrorist attacks and 
special counterterrorism operations outside of Iran and the Persian Gulf (White, 2011). 
However, Byman (2013) argued that this kind of war is already taking place. According 
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to Bryman, Iran is a major sponsor of terrorism that strikes Israel, U.S. Arab allies, and 
U.S. citizens. The author discussed two blasts on November 19, 2013, that destroyed the 
Iranian embassy in Lebanon and killed at least 20 people. Bryman argued that these 
attacks are a reminder that Iran has a serious terrorism problem. Byman noted that the 
increasing violence further destabilizes the Middle East and negatively affects U.S. 
interests.  
Predicting how Iran will use terrorism is more challenging than conventional 
forms of warfare, which require weapons and vehicles (Cummings & Cummings, 2012). 
Cummings and Cummings (2012) emphasized that terrorism requires a great deal of 
planning such as 9/11, which required flight school training for at least eight individuals. 
The authors discussed Iran’s terrorism courses of action and noted that Iran could 
conduct cyber and terror attacks on Israel, the United States, Europe, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. The GCC includes six Middle Eastern countries, 
which are as follows: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, 
and Oman (“Gulf,” 2015). Cummings and Cummings concluded that the biggest threat 
for war with Iran is an out of control war. 
Modified Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
The ModIPB basic framework is derived from the U.S. Army IPB (Landree et al., 
2007). Landree et al. (2007) reported that due to the abundance of information in the 
public domain, being able to identify all the information that are essential to a potential 
target and evaluating its possible value to terrorist planners is overwhelming. Therefore, 
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Landree et al. created the ModIPB as a way to define the kinds of information most likely 
to be useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets. In the ModIPB, Landree 
et al. identified four main categories of information where all possible relevant 
information requirements are grouped: (a) approach avenues and ease of access (b) target 
features, (c) security, and (d) threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations (p. 19). The 
researchers noted that the first two categories pertain to IPB concerns with battlefield 
environment and effects, which are the first two IPB steps. The third category is drawn 
from the third IPB step, evaluate the threat. The fourth category is based on the threat 
evaluation and the development of the enemy COAs, which are the third and fourth IPB 
steps. 
The first category, approach avenues and ease of access, include multiple 
elements such as target location and surrounding terrain and buildings, such as maps, 
blueprints, types of building construction, critical points, and OCOKA factors (Landree et 
al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) also noted that the first category includes available paths 
to target, such as the exact paths to take, go or no-go areas due to barriers, obstructions, 
or impassable terrains, restricted areas or limited access due to security restrictions, rules 
or laws governing movement in target area, and traffic conditions in relation to vehicles 
and pedestrians. The researchers related that well planned terrorist attacks require 
planning about how attackers will reach the target such as the use of scenarios about how 
attackers will be at a certain place at an exact time in order to carry out a coordinated 
attack or multiple attacks, or an attack against a moving target. In addition, terrorists do 
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not want to be identified; thus, planning includes the exact paths they will take. Terrorists 
who plan overt attacks may be concerned about whether they will be seen, the presence 
of physical obstacles, and time and place of the greatest risk where they may be seen by 
security forces or pedestrians. 
Features of the second category, target features, may overlap with those in the 
first category, approach avenues and ease of access (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. 
(2007) noted that elements of target features include attack and target. The researchers 
related that attack pertains to the possible locations from which to launch an attack and 
possible times to launch an attack. Landree et al. reported that target includes the mobility 
and variability of the target. If the target is mobile, the predictable path it takes is 
considered. Target also includes important features and structure of the target, such as 
technical details. The researcher shared that elements included in the third category, 
security, include security forces, security measures, and other population groups that are 
present. Landree et al. noted that security forces include the size and types of security 
forces, such as armed and unarmed, plainclothes, canine, and mounted, along with their 
jurisdiction. The researchers shared that security measures include specific 
countermeasures as well as checkpoints use and function, and sensors such as cameras, 
scanners, and other detection equipment. Other population groups include nonsecurity 
force workers in the operations area. Landree et al. related that terrorists assess who these 
workers are, when they may be present, and what they do in the operational area. The 
researchers noted that terrorist planning also includes knowing whether nonsecurity 
36 
 
workers have had training or have been given instructions that might increase their 
contribution to security.  
The fourth category, threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations, includes 
threats posed by security forces and security measures, threats posed by employees of the 
target, concentrations and heightened vigilance of citizens, and how weather affects 
operation effectiveness (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007, p. 19) noted that the 
elements in this category are assessed based on the information that was collected in the 
first three categories. In addition, the researchers shared that the elements in this category 
provide an estimate of how information may affect the terrorist attack operation from 
terrorists’ perspectives, as they are the ones collecting the information. 
Research Application of the Modified Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
Obtaining information that is relevant to planning terrorist attacks from available 
public sources is valuable to terrorist planners because it can normally be obtained at 
lower cost, risk, and effort than more direct forms of gathering information such as 
observation of a possible target (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) developed 
the ModIPB framework to guide assessments of available information that is used for 
planning attacks on the U.S. air, rail, and sea transportation infrastructure. Even though 
the study was conducted in 2007, it is very relevant and applicable to this research study. 
The researchers applied the ModIPB framework in a red team information gathering 
exercise. The red team served as substitutes for terrorists seeking information about each 
of the potential six attack scenarios. The red team exercise represented the beginning of 
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detailed operation planning and no information was assumed to have already been 
collected. Information gathering for operational planning was conducted without travel to 
the target site and through very low-risk or no-risk information gathering activities, 
specifically, public source, off-site research. Using the ModIPB framework as a guide, 
the researchers instructed the red team to obtain information to complete an operational 
plan for each of the six scenarios. 
The six scenarios were as follows: (a) a poison gas attack on the New York City 
(NYC) subway at 42nd station street, (b) bomb in a passenger plane cargo hold at the Los 
Angeles International Airport (LAX), (c) shipping a nuclear device in a cargo container 
through Los Angeles, Long Beach (LA/LB), (d) Madrid-style bomb attack on commuter 
train in the NYC East River tunnel, (e) man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) 
attack on a flight bound into LAX, and (f) suicide boat rams a docked cruise ship at the 
Port of Los Angeles (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) noted that the red team 
exercise was subjected to three levels of validation: (a) a review by subject matter experts 
(SMEs), (b) a review based on interviews conducted with transportation infrastructure 
insiders, and (c) an assessment comparing the results obtained by a research and 
development (RAND) expert who was tasked with the same exercise to those by the 
team. Findings indicated that the ModIPB framework was beneficial in directing analyses 
of publicly available information that would be needed to plan terrorist attacks across 
numerous transportation infrastructure targets and attack methods. Thus, Landree et al. 
found that the ModIPB was applicable to the problem of identifying information that 
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might reveal vulnerabilities in those systems. In addition, the researchers found that when 
this framework was applied, it became clear what types of information were relatively 
hard versus relatively easy to find for the six scenarios. Landree et al. discussed two 
implications in relation to the availability of information. First, the researchers related 
that although the results indicated that a lot of information that are relevant to the 
execution of a particular terrorist attack is available, much of the information is not 
detailed enough to allow terrorists to carry out attacks with a high level of confidence that 
the attacks will be successful. Second, information that are useful to terrorists can be 
obtained from nonobvious sources, such as official and company websites, and 
newspaper articles. However, the researchers noted that the information provided from 
these sources does not create a threat to operational security.  
Based on the findings, Landree et al. (2007) proposed two recommendations to 
assist infrastructure owners increase security. First, the researchers recommended that 
infrastructure owners conduct periodic reviews and revise procedures for operational and 
information security in order to prevent security details from entering the public domain. 
Second, Landree et al. recommended that owners and operators of transportation 
businesses include information that can be obtained from easily accessible, off-site public 
information sources in vulnerability assessments. For example, the researchers noted that 
owners and operators of transportation businesses should assess the specific 
vulnerabilities created by public knowledge of passenger travel information such as 
39 
 
schedules, costs, and security procedures that passengers need in order to address them 
through countermeasures.  
Nine Preattack Phases 
Before a terrorist attack, individuals who are involved join a terrorist group; get 
training; plan the attack; obtain finances, weapons, and other materials; and prepare or 
rehearse for the final attack (Freeman et al., 2010). To incorporate these activities, 
Freeman et al. (2010) created nine different phases. Freeman et al. shared that each of the 
phases was created to be distinct as possible from the others; however, they recognized 
that some of the phases may overlap or that it may be challenging to differentiate when 
actual cases are coded. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases are as follows (p. 77):  
1. Networking and indoctrination: In this phase, cell members are introduced and 
exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious 
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities.  
2. Terrorist training: This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell 
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities. 
3. General planning: In this phase, the decision to conduct a terrorist attack is 
made as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships, 
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers. In addition, general shopping for potential 
targets is performed. 
4. Recruitment: In this phase, senior terrorist elements select and activate cell 
members for a certain terrorist operation. Similar to 9/11, it is assumed that 
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there is a senior element that helps with recruitment and personnel selection. 
However, in the terrorist group that carried out the attacks on the London 
mass transit system on July 7, 2005, also called 7 July attacks or 7/7 attacks, 
this may not have been the case (Freeman et al., 2010; Ray, 2016). 
Nevertheless, Freeman et al. noted that in groups like this, a recruitment and 
selection process still occurs as preexisting groups of friends and 
acquaintances go through the radicalization process that results in a group 
committed to an attack.  
5. Financing: In this phase, funds are collected and allocated for a certain 
terrorist attack. For example, the money came before the decision to conduct 
an attack was made when a cell within the al-Qa’ida network carried out the 
attack on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000 (Freeman et al., 2010; 
Pearl & O’Rourke, 2001). 
6. Operational planning: In this phase, the specific target is selected, detail 
reconnaissance of the target is conducted, and specific operation planning 
takes place such as the delivery and procurement methods.  
7. Weapons procurement: In the phase, materials for the construction of 
explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack is obtained or received, 
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets.  
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8. Logistical preparation: In this phase, logistical actions are taken in order to 
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and 
document procurement, and electronics purchase.  
9. Operational preparation: In this phase, physical preparations for the imminent 
terrorist attack takes place, including explosive construction, vehicle 
alteration, specific explosives training, and multimedia preparation and 
creation.  
In Table 1 below, I compare Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, 
Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, and Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB 
framework. I also included al-Qa’ida’s (1988/2002) planning phases for comparison with 
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Research Application of the Nine Preattack Phases 
To determine whether terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in their 
preattack activities, Freeman et al. (2010, p. 75) divided terrorists’ preattack activities 
into nine phases: networking, training, general planning, attack-specific recruitment, 
financing, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation, and 
operational preparation. Using these nine phases, the researchers examined 21 terrorist 
attack cases (e.g., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 9/11, 2007 Fort Dix plot, and 2007 
John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport plot) and two school attacks (1999 
Columbine shooting and 2007 Virginia Tech shooting) that are not normally considered 
terrorist attacks since there were no contributing political factors. For each case, the 
researchers investigated whether there was evidence of when terrorists or attackers took 
part in activities across the nine phases. The researchers noted that the cases were not 
chosen randomly, thus, conclusions must be tentatively interpreted. Instead, Freeman et 
al. related that the cases were chosen based on two criteria: (a) cases where the 
researchers expected to obtain data on the different phases and (b) cases where the 
researchers could obtain a lot of variation. Variations included big cases such as 9/11, 
smaller attacks such as the LAX Millennium plot, al-Qa’ida attacks, attacks by other 
groups, nonmaritime attacks, successful attacks, failed attacks, and cases that were 
thwarted. By including different types of cases, the researchers were able to see if they fit 
the larger overall pattern. 
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Findings indicated that the nine phases fell into three stages (Freeman et al., 
2010). Freeman et al. (2010) related that Stage 1 included Phases 1 through 3, which are 
planning, training, and networking. This stage takes place 1 year or more in advance of 
the attacks. Stage 2 included Phases 4 and 5, which are recruitment and financing. This 
stage takes place 6 months to 1 year in advance of an attack. Stage 3 includes Phases 6 
through 9, which are operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation, 
and operational preparation. This stage takes place closest to the attack, normally within a 
few months before the attack is carried out. The researchers noted that these three stages 
are robust across types and scales of attacks and the researchers suggested that these 
stages might be used as an indication of the timing of possible future attacks.  
Decision makers and CTOs are faced with many challenging situations in 
combating global terrorism (Fox, 2014). Seeking to add a new quantitative aspect to 
Freeman et al.’s (2010) work, Fox (2014) examined the use of a hybrid multiattribute 
decision-making approach, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and technique of order 
preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), to rank order the nine phases of a 
terrorist attack based on data from 21 different terrorist attacks. Thus, Fox used the AHP 
and the TOPSIS to interpret the data into a better understanding of which terrorist attack 
phases to focus intelligence collection. When AHP was the only decision-making 
approach used, Fox found that terrorist training, networking, planning, and operational 
prep made up over 65% of the ranking weights. On the other hand, when TOPSIS was 
used, the top four ranked ordering were operational prep, recruitment, terrorist training, 
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and terrorist networking, which accounted for over 76% of the ranking weights. Fox 
noted that both the AHP and the TOPSIS identified planning as the most detectable 
phase, followed by recruitment, financing, logistic prep, weapons procurement, 
operational planning, terrorist training, operational prep, and networking, respectively. 
Fox concluded that by having the correct focal point, decision makers and CTOs have 
insight into options and connected events, which increases their ability to prevent attacks.  
Background of Terrorist Attacks 
 While the evolution of U.S. national security policy began with the end of the 
Cold War and the rise of radicalized terrorism, the first identified terrorist group dates 
from 66 A.D. to 73 A.D., when a Jewish group called Sicarii tried to displace the Romans 
and their Jewish supporters from the Judean Region (Harmon, Pratt, & Gorka, 2011). 
Kramer and Pape (2005) related that modern-day tactics such as suicide bombings began 
in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1981. This method was first implemented during a bombing attack 
against the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2014) reported that on 
April 18, 1983, an individual strapped with explosive devices drove a truck toward the 
U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The suicide driver detonated a 2,000-pound bomb that killed 63 
people, including 17 Americans and injured 120 individuals in the nearby perimeter. The 
bombing was carried out by a previously unknown group, Islamic Jihad, known today as 
Hezbollah, the Party of God. Friedman (1998) reported that 6 months later, on October 
23, 1983, Hezbollah struck the building housing the U.S. Marine’s peacekeeping force in 
Beirut using a suicide truck bomb. Friedman related that most of those killed were asleep 
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in their bunks when the explosion occurred at 6:20 a.m. The researcher explained that the 
incident killed 241 Americans and injured 81 individuals. Friedman noted that 
approximately 2 minutes later, Hezbollah also struck the French barracks in Beirut, 
killing 58 French soldiers. Ganor (2003) reported that the motive behind the embassy and 
barracks attacks was to pressure the multinational peacekeeping force to leave Lebanon. 
In the wake of these attacks, both the U.S. and France withdrew their forces from 
Lebanon. 
 Even though there is Islamic teachings against suicide and the killing of innocent 
people, terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State or ISIS or ISIL have used 
Islamism, which is a political form of Islam, to substantiate their terrorist actions 
(Constitutional Rights Foundation [CRF], 2016). In this study, the Islamic State will be 
referred to as ISIS. The CRF (2016) reported that Osama bin Laden founded al-Qa’ida in 
1988 and this terrorist group committed many terrorist acts, killing numerous men, 
women, and children. The CRF related that al-Qa’ida was responsible for the 1998 
terrorist attacks at U.S. embassies in the East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania, 
which killed 12 Americans and approximately 250 Africans, many of whom were 
Muslims (para. 2). In addition, the CRF noted that this group was also responsible for 
9/11, where suicide attackers killed approximately 3,000 people (para. 2). In 2003, al-
Qa’ida suicide terrorists killed 35 people, including 12 Americans, when they set off 
bombs in three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (CRF. 2016). Other terrorist 
groups linked to al-Qa’ida were responsible for the 2005 subway bombings in London 
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that killed 56 people and the 2008 shootings and bombings in Mumbai, India, which 
killed over 160 people (CRF, 2016, para. 3). The CRF shared that in 2010, a bomber tried 
to set off a car bomb in New York City’s Times Square.  
 ISIS has risen to power in the Middle East and has developed an ideology that is 
more extreme and brutal than other terrorist groups (CRF, 2016). The CRF (2016) noted 
that this group has seized territories in Iraq and Syria, driving many Syrians from their 
homes. The CRF reported that another jihadist group, Boko Haran, organized a militant 
rebellion against the Nigerian government. Boko Haram goal is to conquer Christian-
dominated areas in Southern Nigeria and instill an Islamist government for the whole 
nation (CRF, 2016). This group targets Muslims and Christians in violent raids and 
assaults (CRF, 2016). The CRF shared that Boko Haram received the world’s attention in 
2014 when members of the group kidnapped 276 school girls from a government 
secondary school in Chibok (para. 43). The majority of the girls were Christians and were 
forced to convert to Islam. Only a few were rescued as many were sold into slavery, 
forced into marriages, and brainwashed to become Boko Haram fighters (CRF, 2016). 
The CRF related that Boko Haram was originally allies with al-Qa’ida, but in 2015, the 
group announced its support for ISIS.  
The events that occurred on 9/11 sparked an urgent need to understand whether 
terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in their preattack activities (Freeman et al., 
2010; Fox, 2014). With regard to terrorism in Israel, the ability of terror organizations to 
successfully target civilian or nonmilitary objectives in Israel is achieved not through 
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capture of land but by instilling fear in the civilian population (Dolnik, 2007). To achieve 
its goal, terror organizations study potential targets to reveal community vulnerabilities 
and exploit those vulnerabilities for terrorist attacks (Dolnik, 2007). Paul and Landree 
(2008) related that even the most complex events such as terrorist acts have certain 
patterns that can be studied and exploited to prevent future occurrences; therefore, by 
understanding the processes by which the adversary plans and executes its attack, 
counterterrorism professionals can allocate resources and countermeasures to effectively 
thwart the adversary’s planning process or mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. 
Suicide Attackers 
Understanding terrorists’ mental state may provide important insight that may be 
used to create counterterrorism methodologies. Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) 
analyzed the characteristics of lone actors with regard to their behaviors prior to an attack 
as well as their sociodemographic background. The researchers found that network 
connectivity and ideologies did not reveal a uniform profile of the attacker; however, 
there were interesting findings with regard to transience and social isolation. Findings 
indicated that approximately half of the attackers had changed their address within 5 
years before the attack. Findings also revealed that social isolation was a common trait 
among attackers, where more than 52.9% were described as socially isolated and at least 
37% of the attackers lived alone at the time of the planning or attack (p. 6). Findings from 
the study contributed to an overall understanding of the very early adversary planning 
phases and how attackers’ surroundings influenced their terrorist transformation. 
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 A single profile of suicide bombers does not exist (Merari, 2000). Merari (2000) 
profiled more than 50 identified radical Islamists who used suicide bombing and served 
in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as in Hamas 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Merari concluded that there is no single psychological or 
demographic profile of suicide terrorists. The researcher related that as a group, suicide 
attackers are rational and do not suffer from psychopathology. While no single profile of 
suicide bombers exists, certain trends, descriptive statistics, and social factors are 
nevertheless useful in developing an understanding of suicide bombers. Given the 
complexity and ongoing difficulties of successfully identifying, profiling, and preventing 
terror attacks, particularly suicide bombings, there is a need for scholars to examine 
differences in the processes, preparation, and execution of both successful and 
unsuccessful attacks, including terrorists’ motivation, resources, recruitment, and 
planning activities. The response to such asymmetrical challenges is constantly being 
reevaluated due to past ineffective practices in countering them. Terrorists learn from 
each other’s successes and failures and adapt their tactics accordingly (Atran, 2006). 
Atran (2006) related that historical successes and the difficulties inherent in preventing 
suicide bombing incidents have led to much more imitation than innovation in the 
evolution of suicide bombing tactics.  
Understanding perpetrators of attacks and events that may have led to their 
decision to execute an attack are crucial factors for preventing future attacks. Pape (2008) 
created a database of all suicide bombing and attacks that took place around the world 
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from 1980 to 2003, which was the first complete data created. The researcher found that 
315 attacks were carried out and at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while 
trying to kill others (p. 129). Pape excluded attacks that were authorized by a national 
government. Pape found that the connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism or any other religion was small. The researcher found that the leading 
suicide attackers were the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group whose 
members were from Hindu families who were opposed to religion. Findings indicated 
that the Tamil Tigers committed 76 of the 315 attacks, which was more than Hamas (p. 
130). Pape related that what nearly all the suicide attackers had in common was a secular 
and strategic goal of forcing modern democracies to withdraw their military forces from 
territories that the terrorists believed to be their homeland. Thus, Pape explained that 
religion was hardly the main cause of terrorist attacks; however, it was used as a tool to 
recruit and used as to tool to obtain broader strategic objectives.  
General patterns in the data supported Pape’s (2008) conclusions. First, findings 
indicated that almost all of the suicide attacks occurred as part of organized campaigns 
and not as isolated incidents. From the 315 separate attacks, 301 had roots traced to large, 
coherent political or military campaigns (p. 130). Second, Pape found that democratic 
states were vulnerable to suicide attacks, such as Israel, the United States, France, India, 
Russia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Pape found that for the past 2 decades, these countries 
have been targets of nearly every suicide attack. Third, findings indicated that suicide 
campaigns were directed toward a strategic objective, such as in Israel, where the 
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sponsors of the terrorist campaigns have been terrorist group who tried to create or 
maintain political self-determination by forcing a democratic power to withdraw from 
their claimed territories. For example, Pape noted that Osama bin Laden’s objective was 
to expel American troops from the Persian Gulf and to reduce Washington’s power and 
influence in the region.   
Suicide terrorists do not have considerable psychopathology and they are 
similarly educated and have similar economic means as their surrounding populations 
(Atran, 2003). While Pape (2008) concluded that suicide bombers may be from middle-
class families and have secular educations, Atran (2003) noted that most individuals who 
volunteer or are selected to carry out attacks regard religion as an important personal 
value. Freeman et al. (2010) related that while terror organizational members in groups 
such as al-Qa’ida and Hezbollah have carried out carefully planned attacks and 
assassinations in efforts to make nonreligious political gains, religious motives have 
frequently played a role in the decisions of suicide bombers. Atran reported that their 
religious beliefs allow them to justify attacks as a battle against threats to Islam, claiming 
that their actions are sanctioned by their Islamic religion. Atran related that the 
importance of religion in the lives of suicide bombers indicate that suicide terrorism is 
not one dimensional. Freeman et al. shared that modern strategic logic of suicide bombers 
usually incorporates both secular and religious ideals. 
Suicide terrorists have certain personality traits that may lead them to kill 
themselves and murder others (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy (2006) related that those traits 
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include antisocial behavior, authoritarian personality, dependency, narcissism, paranoia, 
and detachment. The researcher related that other factors include extramarital pregnancy, 
sterility, or a desire for revenge for prior perceived injustices perpetrated by government 
entities or other rivaling groups. Kennedy cautioned that although the character traits may 
be shared by individuals engaging in terrorist activities, they are also present in 
individuals who do not engage in terrorist activities, which shows the complexity of 
creating a psychological profile of terrorists. Due to the limitations of psychological 
profiling, behavioral profiling is also used by military, police, and security personnel who 
monitor critical infrastructure for evidence of terrorist activity and the presence of suicide 
bombers (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy discussed suspicious activities that might be 
precursors to a suicide attack; however, the researchers argued that the inability to create 
a clear profile of a terrorist make counterterrorism and the prevention of suicide attacks 
during the operational phase an especially difficult and complex task. 
Suicide Attacks 
 In this section, I provide an overview of suicide attacks. I also discuss suicide 
attacks in Israel. I organized this section in the following subsections: overview, suicide 
attacks in Israel, target selection and execution, and after attack responses.  
Overview 
In many instances, suicide attackers are not irrational individuals, but instead are 
driven by social and political motivations (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy (2006) asserted that 
unconventional use of violence, including suicide terrorism, can be effectively used by 
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individuals or groups because it allows them to maximize the number of casualties and 
the emotional effect that such a seemingly desperate attack will have on a broader 
audience (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy reported that from 1980 to 2003, only 3% of 
terrorist incidents were attributed to suicide attacks, but such attacks were responsible for 
48% of the casualties inflicted (p. 1). The researcher noted that suicide attack is a highly 
potent tactic that is continually used due to its ability to force troop withdrawals and 
obtain other goals in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the West Bank, Turkey, and 
Spain (Kennedy, 2006). Bakken (2007) agreed with Kennedy and related that while 
suicide terrorism is viewed by many as an insane act, it is a very deliberate and effective 
tactic. 
Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and 
COIN professionals. In asymmetric warfare, where the military power differs 
significantly between two rivals, suicide bombings are often used as the smaller weaker 
group attacks the stronger one (Saxton, 2016). Straoke (2007) discussed the use of 
suicide bombing as a tactical means of asymmetric warfare in Iraq. The author related 
that after the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, the primary strategic objective of the Iraqi 
insurgent movement was to liberate Iraq from foreign occupation. Straoke reported that 
two other objectives emerged: (a) to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq and (b) to 
undermine the postinvasion political arrangements putting pressure on the Iraqi 
government to resign. These two objectives led to a final objective, which was to free 
Iraq from the United States and its agents. To accomplish their primary objectives, Iraqi 
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insurgents used political and military tactics, with suicide bombing being the tactic most 
widely used.  
In addition to its strategic advantages, suicide bombing has tactical advantages 
over more conventional terrorist attacks because it is very difficult to detect and stop 
(Cronin, 2003). Cronin (2003) stated that suicide attackers are so intent on hurting or 
killing that they are willing to kill themselves in the process. Paz (2005) related that since 
the death of the perpetrator is desirable or is an acceptable outcome of the attack, more 
complex missions can be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route 
was needed. Hence, the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the escape, 
which is unnecessary in a suicide attack (Paz, 2005). With no need for an escape plan, 
route, or means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise 
might be too difficult (Paz, 2005). In addition, Paz related that suicide attacks allow for 
precision in the location and timing of the attack and gives the bomber the option of 
selecting alternate targets if the original target is heavily defended or inaccessible. 
Suicide Attacks in Israel 
 The global terrorism index (GTI) report includes a comprehensive summary of 
key global trends and patterns in terrorism, from 2000 to 2013 (IEP, 2014). The IEP 
(2014) created the GTI with data from the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) global terrorism database (GTD). The 
IEP reported that the GTD is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorism activity 
worldwide, with over 125,000 terrorist incidents categorized. According to the IEP, since 
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2000, the number of deaths attributed to terrorism has increased 5-fold, from 3,361 in 
2000 to 17,958 in 2013 (p. 2). However, the IEP noted that for 4 years, beginning in 
2007, there was a modest decrease in terrorist deaths and a small decrease in the number 
of countries experiencing greater than 50 deaths from terrorism each year (p. 2). The IEP 
reported that the largest increase in terrorist activity can be attributed to the start of the 
2011 Syrian Civil War.  
 Terrorism is a major national security problem for many countries (IEP, 2014). 
The IEP (2014) noted that most terrorist-related deaths (66%) in 2013 are claimed by four 
terrorist organizations, which are ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (p. 2). 
The IEP related that the recent rise of extreme violent groups such as ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq and greater territorial ambitions in the Levant, which includes the countries of Syria, 
Israel, Lebanon, Jordon, Palestine, and Southern Turkey, increases the risk of further 
destabilization in the Middle East region. According to the IEP, al-Qa’ida members view 
the West as allied to Israel and believe that this relationship is attributed to the poverty of 
many Muslim countries. As a result, al-Qa’ida’s goal is to eradicate the Muslim world of 
Western influence and implement an Islamic state under Sharia law. The IEP related that 
the findings provided guidance in assessing the risk of future terrorist attacks in countries 
where there are currently low levels of activity. The IEP claimed that when different 
political, social, and violent indications are measured and compared, countries at risk of a 
major increase in terrorism can be identified. The IEP found that 13 countries were at risk 
for an increase in terrorism, which includes Israel. The other 12 countries identified were 
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Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iran, 
Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.  
 From 2000 to 2013, 5% of all terrorist-related deaths have occurred in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (IEP, 2014, 
p. 35). OECD refers to a forum where governments from 23 democracies with market 
economies and 70 nonmembers work together to foster economic growth, prosperity, and 
sustainable development (United States Mission to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [USOECD], 2016). The IEP (2014) related that with the 
exclusion of the United States, Israel and Turkey experienced the highest number of 
deaths. In 2012, eight OECD countries experienced deadly terrorist attacks compared to 
20 OECD countries that have had deadly terrorist attacks since 2000 (p. 3). The IEP 
related that from 2000 to 2013, the rate of suicide attacks has increased, but the areas 
where most of the attacks occurred have changed. From 2000 to 2003, most suicide 
attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (p. 34). However, in 2003, a truce 
started that led to the gradual decline of suicide attacks and in 2006, Hamas won a 
majority in the Palestinian legislative election and condemned the use of suicide 
bombing, which reduced this tactic. From 2008 to 2013, the IEP reported that in Israel, 
both the political process and counterterrorism activities led to a considerable decease in 
terrorist activities from Hamas, the al-Asqa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad. The IEP noted that with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, suicide bombing started and 
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Iraq accounted for 43% of all suicide attack deaths in the last decade (p. 34). However, 
the IEP related that proportionately, suicide attacks still remain low.  
 In OECD countries, from 2000 to 2013, the United States had the highest number 
of deaths from suicide attacks with 3,042, with 2,996 deaths attributed to 9/11 (IEP, 
2014, p. 35). The IEP (2014) found that Israel had the second highest number of deaths 
with 841 or 17% of all fatalities (p. 35). In 2013, OECD countries with the highest 
number of terrorist-related deaths were the United Kingdom (UK) with 131 deaths (88% 
in Northern Ireland), Turkey had 50 fatalities, and Mexico had 40 fatalities (p. 35). In 
2013, Israel had 24 fatalities from terrorist attacks (p. 35). Israel was also on the list of 
countries that may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing conflicts.  
 In 2008, two terrorists armed with suicide bombs arrived at an open public 
marketplace in Dimona, which is small city in Israel (Amital et al., 2012). Amital (2012) 
reported that two terrorists from the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades terrorist squad from the 
Hebron Hamas organization carried suicide bombs to an open public marketplace. One of 
the suicide attackers denoted his bomb, which inadvertently injured the second suicide 
attacker and the bomb killed one woman and injured 48 people. The researchers shared 
that this was the first suicide attack in Dimona. Amital et al. compared the differences in 
emotions and disturbances in daily life activities 2 days after the suicide attack in Dimona 
between the self-reported resilient and low-resilient population and Israel’s general 
population. The researchers conducted telephone surveys with a random sample of 678 
adults (428 Israeli residents and 250 Dimona residents; pp. 281–282). Findings indicated 
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significantly higher prevalence of stress and fear and lower prevalence of joy among the 
Dimona population compared to the general Israel population. The researchers also found 
a significant higher prevalence of disturbances in daily life activities and changes in 
leisure activity in the self-reported low-resilient Dimona population. In addition, findings 
indicated a higher percentage of adverse emotional responses in the Dimona population at 
the early phase after a terrorist attack compared to the general Israel population. The 
researchers recommended that the differences found between the two populations should 
be addressed by social services following terrorist incidents.  
 Following 9/11, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and widespread 
anxiety have occurred among individuals who have been directly and indirectly exposed 
to terrorist attacks (Shalev et al., 2006). Shalev et al. (2006) evaluated the effects of 
continuous terror by examining the prevalence of PTSD, PTSD symptoms, and 
symptoms of general distress in individuals who lived in two different suburbs in 
Jerusalem, Israel, a directly exposed community and an indirectly exposed community. 
During the 8 months before data collection, the directly exposed community experienced 
higher rates of suicide attack while the indirectly exposed community did not. 
Participants included 167 individuals who were indirectly exposed to terrorist acts and 89 
individuals who were not indirectly exposed. Findings indicated similar PTSD prevalence 
and similar levels of PTSD intensity and general distress in the two populations. Thus, 
exposure to discrete events may not be a necessary mediator of terror threat. The 
researchers also found equal exposure of men and women to terrorist incidents and equal 
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prevalence of PTSD in both genders. In addition, the researchers found an unequal 
distribution of PTSD symptoms, where 25% of the population was highly symptomatic 
while others expressed low symptom levels (p. 672). Many of the participants met the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV) symptom criteria 
without simultaneously reporting significant distress and impairment. Furthermore, the 
researchers found that disruption of daily living significantly contributed to PTSD 
symptoms.  
Target Selection and Execution 
It is important to understand the methods utilized for target selection by 
adversaries. Berman and Laitin (2005) discussed adversaries’ selection of hard and soft 
targets. According to the authors, soft targets have little or no military protection or 
security. Berman and Laitin reported that soft targets can include commercial and private 
sectors as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are 
under minimal security, such as nightclubs, schools, movie theaters, and malls. The 
researchers noted that groups who are not part of a central terror organization, but are 
loosely affiliated, are often unable to attack hard targets and as a result, tend to focus on 
soft targets. On the other hand, Berman and Laitin related that hard targets have some 
degree of military protection or security, making escape scenarios unlikely, and usually 
requires the penetration of various layers of security by the adversary at the time of the 
attack. The authors noted that there is a risk of being intercepted, often with potentially 
lethal force. Hard targets can force attackers either to escalate the size and force used, 
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identify a vulnerability that can be exploited, or risk failure. Hard targets include airports, 
military bases, political organizations, and high-ranking politicians and heads of state, 
such as presidents (Stewart, 2012). Berman and Laitin related that suicide attacks are 
more likely used against well protected hard targets than against poorly defended soft 
targets.  
In 1993, approximately 10 years after the suicide attacks began in Lebanon, 
Palestinian groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad began using suicide bombers 
against Israeli targets in an attempt to disrupt talks for a potential peace process (Dodd, 
2013). Dodd (2013) reported that many of these attacks were deliberately targeted to 
cause the most damage to civilians. At least 742 civilians were killed and 4,899 were 
wounded by suicide bombings in Israel and Palestinian territories (Dodd, 2013, para. 47). 
Kaplan, Mintz, and Mishal (2006) noted that suicide bombings were the leading cause of 
death from terrorism in Israel. Although terrorists often choose symbolic targets, they 
target high trafficked areas when the opportunity arises (Ganor 2015). Ganor (2015) 
argued that terrorists often select their targets based on their assessment of potential 
attack consequences in terms of loss of life, injuries, economic, and other costs. 
Due to the threat of suicide bombing in the United States and other countries, 
Perry et al. (2013) created a method for predicting determinants of suicide bombing 
attacks. Perry et al. examined suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem, Haifa, 
Tel Aviv, and Netanya. The researchers focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, al-
Asqa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In their aim to discover 
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terrorist group target preferences in suicide terrorism, Perry et al. examined spatial 
preference patterns; specifically, how terrorist groups develop target preferences and the 
transferring of these preference patterns. In addition, the researchers examined 
sociocultural, socioeconomic, demographic, and political aspects of the suicide attacks. 
The researchers found several commonalities between previous suicide bombings, where 
attacks were significantly correlated with Jewish holidays, when the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) conducted operations, and when political negotiations were taking place 
among Israeli and Arab leaders. The researchers related that attacks following IDF 
operations were more of a revenge tactic from terrorists due to an arrest or assassination 
of a known terrorist. The researchers noted that attacks that have occurred when political 
negotiations were taking place may be attributed to terrorist need for conflict, to prove 
their presence, and remind Israelis that the war was not over just because negotiations 
were taking place.  
Findings also indicated that there were similarities among the suicide bombing 
locations where suicide attackers targeted accessible crowds (Perry et al., 2013). Perry et 
al. (2013) emphasized that groups were not randomly targeted and over one-third (36%) 
of attacks were repeat strikes on locations that were previously attacked (p. 47). Thus, 
past attack locations should be considered very high risk for future suicide attacks. Along 
with places where people congregate, places that were well known were often attacked 




After Attack Responses 
Law enforcement response can also be an influential factor in how individuals or 
groups choose their targets. Based on historical emergency responses, many individuals 
who engage in terrorist activities consider precise timing, communication, and state or 
federal responses (Everbridge Organization, 2014). The Everbridge Organization (2014) 
evaluated the response of the Boston authorities to the 2013 Boston Bombings as 
satisfactory. Their findings highlighted that law enforcement officials in the area 
effectively conducted media briefings that relayed essential information between law 
enforcement and Boston residents. These briefings included key information on the safety 
measures to be taken by civilians such as staying in their homes and reporting anything 
that may be classified as unusual. The Everbridge Organization reported that there was 
unconditional cooperation among networks and sources that allowed everyone to be 
informed as the incident progressed. The Everbridge Organization highlighted law 
enforcement’s exceptional communication efforts, networking connections, and 
execution plan used in the Boston Bombing response. Therefore, Boston law enforcement 
used their extensive planning and preparation in their response to this emergency by 
effectively executing the search for perpetrators. In addition, the Everbridge Organization 
related that law enforcement demonstrated the importance of staying connected among 
networks and authorities during the emergency, and maintaining strong communication 
between networks and residents. 
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Similarly, other researchers highlighted Boston first responders’ multidimensional 
preparedness. Leonard, Cole, Howitt, and Heymann (2014) discussed Boston authorities’ 
strong execution in terms of their command and coordination as the attack was taking 
place as well as the immediate aftermath of the attack. The researchers noted that the 
level of response by the authorities, including constantly providing instructions and 
updating citizens, helped to maintain a state of general composure. In addition, the 
communication efforts expanded beyond the authorities and included the private sector. 
Leonard et al. related that the private sector protocol among businesses allowed for 
additional assistance to Boston residents. Furthermore, the researchers explained the 
effectiveness of the established emergency plans that were implemented by the 
authorities. Thus, effective emergency planning allowed for the best possible outcome 
with the least amount of casualties and inefficiencies. Leonard et al. noted that a well-
planned level of response is crucial to minimizing damage in the event of a future attack.  
Lone Wolf Suicide Attacks 
Before an attack, it is often difficult to detect terrorists who operate without a 
terrorist organizational support, network, or support from other people (Zierhoffer, 2014). 
Zeirhoffer (2014) reported that research on lone offender terrorism is limited as focus has 
been placed on terrorist organizations. The researcher noted that there is no profile that 
would predict a lone offender terrorist attack. Spaaij (2010) defined lone wolf terrorism 
as terrorist attacks that are carried out by individuals who operate alone, who are not 
affiliated with an organized terrorist group or network, and whose methods are created 
64 
 
and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy. Spaaij 
analyzed the main features of lone wolf terrorism as well as the trends in 15 countries. 
The researchers found that lone wolf terrorism accounted for 1.28% of all terrorist 
incidents in the 15 countries (p. 866). Spaaij found that lone wolf terrorism is 
comparatively prevalent in the United States, where it has significantly increased during 
the past 3 decades. Unlike the United States, there was no significant increase in the other 
14 countries, which were the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, Portugal, Russia, Canada, and 
Australia. The researcher noted that in the 15 countries, the number of casualties has been 
limited and no evidence was found to indicate that the lethality of lone wolf terrorism is 
on the rise. In addition, the researcher found no empirical evidence that lone wolf 
terrorists are among the most likely individuals to use weapons of mass destruction. 
It is difficult to monitor lone attackers because they are not tied to any 
organization that is already under surveillance (Zierhoffer, 2014). Zierhoffer (2014) 
related that lone wolf attackers do not need much for expenses and they have had much 
success. Using Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund (1999) threat assessment model, 
Zierhoffer assessed the model’s value as a predictor of terrorism using three lone wolf 
attackers: Theodore Kaczynski, Eric Rudolph, and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
who was born as Carlos Bledsoe. The researcher noted that Kaczynski, known as the 
Unabomber, was sentenced to life in prison for mailing 16 package or letter bombs that 
killed three people and injured 23 others over 18 years (p. 54). Rudolph was sentenced to 
65 
 
multiple life sentences without parole for killing two people and injuring more than 100 
others in four separate bombing, including a pipe bomb at the 1996 Summer Olympics in 
Atlanta (p. 55). Muhammad was convicted of capital murder, attempted capital murder, 
and 10 weapons-related charges after shooting two soldiers outside of the Little Rock 
Recruiting Station. Zierhoffer found that the 10 questions by Borum et al. in their threat 
assessment model, when slightly modified to reflect behaviors that are consistent with 
terrorism, expanded efforts to identify a lone wolf terrorist by focusing on thoughts and 
behaviors that may be indicative of terrorist activity. Thus, the model not only focuses on 
the demographics or characteristics of a potential terrorist, but also focuses on behaviors 
that could indicate the movement of the individual toward achieving a goal. Zierhoffer 
analysis of the threat assessment model also provided a foundation for further research 
for a model that would prevent lone wolf terrorism.  
President Obama expressed confidence in U.S. intelligence officials’ ability to 
prevent large terrorist attacks; however, President Obama warned that it may be difficult 
for officials to track and prevent lone wolf attacks like the one that occurred in Boston 
(Easley, 2013). Deloughery, King, and Asal (2013) analyzed lone wolf terrorism in 
relation to two related behaviors: (a) group-based terrorism and (b) violent hate crimes. 
The researchers noted that assessments that compared lone wolf terrorism to other forms 
of violence are sparse. Deloughery et al. examined the timing, locations, methods, targets, 
and geographic distributions of lone wolf terrorist attacks, group-based terrorist attacks, 
and violent hate crimes that took place between 1992 and 2010. Terrorism data were 
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obtained from the GTD and hate crime data were obtained from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI’s) annual hate crime statistics files.  
Findings indicated that lone wolf terrorism is not identical to group-based 
terrorism or violent hate crimes; however, it does share some similarities with each 
(Deloughery et al., 2013). Deloughery et al. (2013) found a moderate correlation between 
year-to-year changes in lone wolf terrorism with group-based terrorism. However, no 
correlation was found between year-to-year lone wolf terrorism and violent hate crimes. 
Lone wolf terrorism was higher in less populous states such as New Mexico, Nebraska, 
and Iowa than violent hate crimes and group-based terrorism. Approximately 50% of 
lone wolf terrorist attacks were related to abortion compared to 17% of group-based 
terrorist attacks (p. 1). In contrast, 6% of lone wolf terrorist attacks were directed at 
businesses compared to 27% of group-based terrorist attacks (p. 1). Lone wolf terrorism 
tends to occur in counties with larger populations, lower levels of home ownership, and 
higher percentages of Caucasians, which is similar to group-based terrorism and violent 
hate crimes. However, in contrast to group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone 
wolf terrorism is not more likely to take place in counties with a higher percentage of 
residents living in urban environments, higher percentages of male residents between 15 
and 24 years of age, or higher unemployment rates. The researchers found that the 
location where lone wolf terrorism takes place tend to have more demographic 
similarities with the location of violent hate crime offending than with group-based 
terrorism.   
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In Israel, the recent wave of terrorist attacks has been mostly stabbing and 
shooting events that are normally carried out by individuals, who have been called lone 
wolves (Shaked, 2016). Shaked (2016) reported that as of September 13, 2015, 30 
individuals have been killed and approximately 350 individuals have been injured (para. 
3). Shaked shared that the attacks involved 170 stabbings and attempted stabbings, as 
well as 70 shootings and 30 vehicular ramming attacks (para. 3). Shaked related that the 
current wave of terrorist attacks is different from previous periods of Palestinian uprising 
as the attacks are unguided and unorganized, and are being carried out by lone wolf 
terrorists as young as 13 to 15 years of age (para. 3). The author noted that most are from 
East Jerusalem and other parts of Judea and Samaria. Shaked shared that these lone wolf 
terrorists are not directed by any organization, but instead are inspired by intensive 
incitement from the local media or social networks. The author noted that the attacks 
were designed to be an expression of popular resistance; hence, the attackers used 
weapons such as knives, scissors, and screwdrivers in most of the incidents. Most 
attackers were killed at the scene by a soldier, law enforcement personnel, or a civilian 
bystander.  
Lone wolf terrorist attacks in Israel require a change in certain aspects of the 
counterterrorism approach (Shaked, 2016). According to Shaked (2016), there is a lack of 
intelligence to prevent such attacks; however, such attacks can be decreased or prevented 
through the use of education, influence through social networks, and the identification of 
possible attackers who mention their intentions on websites. Due to the difficulty in 
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knowing when the next attack will take place, Shaked related that counterterrorism 
actions involved increasing security personnel such as police officers, border police, and 
military personnel at major junctions, crowded places, and near Jewish communities in 
Judea and Samaria. Citizens have also been encouraged to learn easy ways to thwart an 
attack and those who have license to carry weapons are encouraged to do so. Shaked 
emphasized that the medical aspects of lone wolf terrorist attacks are different from past 
suicide bombings. Therefore, the author argued that the right adjustments from medical 
providers and domestic preparedness are needed to improve the medical response to the 
injuries that have been inflicted in the attacks. Shaked further argued that the main cause 
of death in penetrating trauma is hemorrhage; thus, first responders and medical 
personnel should refresh their knowledge and skills in order to provide the best level of 
care.  
Lessons Learned From Terrorist Attacks 
The strategic understanding of how a suicide attack is executed requires extensive 
research and the ability to define and establish connections in the study of prior attacks. 
Studying and understanding the outcomes of previous attacks allow CTOs the ability to 
establish emergency plans for future attacks. For example, Boston authorities had 
established an emergency plan that effectively minimized the damage done to the city 
during the 2013 Boston Bombing (Everbridge Organization, 2014). Leonard et al. (2014) 
analyzed how prior preparation and action contributed to the effectiveness of the response 
of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, as well as aspects of the response that were not 
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as effective. The researchers found that response organization leaders in Boston 
performed detailed and meticulous planning each year for many events like the Boston 
Marathon Bombing. In addition, Leonard et al. found that senior leaders showed effective 
use of the spirit and core principles of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), which Congress mandated in 2002. NIMS is a systematic, proactive approach 
that is used by department and agency leaders at all governmental levels as well as in 
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, with the goal of working 
seamlessly to manage incidents that involve all threats and hazards (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], 2016). The aim of this approach is to reduce the loss of 
life, property, and environmental harm (FEMA, 2016). On the other hand, Leonard et al. 
noted that while there were many positive dimensions of interorganizational collaboration 
in the Boston response, there were also some difficulties, such as microcommand with 
leadership and coordination at the street level when individuals and small teams from 
various organizations came together and needed to operate together. Thus, more work 
was needed with integrating NIMS into the practices and cultures of emergency response 
agencies, especially at the tactical operational level.  
Other lessons were learned from the Boston Marathon Bombing. McCaul et al. 
(2014) examined Tsarnaev’s personal history, his interactions with federal agencies, his 
radicalization, the 2011 threat assessment that was carried out by the FBI, and his 2012 
travel to Russia. In addition, the researchers explored missed opportunities that could 
have prevented the bombing. McCaul et al. found that there was not enough cooperation 
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and information sharing between federal agencies and local law enforcement agencies. 
The researchers also found that there was limited communication between federal 
agencies. In addition, there were not enough resources available to properly screen 
outbound travelers whom the federal agencies were interested in. McCaul et al. also 
noted a failure to revise inaccurate or incomplete records that were held by different 
agencies. First, the researchers recommended an increase in information sharing between 
federal intelligence agencies and local law enforcement agencies as well as tribal law 
enforcement agencies. Second, McCaul et al. recommended a revision of agreements on 
task force officers (TFOs) in order to create more open and collaborative relationships. 
Third, the researchers recommended an increase in the examination of international 
travelers with a treasury enforcement communications system (TECS) alert on their name 
as they leave the country.  
The fourth recommendation was an improvement in the TECS alert notifications 
and records; thus, ensuring that the FBI case agents on each assessment where a TECS 
alert is placed on an individual also receives these notifications (McCaul et al., 2014). In 
addition, each time a TECS alert was shared, McCaul et al. (2014) recommended the use 
of a written detail record about when, how, and with whom this alert was communicated. 
Fifth, the researchers recommended a review of the terrorist screening database (TSDB) 
nominations as a more accurate and complete TSDB record for Tsarnaev might have 
resulted in greater scrutiny when he returned to the United States. Sixth, the researchers 
encouraged cooperation and assistance from the community as no one stepped forward 
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based on the public appeal for information regarding the suspects. McCaul et al. noted 
that 56% of the country had never heard of the “If you see something, say something” 
campaign (p. 36). Thus, in preventing terrorist attacks, the researchers emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that residents are alerting their local police or federal authorities 
to suspicious behavior or other possible indicators. Seventh, McCaul et al. recommended 
an end to the case closed mentality due to the concern that officials believed that the 
attack could not have been prevented. The researchers claimed that this was the most 
difficult problem to address, which requires a delicate balance with ensuring that 
investigators and counterterrorism professionals are confident but appropriately critical.  
 Since the late 1960s, the two most successful strategies for ending terrorist groups 
have been policing or the initiation of a political process (IEP, 2014). The IEP (2014) 
related that the use of these strategies resulted in over 80% decrease of terrorist 
organizations that stopped operation (p. 3). The IEP reported that 10% of terrorist groups 
achieved their goals and 7% were eliminated through fully military engagement (p. 3).  
Counterterrorism Operations and Methodologies 
 Due to the prevalence and frequency of terror acts, counterterrorism professionals 
have analyzed previous attacks and developed counterterrorism strategies from their 
findings. Butterworth et al. (2012) reported that public surface transportation is a main 
target for terrorists throughout the world. The researchers related that the Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI) database on terrorist and serious criminal attacks against 
public surface transportation recorded 3,159 attacks against public surface transportation 
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between January 1, 1970, and January 23, 2012, where 7,997 people were killed and 
30,046 were injured (p. 1). Butterworth et al. noted that 47.4% of these attacks were 
against buses, bus stations, and bus stops; accounting for 55% of the fatalities and 41% of 
the injuries resulting from terrorist attacks during this period (p. 1). The researchers 
examined 16 of the numerous attacks that were planned or carried out against the public 
bus system in Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza, during the Second Intifada 
where major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006. The researchers 
underscored the important role of bus drivers in the prevention and mitigation process 
and noted that the more successful attacks involved a lack of proper security protocols. In 
addition, Butterworth et al. discussed the importance of additional security presence at 
bus stops. There are similarities between Butterworth et al.’s, Medby and Glenn’s (2002), 
and Baker’s (2005, 2006) methodologies in recognizing the intentions of attacks on 
public transportation and they recommended appropriate damage prevention and 
mitigation measures. Butterworth et al. noted that prevention and mitigation measures are 
most effective when complex security tactics are used, which creates a deterrent effect. 
Thus, Butterworth et al. noted that security efforts should not be routine or pattern 
oriented, but unpredictable to stop terrorist actors. 
In preventing terrorist attacks, it is important to gather accurate information to 
prevent a future attack (Mazumdar, 2012). Mazumdar (2012) claimed that terrorism is a 
law enforcement problem as well as an intelligence matter; therefore, the prevention of 
terrorist acts requires complete coordination between law enforcement and intelligence 
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officials. The researcher noted that human intelligence (HUMINT), who may be 
informants or agents, is the single most significant source involved in thwarting a 
potential attack due to the secrecy and anonymity elements found in terrorist groups or 
lone wolf assailants. Mazumdar related that the resources available to terrorists for an 
attack are very limited and very challenging to detect. Mazumdar postulated that it is vital 
to know about terrorist groups’ capabilities to carry out its intentions so that law 
enforcement and intelligence officials can effectively create an adverse environment for 
terrorists.  
Some terrorists’ motivation may be attributed to the military being employed to 
suppress and prevent attacks. Counterterrorism is a principle of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations, which refers to military action taken against guerillas or 
revolutionaries and has mixed results in terms of long-term effectiveness (Greenhill & 
Staniland, 2007). Greenhill and Staniland (2007) approached the challenges faced by 
counterterrorism strategies by focusing on counterterrorism methodologies. The 
researchers reported that COIN can frequently include practices that either prevent future 
terrorism or cause it. Coercion tactics might yield a short-term victory, but the long-term 
effects of the resentment and anger that resulted as a consequence of brutality and 
suppression cannot be underestimated. In addition, the researchers argued that these 
tactics can sometimes create a fertile ground for individuals who resort to terrorism. 
Furthermore, Greenhill and Staniland noted that the mental state of those who live in this 
environment and use suicide terrorism as a response to a much stronger opponent may be 
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correlation with the tactics employed in the area. According to Greenhill and Staniland, 
both COIN tactics and strategies involving combating terrorism involve a noticeably 
sensitive process that may result in creating heightened extremist ideals among those 
involved in the use of terrorist tactics rather than stopping them. Individuals conducting 
counterterrorist activities should consider an underlying premise, namely the in-depth 
study of the nature and results yielded by COIN operations as such detailed research is 
indispensable for possibly preventing future incidents involving suicide terrorism. 
Although Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework and Freeman et al.’s (2010) 
nine preattack phases indicated a specific step-by-step framework that potential terrorists 
use, Paul and Landree (2008) noted that there is no simple linear outline for planning a 
terrorist attack. Paul and Landree related that groups and individuals involved in 
terrorism activities focus on assessing avenues of approach and ease of access, target 
features (e.g., location to launch attack, times to launch and window of opportunity, and 
mobility of target), security (e.g., forces, security measures, and other population groups 
present), and threats to the terrorist operation. However, Paul and Landree stated that the 
needs of terrorist groups may differ from one another, thus, their strategies and 
methodologies may vary. The authors argued that instead of establishing an assumed 
pattern of attack, defenders control the attack planning process by protecting essential 
information concerning the infrastructure or the target. This strategy allows the 
individuals and governments combating terror attacks to gather a more concrete set of 
parameters regarding what terrorists are likely to search for; hence, they are better able to 
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identify targets that may be at risk and adjust their defenses accordingly (Paul & Landree, 
2008). Consequently, Paul and Landree noted that controlling the flow of information 
improves security and limits terror attacks. 
Due to the tragic events of 9/11 and the increasing complexity and irregularity of 
terrorist threats to national security, there have been a lot of research and development on 
the application of advanced information technology to help in the analysis, anticipation, 
and countering of these threats (Weinstein, Campbell, Delaney, & O’Leary, 2009). 
Weinstein et al. (2009) counterterror social network analysis and intent recognition (CT-
SNAIR) work focused on the development of automated techniques and tools for 
detecting and tracking of terrorist networks that often changes as well as recognizing 
their capability and intent. Therefore, the CT-SNAIR system framework provide a means 
to detect, model, and simulate security threats from multimedia data collected from the 
Internet and adversary videos (Weinstein et al., 2009). Weinstein et al. noted that based 
on minor leads to potential terrorist activity, analysts are able to build comprehensive 
social networks to track targeted groups and threats. The researchers focused on the 
development of automated recognition of terrorist capabilities and intent based on 
consistent tasks that the adversary must complete for attack execution. Weinstein et al. 
suggested that research should focus on the development of both real and simulated data 





Summary and Conclusions 
The 9/11 suicide attacks illustrated the ingenuity that suicide terrorist groups 
display in planning and executing their missions (Hoffman, 2002). According to Hoffman 
(2002), security concern pertaining to the use of firearms and explosives led the 9/11 
attackers to use household items that were not considered to be an on-board threat, such 
as box cutters, while the planes were used as incendiary weapons. Therefore, Hoffman, 
highlighted that the deadliest terrorist attack in history involved no guns or explosives.  
Israel as one of the 13 countries that are at risk for increased terrorist activity 
(IEP, 2004, p. 4). When examining suicide attacks, it is important to first identify and 
understand the motivation of individual attackers and reasons for executing the suicide 
mission (Pape, 2008). Second, Pape (2008) related that by understanding the terror 
networks and the organization that identifies and recruits suicide attackers, CTOs can 
identify factors that recruitment cells have used for the key player within the suicide 
operation. Fox (2014) related that the most crucial element in law enforcement’s ability 
to successfully stop and mitigate terror threats is to study adversary planning; 
specifically, the phases the adversary must accomplish in order to successfully execute an 
attack. Fox related that the recruitment of future suicide bombers is part of the early 
planning phase, while Freeman et al.’s (2010) related that there are additional tasks in the 
preattack phases that consistently emerge in the adversary planning process.  
Therefore, there is a gap in the literature that focuses on the specific patterns 
within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerge in 
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the adversary planning process for each adversary success or failure in Israel suicide 
bombing cases. In this multiple case study, I addressed this gap using Medby and Glenn’s 
(2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and 
Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases. By focusing on the early planning phases of 
terrorist attacks, decision makers and CTOs are better able to identify essential 
opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from occurring (Fox, 2014). In Chapter 2, I 
included the introduction, literature search strategy, conceptual framework, background 
of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack, lone wolf suicide attacks, lessons 
learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism operations and methodologies, and a 
summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, role 
of the researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I 
include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence of 
trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the interpretation of 
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I first used 
a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed 
suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing 
cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful 
random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from 
the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. I collected data using a researcher-created 
terrorist activity data collection worksheet (see Appendix B), a researcher-created site 
data collection worksheet (see Appendix C), and a researcher-created questionnaire into 
suicide bombing events (see Appendix D). NVivo was used to manage the data. Data 
were analyzed using two stages of analysis in case study research: (a) within-case 
analysis or single-case analysis and (b) cross-case analysis. The study was conducted in 
accordance with Walden University’s IRB guidelines. The IRB approval number was 11-
18-16-0108044. In Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, role of the 
researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary. 
Research Design and Rationale 
In this section, I present the research question for this multiple case study. I also 
discuss the multiple case study research design rationale. This section is organized in the 
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following subsections: research question and multiple case study research design 
rationale. 
Research Question 
In this multiple case study, I addressed one central research question: What are 
the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that 
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or 
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel?  
Multiple Case Study Research Design Rationale 
I chose a multiple case study research design because it enabled me to delve into 
the topic and explore specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of 
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I considered all possible 
research methodologies, which include mixed methods, quantitative, and qualitative 
research methods (Mertens, 1998). I considered a mixed methods approach for this study; 
however, I did not choose this method because it requires various views as a practical and 
natural approach to research (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). A mixed methods 
approach was not needed to answer this study’s central research question. Johnson 
(2006b) noted that a quantitative design focuses on the relationship among variables 
(Johnson, 2006b). A quantitative approach was considered, but it did not align with the 
purpose of this study. Tellis (1997) reported that a qualitative approach allows for the 
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development of a rich, complex, and holistic understanding of the research problem. In 
this study, I applied a qualitative research method.  
Five qualitative research designs were considered, which include case study, 
phenomenology, narrative, grounded theory, and ethnography (Guetterman, 2015). A 
multiple case study research design was chosen after an in-depth review of the five 
qualitative designs. Yin (2009) defined a case study as an empirical inquiry about a 
contemporary phenomenon, such as a case, that is set within its real-world context, 
mainly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (p. 
4). A multiple case study research design was selected because it allows the researcher to 
explore differences within and between cases, and the goal is to replicate findings across 
cases (see Baxter & Jack, 2008). Yin (2003) related that it is crucial that the cases are 
selected carefully so that the researcher can predict similar results across cases. Stake 
(1995) related that case studies are usually bounded by time and a set of activities.  
In this multiple case study, data collection were bounded by three successful and 
three failed Israel suicide bombing cases from 2000 to 2010. Yin (2014) noted that in a 
case study, there are many more variables of interest than data points, and multiple 
sources of evidence are used. Yin further related that data need to converge in a 
triangulating fashion. In this study, six suicide bombing cases were used: (a) three 
successful suicide bombing cases and (b) three failed suicide bombing cases from 2000 to 
2010. I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the 
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 
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35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then 
using purposeful random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide 
attack cases from the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. I used a researcher-
created terrorist activity data collection worksheet to collect archival data from the 
private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I 
used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect data at each site of the 
three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). I 
used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open 
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases 
(see Appendix D).  
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the case study researcher includes being a teacher, advocate, 
evaluator, and biographer (Stake, 1995). Stake (1995) claimed that from a constructivist 
perspective, the roles of interpreter and gatherer of interpretations are central. Stake 
argued that the goal of research is to build clear and sophisticated realities that can 
withstand skepticism. I served as a participant-observer during the data collection 
process, using multiple sources in this multiple case study. Therefore, I was a key 
instrument in the qualitative data collection process. I collected all data, which included 
collecting data using the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, 
the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. I transcribed the data, coded and analyzed the 
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data, and interpreted the findings. Thus, I followed specific procedures for data collection 
and analysis to ensure the trustworthiness of this study.  
I am the CEO of the private intelligence company in Israel where the case study 
data were obtained. I conducted an ethical research study that relied on the community 
partner’s cooperation and data use agreement. Therefore, I obtained cooperation of the 
board members and permission to use the suicide bombing attack data in the company’s 
database. I informed the board members that my role is separate from that of the CEO as 
the company is not sponsoring the study. While conducting the study, I used specific 
strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed any experiences, biases, and values 
pertaining to specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack 
phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six 
successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that 
a reflexive journal helps to prevent biases as the researcher makes regular entries during 
the research process. In these entries, I recorded methodological decisions and the 
reasons for them, the logistics of the study, and reflected on what was happening in terms 
of my own values and interests. After the study is completed and approved, I will e-mail 
a summary report of the research findings to the private intelligence company’s board 
members. I will keep all data secure for at least 5 years per Walden University’s IRB 






In this section, I discuss the methodology. Sufficient depth is provided so that 
other researchers can replicate the study. This section is organized in the following 
subsections: participant selection logic, instrumentation, procedures for recruitment, 
participation, and data collection, and data analysis plan. 
Participant Selection Logic 
I used a combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum 
variation sampling and purposeful random sampling. Patton (2001) related that using 
more than one sampling strategy meets multiple interests and needs. Patton reported that 
maximum variation sampling is used to select a wide range of variation on dimensions of 
interest. The purpose of maximum variation sampling is to discover or uncover central 
themes, core elements, and shared dimensions that cut across a diverse sample while at 
the same time offering the opportunity to document unique or diverse variations. 
Flyvbjerg (2004) noted that maximum variation is used to obtain information about the 
significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome, example, three to 
four cases that are very different on one dimension, such as the location, size, form of 
organization, and budget. Cohen and Crabtree (2006) shared that when using a maximum 
variation sampling, the researcher selects a small number of cases that maximize the 
diversity relevant to the research question. 
On the other hand, purposeful random sampling adds credibility to a sample when 
the potential purposeful sample is larger than what the researcher can handle (Patton, 
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2001). Patton (2001) related that while purposeful random sampling is a type of random 
sampling, a small sample size is used; therefore, the goal is credibility and not 
representativeness or the ability to generalize. Patton further noted that purposeful 
random sampling is used to prevent potential selection bias.  
Using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful random sampling, the 
six cases were chosen based on the study’s selection criteria. One criterion was successful 
and failed suicide attacks that occurred from 2000 to 2010 in Israel. The criteria for 
successful attacks included the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at 
least one civilian victim. The criteria for failed attacks were that the suicide attacker was 
not killed, no civilians were killed, or the suicide attacker was killed before any civilians 
could be killed. The attack site for each of the case studies was a soft target, such as in 
urban settings and civilian population. Soft targets can include commercial and private 
sectors as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are 
under minimal security, such as schools and open public marketplaces. Soft targets 
exclude military-related settings and bases, convoys, or checkpoints. The cases chosen 
had sufficient data available so that I was able to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) 
nine phases. Using archival data of suicide bombing attacks from the database of a 
private intelligence company in Israel, three successful and three failed suicide attacks 
from 2000 to 2010 were chosen using purposeful random sampling after meeting the 
other selection criteria. The cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location, 
size of the attack, and successful and failed attacks. Intentionally including cases of 
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different types allowed me to analyze these cases using single-case analysis and cross-
case analysis to see if they fit the larger, overall patterns.  
Saturation is the point in data collection where the collection of new data does not 
shed any further light on the issue under investigation (Glaser, Strauss, & Strutzel, 1968). 
The TESOL International Association (2016) reported that case study research often 
includes a single-case or multiple-cases, which often involves two to four cases. The 
relationship between saturation and sample size was sufficient in this multiple case study 
because I used purposeful random sampling to select six cases (three successful and three 
failed suicide bombing attacks) in order to obtain the richest data possible. I used a 
random number generator, such as the one provided by GraphPad Software (2016). The 
richness of case studies is related to the amount of detail and contextualization that is 
possible when only one or a small number of focal cases and issues are analyzed (TESOL 
International Association, 2016). From 2000 to 2010, 35 suicide bombing attacks 
occurred in Israel; hence, the six cases represented 17% of the attacks that occurred 
during the 2000 to 2010 timeframe. 
Instrumentation 
A case study relies on multiple sources of evidence to present a rich picture of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 2014). Case studies benefit from having multiple 
sources of data, such as archival records, direct observation (e.g., physical environment), 
and documents (Yin, 2012), all of which were used in this study. I first used a researcher-
created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed suicide attack 
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cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing cases that took 
place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful random sampling, I 
selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from the cases that met the 
study’s selection criteria. The researcher-created terrorist activity data collection 
worksheet, which was based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, was used 
to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the 
six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to 
collect data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack 
locations (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide 
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on 
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). Yin (2012) discussed the use and 
importance of a case study protocol where a set of questions are addressed while 
collecting the case study data in the field setting or at the researcher’s desk when 
extracting information from archival sources. Yin related that questions in the protocol 
are directed at the researcher and not at field participants. Therefore, the researcher-
created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, researcher-created site data collection 
worksheet, and the researcher-created questionnaire served as the case study protocol. 
Archival data and documents. I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data 
collection worksheet to collect archival data from a private intelligence company’s 
database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researcher-created 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open source information or public 
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data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). Yin (2012) 
related that archival data, such as those stored in electronic records, libraries, and paper 
files are a common source of evidence in case studies. Data can also be collected from 
newspapers, television, and mass media. In addition, data can be obtained from records 
that are maintained by public agencies, such as law enforcement or court records. Yin 
warned that archival data or documents can be subjected to their own biases or 
shortcomings, therefore, steps should be taken to counteract them. For example, with 
mass media, Yin suggested that the researcher selects two different media that are 
believed to have opposing orientations, which will allow a more balanced picture to 
emerge.  
Site data collection worksheet. I used a researcher-created site data collection 
worksheet to collect data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide 
bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). Yin (2012) discussed direct observations in a 
field setting and noted that such observations can focus on the physical environments, 
real-world events, or human actions. Yin related that such observations are one of the 
most distinctive features in doing case study research. According to the researcher, direct 
observations can take place by using a formal observational instrument and then noting, 
rating, or reporting the observational evidence under the categories specified by the 
instrument. However, Yin also discussed the use of a case study protocol, which differs 
from instruments used in surveys and interviews. Yin related that the protocol questions 
serve as a mental framework for the researcher. 
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The availability of data from the different sources creates an important 
opportunity during case study data collection (Yin, 2012). Yin (2012) recommended that 
the researcher constantly checks and rechecks the consistency of the findings from 
different and similar sources. As a result, the researcher triangulates or establishes 
converging lines of evidence, which make the findings robust.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
I completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural 
Research human research protections training before beginning data collection (see 
Appendix E). I also abided by all U.S. and Israel federal research regulations, which 
included obtaining the community partner’s cooperation and data use agreement before 
using the private intelligence company’s data. I wrote a letter to the board members of a 
private intelligence company in Israel, describing the research project and asking 
permission to use their suicide attack archival data for Israel from 2000 to 2010 and I also 
sent them a data use agreement. A cooperation letter and signed data use agreement were 
received from the board members, which were provided to Walden University IRB as 
two of the supporting documents. The documents have been redacted to protect the 
private intelligence company’s identity.  
After receiving approval to conduct the study from Walden University IRB, I first 
used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and 
failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide 
bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). From the case that 
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met the study’s selection criteria, I used purposeful random sampling using a random 
number generator to select three successful and three failed suicide attack cases. After 
selecting the six cases, I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection 
worksheet to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in 
Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I visited the site of each of the six suicide 
bombing cases and I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect 
data at each site (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide 
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on 
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). All data were properly transcribed. 
After the study is completed and approved, a summary report of the research 
findings will be e-mailed to the private intelligence company’s board members. I will 
keep hard copy data and any flash drives secure in a locked file cabinet and password 
protected computer, and I will be the only one with access to the records. I will keep the 
data for at least 5 years based on Walden University’s IRB guidelines.  
Data Analysis Plan 
Unlike qualitative studies, data analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing 
process of applying inductive reasoning as opposed to the deductive reasoning (Mayring, 
2000). The information from the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection 
worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-
created questionnaire into suicide bombing events were all properly transcribed and data 
were managed with NVivo. NVivo is a data management tool that is used to organize 
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data (Jabbar, 2015). NVivo helps the researcher to index segments of text to particular 
themes, link research notes to coding, carry out complex search and retrieve operations, 
and helps the researcher in examining possible relationships between the themes (King, 
2004). Jabbar (2015) noted that advantages of NVivo include the ability to collect and 
archive almost any data type and connect to the researcher’s transcribed data, it searches 
large data sets, and creates codes to identify patterns. Data were coded and analyzed. The 
data analysis plan is discussed in further detail below and is organized in the following 
areas: central research question categories for analysis and two stages of analysis and 
discrepant cases. 
Central research question categories for analysis. Coding by means of 
categories is often used by researchers in qualitative studies to group consistent responses 
and summarize significant ideas to identify themes and differences between the stories of 
the participants (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Coding categories that were used for the 
central research question were Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases, which are as 
follows (p. 77):  
1. Networking and indoctrination: In this phase, cell members are introduced and 
exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious 
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities.  
2. Terrorist training: This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell 
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities. 
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3. General planning: In this phase, the decision to conduct a terrorist attack is 
made as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships, 
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers. In addition, general shopping for potential 
targets is performed. 
4. Recruitment: In this phase, senior terrorist elements select and activate cell 
members for a certain terrorist operation. Similar to 9/11, it is assumed that 
there is a senior element that helps with recruitment and personnel selection. 
However, in the terrorist group that carried out the attacks on the London 
mass transit system on July 7, 2005, also called 7 July attacks or 7/7 attacks, 
this may not have been the case (Freeman et al., 2010; Ray, 2016). 
Nevertheless, Freeman et al. noted that in groups like this, a recruitment and 
selection process still occurs as preexisting groups of friends and 
acquaintances go through the radicalization process that results in a group 
committed to an attack.  
5. Financing: In this phase, funds are collected and allocated for a certain 
terrorist attack. For example, the money came before the decision to conduct 
an attack was made when a cell within the al-Qa’ida network carried out the 
attack on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000 (Freeman et al., 2010; 
Pearl & O’Rourke, 2001). 
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6. Operational planning: In this phase, the specific target is selected, detail 
reconnaissance of the target is conducted, and specific operation planning 
takes place such as the delivery and procurement methods.  
7. Weapons procurement: In this phase, materials for the construction of 
explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack is obtained or received, 
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets.  
8. Logistical preparation: In this phase, logistical actions are taken in order to 
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and 
document procurement, and electronics purchase.  
9. Operational preparation: In this phase, physical preparations for the imminent 
terrorist attack takes place, including explosive construction, vehicle 
alteration, specific explosives training, and multimedia preparation and 
creation.  
Two stages of analysis and discrepant cases. Based on Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1998) coding process, the overall coding process started with open coding that involves 
defining line by line the actions and events with data. I was then able to discover, name, 
and categorize the phenomena according to properties and dimensions. The axial coding 
process helped me to establish theoretical and conceptual connections in the multiple 
sources of data. Finally, selective coding helped to systemically validate the relationships 
by searching for and confirming examples in the presentation of the data. 
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More specifically, Merriam (2009) described two stages of analysis in case study 
research. The first stage is a within-case analysis or single-case analysis in which each 
case is treated as a comprehensive case (p. 204). For this study, each successful and each 
failed suicide bombing attack case was analyzed separately. Level 1 analysis of the six 
cases included coding and categorization of all data from the researcher-created terrorist 
activity data collection worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, 
and the researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The coding process 
followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) coding process, which included line-by-line 
identification of free codes. Level 1 coding analysis continued with axial coding in which 
common themes and patterns were condensed and categorized. All documents were 
analyzed using content analysis, which involved a description of the purpose of the 
documents, the organization and scope of the topics, and the use of the documents.  
The second level of data analysis involved a cross-case analysis. Yin (2009, 2014) 
and Merriam (2009) believed the second level of data analysis is dependent on theory 
development or the development of theoretical propositions that helps to focus on certain 
data and ignore other data. Coded and categorized data were examined across all sources 
of data for the three successful suicide bombing attack cases and the three failed suicide 
bombing attack cases to determine themes and discrepancies. Therefore, the three 
successful suicide bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. Then 
the three failed suicide bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis.  
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Identifying and analyzing discrepant cases is a key part of the logic of validity 
testing in qualitative research. Instances that cannot be accounted for by a particular 
interpretation or explanation can point to important defects in that account (Maxwell, 
2013). Patton (2001) related that often during data analysis, qualitative researchers may 
come across deviant cases that do not follow the main emerging patterns within their 
studies, which can lead to issues of trustworthiness if researchers do not handle such 
negative cases openly and honestly. Patton suggested that to increase trustworthiness, 
qualitative researchers may include in their report alternative explanations of why certain 
cases do not follow the main emerging patterns that surface in their studies. The constant 
comparative method was used to identify emerging themes, which were the basis for the 
findings of this study (see Merriam, 2009). I found no discrepant cases during data 
analysis. Findings in this study were presented in relation to the central research question. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
I organized this section in the following subsections: credibility, transferability, 
dependability, confirmability, and ethical procedures. According to Jeanfreau and Jack 
(2010), in quantitative studies, researchers often use reliability and validity when 
evaluating threats to their research while trustworthiness is used in qualitative studies. 
Trustworthiness pertains to how truthful the findings of the study are or the accuracy of 
the researcher’s interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Hence, researchers assess the 
trustworthiness of their study through credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
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confirmability (Cutcliffe & McKenna, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodgers, 2008; 
Sandelowski, 1986; Streubert-Speziale, 2007).  
Credibility 
Credibility is the qualitative counterpart to internal validity and pertains to the 
study’s findings being believable or truthful (Polit & Beck, 2006; Sandelowski, 1986; 
Streubert-Speziale, 2007). Jeanfreau and Jack (2010) reported that strategies used to 
establish credibility include the use of multiple sources of data or methods and having 
repeated contact with participants, such as peer debriefing where questions are shared 
about the research process, obtaining additional perspectives on analysis and 
interpretation, and through the use of participant member checks in order to verify with 
participants if the findings is a correct reflection of their experiences. In this study, 
credibility was established by using triangulation where multiple data sources were used, 
specifically, the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the 
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Yin (2012) related that the researcher 
triangulates or establishes converging lines of evidence, which result in robust findings. 
Transferability 
Transferability is the qualitative counterpart to external validity and pertains to 
the extent to which researchers can apply the findings of their study to other situations 
(Byrne, 2001; Merriam, 2009; Streubert-Speziale, 2007). Merriam (2009) noted that 
strategies to establish transferability include rich, thick description in reference to the 
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setting, the participants, and the findings of the study. It is also the responsibility of the 
qualitative researcher to describe the context of the study and its participants in detail so 
that the possibility of replication exists. Bitsch (2005) also discussed the use of thick 
description as well as purposeful sampling as strategies to establish transferability. To 
ensure transferability, I provided a rich description of the context of the study and used a 
combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation sampling 
and purposeful random sampling. 
Dependability 
Dependability is the qualitative counterpart to reliability. Shenton (2004) 
recommended that the processes within the study should be reported in detail in order to 
enable future researchers to repeat the work, but it does not necessarily mean that same 
result will be obtained. In this study, dependability was established through the use of 
audit trails, which pertains to a thorough collection of documentation about all aspects of 
the research (see Rodgers, 2008). Documentation used in this study included detailed 
transcriptions of the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the 
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Therefore, the strategy of triangulation was 
also used by comparing these multiple data sources. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability is the qualitative counterpart to objectivity. To establish 
confirmability, Merriam (2009) recommended reflexivity, which is the process of 
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reflecting critically on the self as a researcher in order to maintain the integrity of a 
research study. Reflexivity pertains to researchers’ self-awareness and the strategies they 
use to manage potentially biasing factors within the study (Jootun, McGhee, & Marland, 
2009; Porter, 1993). Merriam (2009) shared that researchers need to explain their biases, 
dispositions, and assumptions in relation to their investigation. Merriam also suggested 
that this clarification of the researcher’s position allows the reader to better understand 
how the researcher might have arrived at a particular interpretation of the data. In this 
study, I used the strategy of reflexivity where I reflected on any biases that I may have 
had about specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases 
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful 
or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that a reflexive 
journal helps to prevent biases as the researcher makes regular entries during the research 
process. In these entries, I recorded methodological decisions and the reasons for them, 
the logistics of the study, and reflected on what was happening in terms of my own 
values and interests. 
Ethical Procedures 
I completed the NIH Office of Extramural Research human research protections 
training before beginning data collection (see Appendix E). I also abided by all U.S. and 
Israel federal research regulations. I conducted the study in accordance with Walden 
University’s IRB guidelines. Data collection began after IRB approval had been obtained. 
I obtained the private intelligence company’s cooperation and data use agreement before 
98 
 
using the company’s data in my study. I kept confidential all names associated with each 
suicide bombing attack case, such as the names of the attackers, victims, families, first 
responders, and law enforcement officials; therefore, no identifiable information were 
used in any of my study’s reports. I only used data that specifically pertained to patterns 
within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases. I kept confidential all 
security measures and tools used to deter, detect, and mitigate suicide attacks.  
All hard copy and electronic data will be kept secured in a locked file cabinet and 
password protected computer in my personal home office for at least 5 years per Walden 
University’s IRB guidelines. Only my supervising committee and Walden University 
IRB had access to the data. After the study is completed and approved, a summary report 
of the research findings will be e-mailed to the private intelligence company board 
members. After 5 years, I will properly destroy the data using techniques such as 
shredding. 
Summary 
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I first used 
a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed 
suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing 
cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful 
random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from 
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the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. Data collection included a researcher-
created terrorist activity data collection worksheet (see Appendix B), a researcher-created 
site data collection worksheet (see Appendix C), and a researcher-created questionnaire 
into suicide bombing events (see Appendix D). The information was transcribed and data 
were managed with NVivo. Data were analyzed using two stages of analysis in case 
study research: (a) within-case analysis or single-case analysis and (b) cross-case 
analysis. The study was conducted in accordance with the parameters established by 
Walden University’s IRB. I will keep all data secured in a locked file cabinet and 
password protected computer.  
In Chapter 3, I included the introduction, research design and rationale, role of the 
researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I 
include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence of 
trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the interpretation of 
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within 
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the 
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases 
in Israel. Three data sources were analyzed using within-case analysis or single-case 
analysis and cross-case analysis to determine the similarities and differences in the three 
successful and three unsuccessful attacks or bombing cases in Israel: (a) researcher-
created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) researcher-created site data 
collection worksheet, and (c) researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing 
events. The central research question explored the specific patterns within each of 
Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary 
planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. 
In Chapter 4, I include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence 
of trustworthiness, results, and a summary. 
Setting 
I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was 
based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, to collect archival data from a 
private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I 
used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open 
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases 
(see Appendix D). I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect 
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data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations 
(see Appendix C). Obtaining data from these three sources helped in triangulating or 
establishing converging lines of evidence, which made the findings robust (see Yin, 
2012). There were no personal or organizational conditions that influenced data 
collection or interpretation of the study results.  
Demographics 
This section contains case information about the six attacks analyzed using 
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases. I used three successful attacks and three 
unsuccessful attacks in this study. Tables 2 and 3 contains the information about the year 
of attack, attack outcome, city of attack, bomber casualty, civilian casualty, and target 
type. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the successful attacks occurred in 2001 and 2002, 
whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The differences in years 
might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators having a better 
understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their counterterrorism 
strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the successful and 
unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes, such as suicide 
attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but a barrier or 
wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when major rioting 
and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012; Zonszein, 2014). 
Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as a measure to 
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p.m. 
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kilometer (km) from 
center city Jerusalem 
Successful attack 
targeting civilian 
population in a pizza 
restaurant, Sbarro, in 
center city Jerusalem 
Successful attack 
targeting civilian 
population in a 
popular café and bar, 
called, Café Moment, 
in the city of 
Jerusalem, along the 
outskirts of the center 








1 suicide bomber, 
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bomber, age 22 





11 dead, 50 injured  
  
15 dead, 130 injured  
  




Entrance to a Jewish 
religious place of 
study, Yeshiva, on a 
Saturday night, after 
the Sabbath 
Entrance to a Jewish 
religious place of 
study, Yeshiva, on a 
Saturday night, after 
the Sabbath. 
Café and bar 
frequented by local 
younger population 























Failed Failed The attack was foiled 
by police after the 
would-be suicide 
bomber was arrested 
by police following a 








It is believed that the 
would-be suicide 
bomber planning an 












somewhere in Central 
Israel 
Suicide bombing 
somewhere on Yafo 
Street 
While in police 
custody, the would-be 
suicide bomber 
revealed that he was 
planning on detonating 
an explosive device at 







I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the 
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 
35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). From the 
cases that met the study’s selection criteria, I used purposeful random sampling using a 
random number generator to select three successful and three failed suicide attack cases. 
After selecting the six cases, I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection 
worksheet to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in 
Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I visited the site of each of the six suicide 
bombing cases and I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect 
data at each site (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide 
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on 
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). I transcribed all of the data.  
Data Analysis 
I analyzed three data sources for this multiple case study research: (a) researcher-
created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) researcher-created site data 
collection worksheet, and (c) researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing 
events. Each data source was analyzed using a qualitative content analysis to search for 
the most frequent occurrences found in each of the data. Specifically, I conducted single-
case analysis and cross-case analysis. Each data source file was also uploaded to NVivo, 
which allowed for a more systematic organization and tabulation of the discovered 
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themes from the analysis. I found no discrepant cases during data analysis. In the results 
section, themes with the most number of occurrences were identified as the major themes 
and the ones with fewer occurrences were the minor themes of the study.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
In this multiple case study, I assessed trustworthiness through credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I established credibility using 
triangulation where multiple data sources were used, specifically, the researcher-created 
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection 
worksheet, and the researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. I 
ensured transferability by providing a rich description of the context of the study and 
used a combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation 
sampling and purposeful random sampling. I established dependability through the use of 
audit trails, thus, thoroughly collecting documentation about all aspects of the research. I 
established confirmability through the strategy of reflexivity where I reflected on any 
biases that I may have had about specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine 
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of 
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. In these entries, I recorded 
methodological decisions and the reasons for them, the logistics of the study, and 
reflected on what was happening in terms of my own values and interests. 
Results 
I organize this section based on one central research question: What are the 
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specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that 
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or 
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel? Based on the central research question analyzed 
data, 13 major themes and 21 minor themes emerged for the successful attacks, whereas 
seven major themes and 20 minor themes emerged for the unsuccessful attacks. This 
section is organized in three sections: successful attacks, unsuccessful attacks, and cross-
case analysis. I organized the successful attacks and unsuccessful attacks subsection by 
the three data collection sources: (a) terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) site 
data collection worksheet, and (c) questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Major 
themes and minor themes are discussed and include descriptive narrative data related to 
the themes in block quotation format or in quotation marks. In presenting the results, 
verbatim information from the data collection sources were used, thus, the use of 
quotations. Under each data collection source, I used quotation marks when the 
information being quoted was less than 40 words; thus, the information was incorporated 
into the text and enclosed with double quotation marks. I used the block quotation format 
when the quotation consisted of 40 or more words; thus, displaying it in a freestanding 
block of text without the quotation marks. Citing these sources was not necessary as the 
quotations were presented under the corresponding data collection source.  
Successful Attacks 
Terrorist activity data collection worksheet. The first data source was the 
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was used to collect archival data from a 
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private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the cases. From the content analysis, 
all nine framework categories were present in the successful attacks. The categories with 
the most number of occurrences were general planning, financing, and operational 
preparation of the attack. There were nine major themes and nine minor themes. Table 4 





Results Breakdown from the Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet of the 
Successful Attacks 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 
1. Networking and indoctrination Hamas group or organization 
**Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade 
affiliated with the Hamas 
organization 
2 
 al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
affiliated with the Fatah 
organization 
1 
2. Terrorist training No special training conducted for 
the attack 
2 
 Very well trained and prepared 
for the attack 
1 
3. General planning Complete coordination, followed 
as planned (time of attack, 
disguise, transportation, etc.) 
3 
4. Recruitment Coming from a refugee camp 1 
 Volunteered for the suicide 
bombing 
1 
 Coming from one neighborhood; 
easier recruitment 
1 
5. Financing Funded by large organizations 3 
6. Operational Planning Scouting of attack site 2 
 Targeting a large number of 
people for high casualty rate at a 
specific time and location 
1 
 Suspects disguised themselves 1 
7. Weapons procurement Using of explosive devices with 
other sharp metal objects to 
impose the most damage 
2 
 Created by the group’s chief 
bombmaker 
2 
 Using an improvised explosive 
device 
1 
8. Logistical preparation Using a disguise, appropriate to 
the target demographics and 
location 
2 
 Forming a cell within the local 
target area 
1 
9. Operational preparation Thorough research and planning 




Networking and indoctrination. The first category was the networking and 
indoctrination of the three successful attacks. The category had one major theme where 
two attacks were carried out by the Hamas group or organization and one minor theme, 
where one attack was carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the 
Fatah organization.  
Major Theme 1: Hamas group or organization. The first major theme was the 
finding that two of the successful attacks were by the Hamas group or organization, one 
of which was by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, also affiliated with the Hamas 
organization. Suicide attack 2 (SA2) was performed by the Hamas group. The suicide 
bombers acted as the handlers of one another, where each had their respective professions 
as well at the time of the attack.  
The bomber, who was 22 at the time of the attack, was from the West Bank town 
of Aqabah. He was the son of a successful restaurant owner and from a 
landowning family. His Hamas hander led him to the site the day of the bombing. 
The bomber volunteered for the suicide bombing and was paired up with another 
person who acted as his handler, a Palestinian woman from the West Bank town 
of Nabi Salih. At the time of the attack, she was a 20-year-old part-time student at 
Birzeit University and a part time journalist.  
Suicide attack 3 (SA3) was arranged by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, an 
arm of the Hamas group. The group targeted a popular café and planned the attack at a 
time when the most crowd was present. 
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On March 9, 2002, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in the Café 
Moment, a popular café and bar, killing 11 people and wounding 54. The attack 
was planned and carried out by the Silwan cell, a branch of Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam 
Brigade, the militant arm of Hamas. On the night of the attack, two Silwan cell 
members, picked up the bomber and drove him to the café at 10 p.m. They arrived 
at 10:29 p.m. The bomber then walked into the café through the garden. 
Normally, he would have had to talk to a bouncer to get in, but the bouncer was in 
the bathroom. The bouncer then came out of the bathroom and approached him. 
Upon confrontation by the security guard, bomber then detonated the bomb at 
10:30 p.m. 
Minor Theme 1: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization. 
A minor theme with only one occurrence was the successful attack claimed by the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization. Suicide attack 1 (SA1) was 
by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is the military wing of the Fatah organization. The 
attack was in response to the previous security operations in their refugee camp. “The 
network utilized for the attack was affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is 
considered the military wing of the Fatah organization of the West Bank. The network 
was based in the Deheisheh refugee camp of Bethlehem.” 
Terrorist training. The second category was the terrorist training of the attackers. 
From the content analysis of the worksheet, one major theme emerged, that no special 
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training was conducted for the attack, and one minor theme emerged, which was very 
well trained and prepared for the attack. 
Major Theme 2: No special training conducted for the attack. The second major 
theme was that two of the three attacks had no special training conducted. SA2 and SA3 
had no special training performed or identified. However, it was reported that both the 
handler and bomber met with each other a day before the attack. “No special training was 
used in this attack; however, the handler and bomber met the day prior to the attack in the 
neighboring city of Ramallah, and the handler took the bomber to the scene.” 
 Minor Theme 2: Very well trained and prepared for the attack. The one minor 
theme was the successful attack’s excellent training and preparation. SA1 was very well 
planned by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. It was described that the suspects carefully 
strategized the attack to the point of disguising as one of the local religious Jews in order 
to move and operate more swiftly. 
The training was done in the refugee camps next to Jerusalem, which enables ease 
of access to the targeted city at the time of the execution of the attack. Suicide 
bomber had been prepared to the extent of dressing like a religious Jew and 
thereby was able to operate easier in this environment. 
General Planning. The third category was the general planning of the attackers. 
Based on the content analysis, findings indicated that the successful attacks had complete 
coordination and the plans were followed as intended, such as the time of attack, 
disguise, and transportation; thus, one major theme emerged in this phase. 
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Major Theme 3: Complete coordination, followed as planned (time of attack, 
disguise, transportation, etc.). The third major theme of the study was the full 
coordination of the attack groups in fully executing their plans. All three attacks 
embodied the said characteristic. SA1 was well planned and well-coordinated. The attack 
was successful because it was executed according to the planned time, location, and 
crowd number. In addition, the bomber even prepared a disguise to avoid from being 
suspected among the crowd members. 
Well planned target based on time of attack, location of the attack, with a 
choreographed attack to coincide with the ending of religious classes at the end of 
the Jewish Sabbath. Time of the attack was well planned as well as disguise the 
bomber wore to include a Jewish skullcap. 
SA2 was also well executed; the plan was completed with an efficient escape 
vehicle. Another factor for success was the fact that the handler personally went to the 
site to count the number of people at the planned time of attack. By doing so, both the 
handler and bomber were prepared for the actual attack. 
Planning included a taxi driver most likely chosen for ease to escape as well as a 
vehicle often used in center city due to traffic congestion. The handler shared that 
prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many people went in and 




Lastly, SA3 was implemented as planned. The members of the cell were 
permanent residents of Israel which allowed them to freely access and travel the targeted 
area in Jerusalem. As residents, they were skilled and had enough knowledge on how to 
move around the target area. 
The attack was carried out by the Silwan cell. Silwan is an Arab neighborhood 
located in East Jerusalem on the outskirts of the old city. The members of the cell 
had permanent resident status in Israel, which allowed them to travel in Israel 
without suspicion. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas in Ramallah to 
locate and suicide bomb a target in crowded area in Jerusalem. 
Recruitment. The fourth category was the recruitment process of the attack 
groups. From the content analysis, there were three minor themes that emerged, each 
having one occurrence: (a) coming from a refugee camp, (b) volunteered for the suicide 
bombing, and (c) coming from one neighborhood; easier recruitment. 
Minor Theme 3: Coming from a refugee camp. The first minor theme of the 
category was the attackers coming from a refugee camp. SA1 was a response to the 
security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs 
highlighted that the bomber was directly from the refugee camp and committed the act to 
condemn the treatments received at the refugee camp. “The bomber was from a refugee 
camp near Bethlehem. According to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade spokesman. This 
operation is a response to the Israeli crimes committed in our heroic refugee camps. We 
selected a refugee to launch this response.” 
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Minor Theme 4: Volunteered for the suicide bombing. The second minor theme in 
this category was the attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing. SA2 had a volunteer 
bomber paired with a handler to execute the attack. In addition, the volunteer bomber was 
also a part-time student and a part-time journalist, 
Bomber volunteered for the suicide bombing and was paired up with handler to 
act as his handler, a Palestinian woman from the West Bank town of Nabi Salih. 
At the time of the attack, she was a 20-year-old part time student at Birzeit 
University and a part time journalist. 
Minor Theme 5: Coming from one neighborhood; easier recruitment. The third 
minor theme in this category was that the attackers came from one neighborhood 
implying an easier recruitment. SA3 had cell members coming from the same residential 
area or neighborhood. This became an advantage to the success of the attack as the eight 
members of the cell were able to plan and recruit accordingly to prepare for the possible 
security barriers on the day and time of the attack. 
The attack was carried out by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, the militant arm 
of Hamas. The Silwan cell was directly responsible for the attack. Total members 
of the cell were eight. All cell members were residents of the same neighborhood, 
thereby making recruitment locally and enabling a safe means for indoctrination 
in mitigating security forces interdiction.   
Financing. The fifth category was the financing of the attackers. All three attacks 
were reported to be funded by large organizations, which was the fourth major theme of 
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the study. SA1 was funded by the Fatah organization, with a reported budget of $50,000 
per month. “The entire operation was financed under a fund of $50,000 per month to 
conduct such attacks by the Fatah organization.” On the other hand, SA2 was funded by 
the Hamas group. The reported amounts were $500 and $117,000, respectively. It was 
shared that “Hamas paid $500 for the bomb itself and $117,000 for the operation by the 
bomber.” SA3 was reportedly funded by the Arab Bank in cooperation with the Hamas 
group. It was also indicated that the entire operation was under the support and direction 
of Hamas Ramallah. 
The Arab Bank was later sued for allegations of working with Hamas in financing 
the attack. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas in Ramallah to locate and 
suicide bomb a target in crowded area in Jerusalem. The entire operation was 
under the command and direction of Hamas Ramallah. 
Operational Planning. The sixth category was the operational planning of the 
attacks. In two of the three attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the attack site prior to the 
actual implementation. From the content analysis, there was one major theme, scouting of 
attack site, and two minor themes, targeting a large number of people to obtain a high 
number of casualties at a specific time and location, and suspects disguised themselves. 
Major Theme 5: Scouting of attack site. The fifth major theme of the study was 
the scouting of the attack site by the attackers prior to the execution of their plans, which 
was performed in two of the three successful attacks. SA2 was executed as planned, 
having the handler scout the target area by counting the number people within the vicinity 
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of the restaurant at the time of their attack. The scouting of the handler allowed for them 
to strategically plan for the attack on the following day.  
Hamas paid the bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case. 
The handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how 
many people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the 
restaurant would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber 
for the first time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before 
traveling to Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led the bomber to the target 
location. 
On the day of the attack, both took a taxi from the West Bank city of 
Ramallah to Jerusalem. Prior to leaving the West Bank, the two had disguised 
themselves as tourists to blend in once they got to Jerusalem. Handler left the site 
to go back to Ramallah through the Damascus gate of the Old City, and at 2 p.m., 
the bomber detonated the device.  
SA3 was performed with the instructions of Hamas to search for a specific attack 
site that would give them an ease of access without encountering any security hindrances 
or barriers that would not go along with their plans. The bomber was able to get inside 
the target site without being seen by the bouncer and by the time the bouncer noticed the 
suspicious act of the bomber, the explosive was detonated. 
Weeks before the bombing, cell leadership were given instructions from Hamas to 
scout for an attack site. The eight-member cell was in place inside Jerusalem as 
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the neighborhood they lived in was a part of the city, thereby easing targeting and 
reconnaissance operations. On the night of the attack, the Silwan cell members 
assigned to act as handlers for the bomber, picked up and drove the bomber to the 
café at 10 p.m. They arrived at 10:29 p.m. Bomber then walked into the café 
through the garden. Normally, he would have had to talk to a bouncer to get in, 
but he was in the bathroom. The bouncer then came out of the bathroom and 
approached him due to his suspicious behavior and upon confrontation, the 
bomber detonated the bomb at 10:30 p.m. 
Minor Theme 6: Targeting a large number of casualties at a specific time and 
location. The first minor theme of this phase was the plan of targeting a large number of 
casualties at a specific time and location. Only one successful attack practiced this theme. 
SA1 was planned by targeting a large number of casualties gathered outside of an 
institution following a celebration. It was reported that the attack was very precise, 
detonating the bomb at the exact time after the classes have ended and individuals were 
starting to gather for their free time. The attack later struck the students coming from the 
Yeshiva.  
On March 2, 2002, a large group of Haredi Orthodox Jews had gathered outside 
of a Yeshiva in the Beit Yisrael neighborhood following a bar mitzvah 
celebration. At approximately 7 p.m., the suicide bomber detonated a bomb in a 
car outside of the Yeshiva killing 11 and wounding more than 50 people. The 
bomber had been recruited by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to carry out this 
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attack. This attack would later be known as the Beit Yisrael Massacre. The 
bomber struck at the precise moment to exact a large number of casualties, just as 
classes on religious thought at the religious school had ended and students and 
others filled the small neighborhood streets to enjoy a few hours of free time. 
Minor Theme 7: Suspects disguised themselves. The second minor theme of this 
phase was the plan of disguising the suspects. There was only one successful attack 
related to this theme. For the SA2, the scouting of the handler became useful as their 
group was able to prepare a disguise to act swiftly on the day of the attack. The handler 
and the bomber disguised themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed and be credulous as 
they executed their plan. 
Hamas paid bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case. The 
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many 
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant 
would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber for the first 
time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before traveling to 
Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led bomber to the target location. 
On the day of the attack, both took a taxi from the West Bank city of 
Ramallah to Jerusalem. Prior to leaving the West Bank, the two had disguised 
themselves as tourists to blend in once they got to Jerusalem. The handler left the 
site to go back to Ramallah through the Damascus gate of the Old City and at 2 
p.m. the bomber detonated the device.  
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Weapons procurement. The seventh category of the framework was the weapons 
procurement which had two major themes and one minor theme. Two of the three attacks 
used explosives devices with other sharp metal objects and employed their groups’ chief 
bombmaker. In one attack, the attacker used an improvised explosive device.  
Major Theme 6: Using of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to 
impose the most damage. SA2 and SA3 employed explosives hidden by the attackers or 
bombers, where the explosives were mixed with metal objects to perpetrate the most 
damage and destruction to their attack sites. “The device in this attack was explosives 
hidden in a guitar case containing nails, nuts, and bolts to inflict the most damage. It was 
constructed by Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time.” 
Major Theme 7: Created by the group’s chief bombmaker. SA2 and SA3 also 
utilized weapons or explosives that were assembled by Hamas’s primary bombmakers 
during the time of the attacks. “The device in this attack was explosives hidden in a guitar 
case containing nails, nuts, and bolts to inflict the most damage. It was constructed by 
Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time.” 
Minor Theme 8: Using an improvised explosive device. SA1 involved an 
improvised explosive device strapped to the chest of the bomber at the time of the attack. 
The improvised explosive device was detonated as the attacker stayed beside a group of 
mothers with babies at the school institution’s entrance. 
Weapon was an improved explosive device with the bomber being the delivery 
mechanism of the explosive device. Law enforcement shared that the large device 
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was strapped to the chest of the bomber who detonated himself as he stood next to 
a group of mothers with baby strollers near the school’s guesthouse entrance. 
Logistical preparation. The eighth category of Freeman et al.’s (2010) framework 
was the logistical preparation. From the analysis, one major theme and one minor theme 
were obtained. In two of the three attacks, the attackers reportedly used disguises that 
were appropriate to their target demographics and location. In another attack, attackers 
formed a cell within their local target area for easier mobility. 
Major Theme 8: Using a disguise, appropriate to the target demographics and 
location. In SA1, the bomber used a realistic disguise to perform the plans strategically 
without being suspected by the authorities. Furthermore, the bomber wore the explosive 
device to cover the large volumes of explosives to be used for the attack. 
Logistics included a disguise of the bomber as well as the age of the bomber was 
indicative of a teen taking part in the religious classes after the Sabbath or as one 
of the party goers to the bar mitzva taking place at the same time. A hostel is also 
at the same location which tends to host guests of a teenager age bracket. The 
explosive device was worn on the bomber in an effort to hide and conceal the 
large amounts of explosives until detonation. 
In SA2, the attacker had a guitar case containing the explosives as well as the 
metal objects used to ensure that the destruction and result would be in the group’s favor.  
Bombmaker was paid $500 for the bomb itself and $117,000 for his troubles. The 
device he built was 5 to 10 kilograms (kg) of explosives hidden inside a guitar 
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case filled with nails, bolts, and nuts. In addition, the handler and bomber dressed 
as tourists with a guitar case to disguise the explosive device. 
Minor theme 9: Forming a cell within the local target area. To ease the logistical 
operations, SA3 employed a local cell which allowed them to freely move around the city 
in planning and executing their attack. 
Ease to conduct logistics was because of the cell being locally based and having 
received orders from outside of Israel, in Ramallah. This enabled logistics to be 
conducted within Jerusalem, utilizing Israeli licensed vehicles, Israeli citizens, 
and free movement to all parts of the city. 
Operational preparation. The final and ninth category of the framework was 
operational preparation which included all three successful attacks’ thorough research 
and planning of target sites, led by the handlers. SA1 had a handler who led and guided 
the bomber to the target site during the attack. The handler assisted in evading security 
from the refugee camp to the target site, and the knowledge of the handler paved the way 
to target a location that was congested at a certain time, perfect for their aim and purpose. 
Thorough understanding by the adversary cell included the ability to bypass 
security leaving the refugee camp and entering Israel to arrive at the target site in 
Jerusalem. This required a handler that took the bomber from the refugee camp to 
the target site prior to the attack hour. In addition, taking into account that the 
attack was planned at this particular time and the exact location required 
operational planning that included identifying the events taking place in such a 
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congested target site and understanding the population of which the bomber must 
operate.   
SA2 was also effective because of the handler’s scouting of the target site prior to 
the actual day of attack. The handler personally visited the site, and observed and counted 
the number of individuals to obtain a visual of the site. 
His Hamas hander led him to the site the day of the bombing. The handler shared 
that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many people went in 
and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant would be when 
attacked. 
Finally, SA3 also had handlers or leaders who guided the bombers in moving 
around the city. It was reported that the handlers led the bombers to the target site at a 
precise time or when the café was busy and crowded. 
Members of the Silwan cell held residency in Israel allowing them to move about 
freely. On the night of the attack, the cell handlers picked up and drove the 
bomber to the café at 10 p.m. They arrived at 10:30 p.m. The drive time to the 
location was timed for an attack when the café was at full capacity. 
Site data collection worksheet. The second data source was the site data 
collection worksheet. The site data collection worksheet differs from the terrorist activity 
data collection worksheet and questionnaire into suicide bombing events as I visited the 
site of each of the suicide bombing cases and I used the worksheet to collect data at each 
site. From the analysis of the second data source, only the categories of networking and 
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indoctrination; and general planning emerged. There were one major theme and one 
minor theme. Table 5 contains the breakdown of the results from the content analysis of 
the site data collection worksheet of the successful attacks. 
Table 5 
Results Breakdown from the Site Data Collection Worksheet of the Successful Attacks 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 
1. Networking and 
indoctrination 
 
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
affiliated with the Fatah 
organization, to condemn 
the treatment in refugee 
camps 
1 
3. General planning 
 
 
Targeting a site with a 
probability of a high 




Networking and indoctrination. The first category was the networking and 
indoctrination of the attacks. From the analysis, the data only indicated one attack 
networking plan. It was found that one successful attack was by the al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization, to condemn the treatment in refugee 
camps, which was the only minor theme for successful attacks using the site data 
collection worksheet. The responsibility for SA1 was claimed by the al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade. The main motive of the group was to condemn the treatment in the refugee 
camps, in addition, another goal was to target the Israeli Jews and ultra-Orthodox. “The 
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility and claimed their motive was because of 
treatment in the refugee camps. Furthermore, their goal was to kill Israeli Jews and the 
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ultra-Orthodox were chosen because they are exempt from military service.” 
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three 
successful attacks. All three attacks reported to target a site with a probability of a high 
number of causalities, at a certain time, which was the main theme for successful attacks 
using the site data collection worksheet. SA1 was generally planned to target the Israeli 
Jews. In particular, the attackers wanted to cause distress to the Israeli Jews by timing the 
attack after a bar mitzvah celebration. The attackers aimed to cause suffering to the large 
groups of families in the neighborhood. 
The site was a synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood. The site 
was chosen to specifically attack Israeli Jews at a time when the high 
concentration of religious Jews was guaranteed as a target based on events taking 
place, ease of access, disguise capabilities, and lack of security. 
The attack occurred during a bar mitzvah celebration and at the end of the 
Sabbath, which results in large amounts of younger targets for the attack. 
This is a religious neighborhood and Saturday evening does not have any 
shopping districts open, but rather large groups of teens who are congregating 
with their peers after spending most of the day in prayer and with family. 
SA2 also related to access to the location and the large number of people as it was 
a tourist spot. It was reported that selecting commercial area decreased the chance of 




The site was chosen because it was easily accessible, the location would be 
crowded, the site was located in a commercial district, and no one would really 
expect or see the attack coming, thus increasing the likelihood of success.    
The bomber and his handler took a cab from Ramallah directly to 
Jerusalem. At the time, this would have been a very direct and quick route to take 
to the site.   
The site was located in the Downtown Triangle district in Jerusalem. The 
district is heavily visited by both locals and tourists. There are many small shops 
located within the vicinity of the site. Located 20 meters (m) Northeast from the 
Ha-Pa’amon mall. There is a hospital located approximately 110 m Northeast of 
the site. The closest religious site is the Tiferet Yisrael Synagogue, located 
approximately 250 m Northwest of the location. 
Finally, SA3 was also planned with the target being the destruction of a popular 
and crowded location. With the high probability of affecting a large number of people as 
well as an effect to the government, the attack was planned and executed accordingly. 
The site was a popular location, which increased the chances of casualties. In 
addition, it was located within 100 m of Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, residence. 
It was located on Azza Street, the major thoroughfare for the Rehavia 
neighborhood. The street had other cafés and shops near the site. 
Unlike most places, the café was open late Friday night into the early 
morning of Saturday, which made it a popular location.   
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Questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The third data source was the 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events, which was used to collect open source 
information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases. In this 
data source, I found themes for eight of the nine categories, but data was lacking on the 
second category, terrorist training. There were four major themes and 11 minor themes. 





Results Breakdown from the Questionnaire of the Successful Attack 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 
1. Networking and 
indoctrination 
Military wing of the Fatah 
organization 
1 
 Hamas organization is 
response to the assassinations 
of their two leaders 
1 
3. General planning Targeting a site with the 
probability of a high number 
of casualties at a certain time 
(number of causalities, 
accessibility, time) 
3 
4. Recruitment Knowledge in entering or 
accessing the country of target 
2 
 Bomber was recruited by the 
Hamas organization 
2 
 al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
affiliated with the Fatah 
organization in retaliation of 
the operations in the refugee 
camp 
1 
 Volunteered for the attack 1 
5. Financing Funded by large organizations 2 
6. Operational planning Using a car to the attack site; 
with the assistance of a 
handler 
1 
7. Weapons procurement Assembled from camp and 
transported to target site 
1 
 Using of explosive devices 
with other sharp metal objects 
to impose the most damage 
1 
 Created by a group’s chief 
bombmaker 
1 
8. Logistical preparation Bomb was hidden in a guitar 
case; Using a disguise 
1 
9. Operational preparation Finding a location with 
minimal security and barriers 
1 




 Networking and indoctrination. Under the first category, two minor themes 
emerged, each receiving just one occurrence respectively. From the questionnaire, it was 
discovered that the two groups involved were the military wing of the Fatah organization 
(Minor Theme 1) and the Hamas organization is response to the assassinations of their 
two leaders (Minor Theme 2). SA1 was an attack systematically organized and 
subsidized by the military section of the Fatah organization from the Bethlehem region. 
“This attack was organized and funded by the military wing of the Fatah organization 
who is well structured and funded in the Bethlehem region.” SA2 was a response by the 
Hamas organization to the slayings of their two leaders, which occurred 10 days before 
the bombing. “Hamas, who carried out the attack, stated that the bombing was a response 
to the assassinations of two Hamas leaders that occurred 10 days prior to the bombing. 
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three 
successful attacks, where all three attacks targeted sites with the probability of a high 
number of casualties at a certain time (number of causalities, accessibility, and time). 
This is the first major theme in the questionnaire into suicide bombing events of the 
successful attacks. SA1 was planned with the target of disturbing the ultra-Orthodox 
neighborhood, which was known to be jammed and unsecured; which was a perfect 
location for the attack. Furthermore, the target site is popular for tourists and religious 
families with minimal causalities from the Muslim community. 
The site was picked because it was located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood. 
The attack resulted in a large amount of casualties in that it is congested, lacked 
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security, and was located along the corridor that leads to the Palestinian 
territories. 
Site is known for tourists as well as local religious civilians for a place to 
view ultra-Orthodox living in Jerusalem as well as for religious families who 
travel to the neighborhood for shopping and studying. 
The site was picked to specifically target Israeli Orthodox Jews with 
minimal casualties to the Muslim community in the city. 
It was just after 7 p.m. at the end of Shabbat, people would be 
congregating for a bar mitzvah in the target location. The end of the Sabbath was 
at the time of the attack and this led to an increase in civilians outside. 
Similarly, SA2 was another target site that was chosen because of its accessibility 
and the number of probable causalities resulting from the attack. The target site was 
based on the careful scouting of the handler; thus, choosing a site with a large number of 
tourists allowed them to work and move without being suspected with acting 
suspiciously. 
The target site was selected because it was easily accessible, it was located in a 
commercial district, meaning there would be people at the location, and it would 
be unsuspected and catch people off guard, increasing the chances of success. 
This site was located at the corner of Jaffa Road and King George Street in 
the Downtown Triangle district. This location guarantees there would be lots of 
people in the restaurant or its vicinity. Also, the site is very accessible on foot, by 
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bus, and by car, both taxis and private vehicles. The Downtown district receives 
lots of tourists, which made it easier for the bomber and his handler to approach 
the site without appearing suspicious. The decision to bomb this particular site 
was based on scouting done by the handler prior to the attack. The location was 
chosen because it would be crowded when they attacked. 
The time of the attack was based on when they believed the restaurant 
would be crowded. 
Finally, SA3 was another terror aggression planned with the aim of affecting the 
government and destroying several commercial establishments. In addition, the group has 
always had the aim of negatively affecting and bombing the most crowded areas in 
Jerusalem. 
It was a popular area for recreation and located 100 m from Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s residence. The site was a very popular café that would turn into a bar at 
night. It was also open late even on the Sabbath. 
The attack was carried out by the Silwan cell. Silwan is a Palestinian 
neighborhood located in East Jerusalem on the outskirts of the old city. The 
members of the cell had permanent resident status in Israel, which allowed them 
to travel in Israel without suspicion. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas 
in Ramallah to locate and suicide bomb a crowded area in Jerusalem. 
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A popular late-night hangout for younger people. It is suspected that the 
location was chosen because of its proximity to the then Prime Minister’s 
Residence and because it was a popular location. 
Recruitment. The fourth category was the recruitment made by the three 
successful attacks. From the content analysis, two major themes and two minor themes 
emerged. It was then discovered that the recruitments centered on the knowledge in 
entering or accessing the country of target and mainly by the Hamas organization. 
Major Theme 2: Knowledge in entering or accessing the country of target. SA1 
had a bomber who was recruited from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The bomber had a 
direct and easy access entering Israel. “Bomber was recruited from within the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade as he was known and active against security forces and was chosen 
because he had access to entering into Israel.” SA3 was similar to SA1 where the 
bombers had easy access to travel to and from Israel. Having Israeli cards allowed the 
attackers to travel and search for the most ideal location for their target. 
Hamas instructed the bombers to find a crowded location to bomb. The bombers 
were residents of East Jerusalem and had Israeli ID cards, allowing them to travel 
in and out of Israel. The attack was organized by the Silwan cell who were taking 
instructions from Hamas. 
Major Theme 3: Bomber was recruited by the Hamas organization. SA2 was a 
terror aggression claimed by the Hamas organization in response to the killings of their 
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two leaders. It was reported that Hamas has been responsible for many bombings and 
attacks before the August 9, 2001 attack. 
Hamas claimed the bombing was a response to the assassination of two Hamas 
leaders. The bombing happened during the Second Intifada, September 28, 2000 
through February 8, 2005. Hamas, who carried out this attack, was responsible for 
many bombing prior to and after this attack.   
SA3 again was instructed and funded by the Hamas organization, with recruits 
who had direct access to and from Israel. 
Hamas instructed attackers to find a crowded location to bomb. The bomber was a 
resident of East Jerusalem and had Israeli ID cards, which allowed them to travel 
in and out of Israel. The attack was organized by the Silwan cell who took 
instructions from Hamas. 
Minor Theme 3: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization 
in retaliation of the operations in the refugee camp. SA1 was performed by the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade, associated with the Fatah organization to address the Israeli security 
acts in the refugee camp. 
The claim by the Fatah organization spokesman was that the attack was in 
retaliation for the recent Israeli security operations in the refugee camp.  
The bomber came from the refugee camp, Daheisha, right outside the 
Palestinian city of Bethlehem. This is a violent refugee camp, known for many 
attacks in Israel and within the refugee camp against security forces. 
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Minor Theme 4: Volunteered for the attack. SA2 had bomber who volunteered for 
the attack; and both bomber and handler was matched only on the day of the attack. 
“Bomber volunteered for the attack and was paired up with his handler on the day of the 
attack.” 
Financing. The fifth category was the financing of the successful attacks. From 
the content analysis, the fourth major theme was discovered, which was that the attacks 
were funded by large organizations. SA1 was funded by the military wing of the Fatah 
organization called as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. More specifically, it was reported 
that Yasser Arafat was the major financier of the group. 
This attack was organized and funded by the military wing of the Fatah 
organization who is well structured and funded in the Bethlehem region. 
The al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade is the militant arm of the Palestinian 
Authority. It was discovered after the attack that they had been receiving funding 
directly from Yasser Arafat. 
SA2 was funded by the Hamas organization. The bomber was paid $500 and 
Hamas also provided other materials, resources, and transportation for the attack. 
Hamas paid bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case. The 
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many 
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant 
would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber for the first 
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time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before traveling to 
Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led the bomber to the target location. 
Operational planning. The sixth category was the operational planning, which 
had one minor theme, which was using a car that was going to the attack site, with the 
assistance of a handler. Thus, with SA1, the attacker used a car that was going to the 
target location, with the presence of a handler, and security disruptions were also 
mitigated. The operational planning was effective, having the bomber arrive using a car 
and at the same time, ensuring that the bomb was detonated at the right time.  
Bomber took a car to the site with the assistance of a handler who guided the 
bomber into the target location and assisted in exploiting the security checkpoints 
leaving Bethlehem region. 
The neighborhood had been attacked 3 times before. In this case, the 
bomber arrived in a car and detonated the bomb when approaching the crowded 
target.   
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was the process of weapon 
procurement of the successful attacks. These three different attacks also had three 
different methods of weapons procurements. The three minor themes were assembled 
from camp and transported to target site, using of explosive devices with other sharp 
metal objects to impose the most damage, and created by a group’s chief bombmaker. 
Minor Theme 6: Assembled from camp and transported to target site. SA1 
members came from a refugee camp and the devices were collected, formed, and brought 
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to the target site. “The devices were assembled and transported from the refugee camp to 
Jerusalem, Israel.” 
Minor Theme 7: Using of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to 
impose the most damage. SA2 was executed using various explosive devices with sharp 
metal objects aimed to enforce greater damages and fatalities. It was reported that the use 
of explosives with sharp objects is a signature act by the Hamas group.  
The bomb used in this attack used nuts, bolts, and nails to create a shrapnel effect 
to inflict more damage and create more casualties. The use of sharp objects in 
addition to explosives is used in many explosive devices used by Hamas. 
Minor Theme 8: Created by a group’s chief bombmaker. SA3 was also 
accomplished with the help of Hamas’s chief bombmaker. “The bomb was built by 
Abdullah Ghaleb Barghouti, who was Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time. He had 
built other bombs used in attacks during the Second Intifada for Hamas.” 
Logistical preparation. The eighth category had one minor theme (this was Minor 
Theme 9 in the questionnaire into suicide bombing events of the successful attacks), 
which was the finding that the bomb was hidden in a guitar case and using a disguise. 
SA2 had a bomb that was hidden by the bombmaker inside a guitar case as a disguise and 
to conceal the explosives. “The bomb was made in the West Bank village of Burqa by the 
bombmaker and hidden in a guitar case.” 
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Operational preparation. The final category was operational preparation. From 
the content analysis of the questionnaire, two minor themes were established, each 
receiving one occurrence respectively. 
Minor Theme 10: Finding a location with minimal security and barriers. SA1 was 
executed given that the handler and bomber moved swiftly from one territory to another 
because of minimal security barriers while traveling to the target location. “The 
movement from the Palestinian territories to the target site was fairly exploitable in that 
minimal checkpoints could be bypassed and there was no need to enter the more secure 
center city district.” 
Minor Theme 11: Finding a crowded location. For SA2, emphasis was placed on 
the importance for the terror groups in finding a crowded and packed target location. In 
the attack on August 9, 2001, the handler stated that he previously inspected and 
observed the location to strategize and plan more effectively. 
The site was chosen because it was a crowded location with easy access. The 
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many 
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant 
would be when attacked. 
Unsuccessful Attacks 
Terrorist activity data collection worksheet. Under the unsuccessful attacks, 
the first data source analyzed was the terrorist activity data collection worksheet. From 
the content analysis of the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, no information was 
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found about the logistical preparations of the unsuccessful attacks (Phase 8). In addition, 
findings indicated that the attackers had very little information about their planning and 
attack strategies. There were three major themes and 12 minor themes. Table 7 contains 





Result Breakdown from the Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet of the 
Unsuccessful Attacks 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 





 Unemployed suspect 1 
 Islamic Jihad network 1 
2. Terrorist training Trained by the Fatah 
organization 
1 
 No relevant training known 1 
3. General planning Travel to the target site to 
detonate themselves and the 
locals 
3 
4. Recruitment Fatah organization 1 
 Unemployed suspect 1 
 Islamic Jihad network 1 
5. Financing Funded by the Government 
of Iran through the Islamic 
Jihad network  
1 
6. Operational planning Tamper security and attack 
a populated site 
1 
 Paying a driver to smuggle 
the suspect to Israel and 
help with the attack 
1 
7. Weapons procurement 5 kg explosive 
 
2 
9. Operational preparation Detonating at a populated 
site 
2 
 Paying a driver to smuggle 
the suspect to Israel and 




 Networking and indoctrination. The first category under the unsuccessful attacks 
had three minor themes: (a) Fatah organization, (b) unemployed suspect, and (c) Islamic 
Jihad network. The unsuccessful attacks were organized by diverse groups. One suspect 
was identified as an unemployed attacker. Unsuccessful suicide attack 1 (USA1) was 
connected to the Fatah organization. In regard to unsuccessful suicide attack 2 (USA2), 
there were no other details about the network connected to the terrorist activity, but the 
suspect was unemployed. Unsuccessful suicide attack 3 (USA3) had a suicide bomber 
with ties to the Islamic Jihad network and other terror groups outside of Israel. “The 
would-be suicide bomber was connected to the Islamic Jihad network, which is 
connected to other terrorist organizations outside of Israel as well as being connected to 
governments that sponsor Islamic terrorism.” 
Terrorist training. The second category was the training of the attackers. From 
the content analysis of the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the unsuccessful 
attacks had limited details about the training. Two underlying minor themes emerged: (a) 
trained by the Fatah organization, where USA1 was reportedly handled, supported, and 
trained provided by the same group, which was the Fatah organization; and (b) no 
relevant training known, where with USA3, the bomber had no relevant training. 
General planning. The third category was the general planning conducted by the 
attackers. The terrorist activity data collection worksheet was analyzed and one major 
theme was formed, where all three unsuccessful attackers attempted to travel to the target 
site to detonate themselves and the residents. For USA1, the bomber planned to travel 
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“from Gaza, infiltrate Israel, and head to a central Israeli location to detonate himself.” In 
addition, USA2 also had attackers who traveled from the West Bank to the target 
location. “Go to Jerusalem from the West Bank, find Yafo St, detonate himself and 
others.” Finally, with SA3, the plan was to pay a Palestinian driver to smuggle the 
bomber and the explosives into Israel. Once in Israel, it shared that the bomber made his 
way to the bus stop near the target area and planned to detonate the device from there. 
The would-be suicide bomber’s plan was to pay a Palestinian driver who was a 
resident of the Old City that routinely smuggled Palestinians into Israel and to 
smuggle him and the explosives he was carrying into Israel. Once in Israel, he 
planned to make his way to the bus stop near the Haifa area checkpoint junction 
to detonate an explosive device.     
Recruitment. Another category was the recruitment performed by the organizers 
of the three unsuccessful attacks. Similar to the networking category, three different 
minor themes were discovered: (a) Fatah organization, where USA1 was planned by the 
Fatah organization; (b) unemployed suspect, where USA2 involved an “unemployed 
Palestinian from the northern part of the West Bank;” and (3) Islamic Jihad network, 
where USA3 was linked to the Islamic Jihad network and other terror organizations 
outside of Israel. “The would-be suicide bomber was connected to the Islamic Jihad 
network, which is connected to other terrorist organizations outside of Israel as well as 
being connected to governments that sponsor Islamic terrorism.” There was very little 
information about the identity and background of the attackers. 
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 Financing. Another category was the financial aspect of the category. Only one 
minor theme emerged, which was the report that one unsuccessful attack was funded by 
the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. It was reported that USA3 
was funded by the Iranian Government through the Islamic Jihad network, but the full 
transaction did not go through; however, portions of the $1.8 million were still 
transferred and used for the attack. 
One month before the foiled attempt, the Government of Iran tried to send 1.8 
million dollars to the Islamic Jihad network. Israeli authorities were able to stop 
some of the money from being transferred into the West Bank, but not all of it.   
Operational planning. The sixth category of the preattack phase was operation 
planning. From the three analyzed unsuccessful attacks, two minor themes emerged that 
received one occurrence each. For the first minor theme, tamper security and attack a 
populated site, USA1 involved the plan to “tamper with border security fences to 
infiltrate Israel, then proceed to a populated part of central Israel.” For the second minor 
theme, paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack, USA3 
involved the “bomber paying a driver who was known to smuggle Palestinians from the 
West Bank to Israel $200 New Israeli Sheqel (NIS).” 
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was planning in terms of weapons 
procurement. Under this category, one major theme was formed with two occurrences, 
where two unsuccessful attacks employed 5 kg of explosives. USA1 had a “5 kg waist-
worn explosive from Fatah,” while in USA2, 5 kg of explosives was procured. 
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Operational preparation. The eighth category was the operational preparation of 
the attempted attacks. The final category as analyzed from the terrorist activity data 
collection worksheet had one major theme, detonating at a populated site; and one minor 
theme, paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack. 
Major Theme 3: Detonating at a populated site. USA1 plan involved executing 
the attack at a much populated and crowded area. The plan entailed tampering “with 
border security fences to infiltrate Israel from Gaza, then proceed to a populated part of 
central Israel and detonate himself in an undisclosed central Israeli location, presumably 
Jerusalem.” USA2 involved obtained an explosive to detonate at a commercial or 
populated street. “Obtained the explosive from an unknown source, ask local Arabs 
where Yafo Street was and if there were police or military forces there, then detonate 
somewhere on the street.” 
Minor Theme 12: Paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with 
the attack. USA3 entailed hired a driver that would smuggle the bomber to Israel at all 
costs. “The would-be bomber found a driver who would smuggle him into Israel no 
questions asked.”  
Site data collection worksheet. The second data source for the unsuccessful 
attacks was the site data collection worksheet. From the content analysis of this data 
source, only three framework categories emerged. There were one major theme and three 
minor themes. Table 8 contains the breakdown of the results from the content analysis of 




Result Breakdown from the Site Data Collection Worksheet of the Unsuccessful Attacks 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 
1. Networking and 
indoctrination 
Islamic Jihad Movement to 
get revenge 
1 
3. General planning Dense location with high 
concentration of religious 
Jews 
3 
7. Weapons procurement 5 to 7 kg explosive device 1 
 
Networking and indoctrination. The first category was networking and 
indoctrination of the attempted attacks. Only one minor theme emerged, which was the 
Islamic Jihad Movement to get revenge. USA3 involved different motives and objectives 
for the terror occurrence. The attack on March 21, 2006 was planned and executed by the 
Islamic Jihad Movement in order to interrupt the Israeli elections as well as contract 
revenge for a young Palestinian girl who was previously killed from a raid. 
Police believe that one of the men was an operative from the Islamic Jihad 
Movement of Palestine, who planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv, in order to 
disrupt the Israeli elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, 
who was killed during an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid. 
General planning. The third category was general planning of the attempted 
attacks. In all three attacks, the bombers searched for a dense location with high 
concentration of religious Jews, which was the first major theme in the site data 
collection worksheet of the unsuccessful attacks. USA1 was planned in order to affect an 
area with a high concentration of religious Jews. “Target city has a high concentration of 
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religious Jews, as well as being a location that was contested by the Arab world and 
Israel.” USA2 was also planned to cause distress to religious Jews. The attack was 
targeted to destroy commercial sites and locations with dense populations. 
Target city has a high concentration of religious Jews, as well as being a location 
that was contested by the Arab world and Israel. Yafo Street is a highly-trafficked 
road and has a dense tourist population. 
Dense commercial location with hotels and restaurants, has been a site of 
previous attacks, and is a location in Jerusalem, which has been religiously 
contested. 
USA3’s location was chosen due because it was public and its composition of 
innocent individuals. It was reported that if the attack was executed as planned, the Israeli 
elections would have been heavily disrupted. 
The target site was chosen because it would be a public location with a lot of 
innocent people. If the attack did happen, it could have scared people into staying 
home on election day. The transportation route was chosen because the driver 
knew how to avoid security and smuggle in Palestinians who were working 
illegally. 
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was the weapons procurement of 
the groups who attempted the attacks. Again, only one minor theme emerged, which was 
the use of a 5 to 7 kg explosive device. USA3 involved obtaining a 5 to 7 kg explosive 
device. “After the men were arrested, the van was searched and an explosive device 
145 
 
between 5 and 7 kg was discovered.” 
Questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The third source was the 
questionnaire into suicide bombing events where information about the three 
unsuccessful attacks were analyzed. From the content analysis of this source, only six of 
the nine categories emerged. There were three major themes and five minor themes. 
Table 9 contains the breakdown of the results from the analysis of the questionnaire. 
Table 9 
Result Breakdown From the Questionnaire of the Unsuccessful Attacks 
Framework categories Themes No. of occurrences 
1. Networking and 
indoctrination 
Volunteer from the Gaza 
Strip 
1 
 Islamic Jihad Movement of 
Palestine 
1 
3. General planning Densely populated area or 
attack site 
2 
4. Recruitment Fatah organization 1 
 None reported 1 
6. Operational planning Hiring of a driver to bring 
the bomber to the location 
1 
7. Weapons procurement Assembled in Israel 2 
8. Logistical preparation Attempted to walk 2 
 
Networking and indoctrination. The first category, networking and 
indoctrination, had two minor themes: (a) volunteer from the Gaza Strip and (b) Islamic 
Jihad Movement of Palestine. Each of the themes only received one occurrence. For 
Minor Theme 1: Volunteer from the Gaza Strip, USA1 had a volunteer bomber from the 
Gaza Strip who had previously launched successful attacks. “The thwarted bomber was 
from the Gaza strip which has launched rockets and carried out attacks from that location 
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before presumably volunteering.” For Minor Theme 2: Islamic Jihad Movement of 
Palestine, USA3 was supposedly affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine. 
“The suspect affiliated himself with the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine and 
assumedly obtained an explosive from them, then boarded a van.” 
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three 
unsuccessful attempted attacks. The major theme that emerged was that the plan was to 
attack densely populated area or attack site, which received two occurrences. Another 
general plan discovered was from the USA2, where the aim was to affect a densely-
populated location or area with many tourists and citizens and cause disruption, “Densely 
populated . . . many tourists, residents of various faiths and citizenship. Densely 
populated area with high chances of achieving goal, all types of people.” USA3 was also 
performed because of the popularity and projected population of the attack site. “The 
target site was selected because it was a bus stop near a popular junction and would be 
crowded.” 
Recruitment. Another category was the recruitment followed by the groups, 
where two minor themes emerged. The first minor theme was that the recruitment was 
made by the Fatah organization, “Fatah group planned and attempted to execute their 
plan.” The second minor theme was that no other details about the recruitment emerged. 
USA2 had no actual recruitment details or information reported; however, it was only 
known that “he worked in central Israel and may have commuted through and visited 




Operational planning. The sixth category was the operational planning of the 
groups. From the content analysis of the questionnaire, only one minor theme emerged, 
which was one unsuccessful attack, where a driver was hired to bring the bomber to the 
location. Thus, for the USA3, a driver was hired to take the bomber to the actual location 
of the attempted attack, “The plan was to pay a driver $200 INS to take him to the 
location.” 
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was weapons procurement, which 
had one major theme. Two unsuccessful attacks had their weapons assembled and 
generated in Israel. For USA1, the attackers had their 5 kg explosives assembled in Gaza. 
“Explosives were presumably assembled in Gaza. The device itself seemed to follow a 
trend of 5 kg explosive systems outfitted for discretion like other bombing events.” On 
the other hand, in regard to USA2,“explosives were presumably assembled in the West 
Bank or in a site in Jerusalem.” 
Logistical preparation. The final category was the logistical preparation, which 
had one major theme. Two unsuccessful attackers attempted to reach their target point by 
foot. The USA1 logistical preparation was the attacker attempted to only reach the 
location by foot, “The bomber attempted to walk, further travel plans unknown.” 
Similarly, the bomber for the USA2 also attempted to reach the location by walking: 
The bomber attempted to walk. The suspect was caught with the explosive 
somewhere outside the Old City by foot. No specifics were said on exactly where, 
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but it can be assumed he was fairly close to the destination. Place of origin was 
somewhere in the northern part of the West Bank. 
Cross-Case Analysis 
From the analyses of the three data sources, which include the terrorist activity 
data collection worksheet, site data collection worksheet, and questionnaire into suicide 
bombing events, the nine preattack phases emerged in the successful and unsuccessful 
attacks, but they were more consistently present in the successful bombing cases. Based 
on the findings above, the nine preattack phases seemed to have played a vital role in the 
actual results of the attacks. For networking and indoctrination, it was found that the 
Hamas organization supported two of the three successful attacks examined in the study. 
Furthermore, I discovered that two of the successful attacks did not practice or perform 
any special training in executing the attack. In general, the successful attacks were 
executed by having skilled handlers and bombers who were able to ensure a complete 
coordination of factors where all plans were followed accordingly, such as the time of 
attack, disguise, and transportation.  
For the funding of the successful attacks, it was established that all three attacks 
were financially supported by large terror organizations and groups. In addition, the 
successful attacks were carefully planned by scouting the sites or location before the 
execution. Furthermore, to ensure the damage and destruction, the weapons were created 
by the group’s chief bombmaker and used explosive devices with other sharp metal 
objects to impose the most damage. Logistically, successful attackers mostly used 
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disguises appropriate to the target demographics and location. Finally, the successful 
attackers performed thorough research and planning of target sites, which were led by the 
handlers. The successful attackers mainly targeted a site that had a high probability of 
casualties at a certain time. 
As for the unsuccessful attacks, the nine preattack phases were also present; 
however, it was very much evident that when compared to the successful attacks, the 
details and information of the planning were vague and inadequate. Network and 
indoctrination included limited details about the attackers and suspect. Only one attacker 
was said to have been trained by the Fatah organization. The general plan of all three 
unsuccessful attacks was to travel to the target site to detonate themselves and the locals. 
Funding information was also unavailable and only one attack was believed to have been 
supported by the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. The weapons 
were 5-kg explosives, which were planned to be detonated in crowded and populated 
sites. From the questionnaire into suicide bombing events, analysis indicated that the 
weapons were assembled in Israel and attackers attempted to walk by foot to the target 
sites. From the themes found from the unsuccessful attacks, the actual and concrete 
planning and implementation of strategies by the attackers were deficient. The successful 
attackers had handlers and completely secured themselves to travel to the target site 
without much barrier. In the unsuccessful attacks, the attackers travelled by foot. 
Furthermore, no disguises and explosive cover ups were reported as compared to the 




In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Through 
content analysis and cross-case analysis, I analyzed data from the terrorist activity data 
collection worksheet, site data collection worksheet, and questionnaire into suicide 
bombing events of both the successful and unsuccessful attacks in Israel. The summary of 
the findings is discussed based on the overall findings from the three data collection 
sources at each phase. The multiple-case analysis allowed me to discover the themes that 
addressed the use and effectiveness of Freeman et al.’s (2010) preattack phases in three 
successful and three unsuccessful attacks. Based on the analyzed data, 13 major themes 
and 21 minor themes emerged for the successful attacks, whereas seven major themes 
and 20 minor themes emerged for the unsuccessful attacks.  
For the three successful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework phases 
were present in the successful attack findings; however, general planning, financing, and 
operational preparation had the most occurrences. For the first phase, networking and 
indoctrination, attacks were carried out by the Hamas group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade, who were affiliated with the Fatah organization. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
carried out a successful attack to condemn the treatment in refugee camps. The military 
wing of the Fatah organization and the Hamas organization carried out suicide attacks is 
response to the assassinations of their two leaders. For the second phase, terrorist 
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training, two of the three attacks had no special training conducted, while one successful 
attack involved excellent training and preparation. For the third phase, general planning, 
findings indicated that the successful attacks had complete coordination and the plans 
were followed as intended, such as the time of attack, disguise, and transportation. In 
addition, the attackers targeted sites that had a high probability for causalities, such as a 
synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood and Downtown Triangle district in 
Jerusalem. 
The fourth phase was recruitment and results showed that the attackers came from 
a refugee camp and an attack was in response to the security attacks and operations 
conducted near Bethlehem. In addition, findings indicated that attackers volunteered for 
the suicide bombing and the attackers came from one neighborhood, which made 
recruitment easier. The fifth phase was financing and all three attacks were reportedly 
funded by large organizations, such as Fatah organization, Hamas, and Arab Bank. The 
sixth phase was operational planning and findings indicated that for two of the three 
attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the attack site prior to the actual implementation. In 
addition, the attackers planned for a large number of casualties at a specific time and 
location. The attackers also disguised themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed. 
Furthermore, the attacker and handler used a car that was going to the target location and 
security disruptions were also mitigated.  
The seventh phase was weapons procurement where three different successful 
attacks had three different methods of weapons procurements: (a) assembled from camp 
152 
 
and transported to target site, (b) using of explosive devices with other sharp metal 
objects to impose the most damage, and (c) created by a group’s chief bombmaker. The 
eighth phase was logistic preparation, where in two of the three attacks, the attackers 
reportedly used disguises that were appropriate to their target demographics and location 
and in another attack, attackers formed a cell within their local target area for easier 
mobility. In addition, in an attack, the bomb was hidden in a guitar case. The ninth phase 
was operational preparation, where findings indicated thorough research and planning of 
target site, which was led by the handlers. One of the attack involved the handler and 
bomber moving swiftly from one territory to another because of minimal security barriers 
while traveling to the target location. Emphasis was also placed on the importance for the 
terror groups in finding a crowded and packed target location. 
For the three unsuccessful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework 
phases were present, similar to the successful attack findings; however, the details and 
information of the planning were vague and inadequate. For both the first phase, 
networking and indoctrination, and fourth phase, recruitment, findings were similar, 
where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by diverse groups, specifically the Fatah 
organization and the Islamic Jihad network. Furthermore, Islamic Jihad Movement of 
Palestine had planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli 
elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, who was killed during an 
IDF raid. Suspects in the unsuccessful attacks included an individual who was 
unemployed and a volunteer bomber from the Gaza Strip who had previously launched 
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successful attacks. For the second phase, terrorist training, for an unsuccessful attack, the 
Fatah organization handled, supported, and provided training; and for another 
unsuccessful attack, the bomber had no relevant training. For the third phase, general 
planning, findings indicated that all three unsuccessful attackers attempted to travel to the 
target site to detonate themselves and the residents. In addition, in all three unsuccessful 
attacks, the bombers searched for a dense location with high concentration of religious 
Jews.  
Findings for the fifth phase, financing, indicated that one unsuccessful attack was 
funded by the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. The sixth phase 
was operational planning and findings indicated the plan to tamper with border security 
fences to infiltrate Israel, then proceed to a populated part of central Israel. In addition, 
operational planning included paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and the 
driver helping with the attack. The seventh phase was weapons procurement where two 
unsuccessful attacks involved the weapons being assembled and generated in Israel and 
the use of 5 kg explosives. The eighth phase was logistic preparation, where two 
unsuccessful attackers attempted to reach their target point by foot. The ninth phase was 
operational preparation, where findings indicated the plan to detonate at a populated site, 
and paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack. 
In Chapter 4, I included the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, 
evidence of trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I collected 
data using a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet where I 
collected archival data from a private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six 
cases, a researcher-created site data collection worksheet where I collected data at each 
site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations, and a 
researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events where I collected open 
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases. 
In this study, I answered one central research question, which was the specific patterns 
within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the 
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases 
in Israel. 
Using single-case analysis and cross-case analysis, I found 13 major themes and 
21 minor themes for the successful attacks and seven major themes and 20 minor themes 
for the unsuccessful attacks. Findings indicated that all nine Freeman et al. (2010) phases 
were present in the successful attack findings; however, general planning, financing, and 
operational preparation had the most occurrences. On the other hand, for the three 
unsuccessful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework phases were present, 
similar to the successful attack findings; however, the details and information of the 
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planning were vague and inadequate. The findings are discussed in more detail in the 
interpretation of the findings section. In Chapter 5, I present the interpretation of findings, 
limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
One central research question was answered: What are the specific patterns within 
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerge in the 
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases 
in Israel? The findings for this study are interpreted in the context of Medby and Glenn’s 
(2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and 
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, as well as the literature review. The themes 
or patterns that emerged from the analysis are categorized as major and minor themes, 
based on the number of occurrences. Some of the aspects that were taken into 
consideration when comparing the six case studies were the year of attack, attack 
outcome, city of attack, bomber casualty, civilian casualty, and target type. The most 
discernable themes that emerged from the analysis are discussed, first in terms of the 
successful attacks, then in terms of unsuccessful attacks, and finally, in terms of overall 
findings across all the attacks that were under investigation.  
Successful Attacks 
The patterns and the major and minor themes that evolved from the analysis of the 
three case studies that pertained to the successful attacks are discussed. The first data 
source, the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, revealed that all nine categories of 
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Freeman et al.’s (2010) preattack phases were present in the successful attacks. The 
second data source, site data collection worksheet, revealed only the following two 
categories: networking and indoctrination; and general planning. The third data source, 
the questionnaire into suicide bombing events, showed important patterns within eight of 
the nine phases postulated by Freeman et al., except the terrorist training phase.  
Networking and indoctrination. This phase pertains to cell members being 
introduced and exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious 
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities (Freeman et al., 2010). In this 
study, findings indicated that all three successful attacks revealed networking and 
indoctrination as prevalent patterns. In this phase, attacks were carried out by the Hamas 
group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who were affiliated with the Fatah organization. 
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade carried out a successful attack to condemn the treatment in 
refugee camps. The military wing of the Fatah organization and the Hamas organization 
carried out suicide attacks is response to the assassinations of their two leaders.  
Findings pertaining to condemning the treatment in refugee camps and response 
to the assassination of two leaders are consistent with what has been reported in the 
literature. Perry et al. (2013) examined suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem, 
Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Netanya, and focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, al-Asqa 
Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which are terrorist groups noted in 
this multiple case study findings. Perry et al. related that attacks following IDF operations 
were more of a revenge tactic from terrorists due to an arrest or assassination of a known 
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terrorist. Similarly, Kennedy (2006) noted that suicide terrorists have certain personality 
traits that may lead them to kill themselves and murder others, such as the desire for 
revenge for prior perceived injustices perpetrated by government entities or other rivaling 
groups. Hassan (2009) argued that although religion may play a key role in recruiting and 
motivating potential future suicide bombers, the driving force is mainly attributed to 
revenge, retaliation, humiliation, politics, and altruism. Findings that the attacks were 
carried out by the Hamas group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who were affiliated 
with the Fatah organization, are consistent with Pape’s (2008) findings that almost all of 
the suicide attacks occurred as part of organized campaigns and not as isolated incidents. 
Pape found that based on 315 separate attacks, 301 had roots traced to large, coherent 
political or military campaigns (p. 130).  
 Terrorist training. This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell 
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities (Freeman et al., 2010). In this 
study, findings indicated that two of the three attacks had no special training conducted, 
while one successful attack involved excellent training and preparation. The finding that 
two of the three attacks had no special training conducted does not conform to the 
prevalent trend that shows terrorists get highly specialized trainings to maximize success 
in their operations (Atran, 2006; Cummings & Cummings, 2012). However, the finding 
that the successful attack involved excellent training and preparation lends support to the 
predominant trend, which illustrates that most suspects associated with terrorist groups 
usually get specialized training before carrying out their attacks (Atran, 2006; Cummings 
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& Cummings, 2012). Altran related that that rarely are suicide attacks unmethodical or 
the targets unsystematically selected as individuals interested in carrying out a suicide 
terrorist attack perform hours of preoperational surveillance, tactical training, firearms 
and explosives training, as well as detailed planning of the clothing they will wear for the 
attack. Similarly, Cummings and Cummings (2012) emphasized that terrorism requires a 
great deal of planning such as 9/11, which required flight school training for at least eight 
individuals. When Fox (2014) used the AHP to assess Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
phases from a quantitative perspective, findings indicated that terrorist training, along 
with networking, planning, and operational prep composed over 65% of the ranking 
weights.  
General planning. This phase pertains to making the decision to conduct a 
terrorist attack as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships, 
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers (Freeman et al., 2010). In addition, general shopping for 
potential targets is performed (Freeman et al., 2010). This was one of the phases that had 
the most number of occurrences as this phase was present in all three successful attacks. 
Findings in this study indicated that the successful attacks had complete coordination and 
the plans were followed as intended, such as the time of attack, disguise, and 
transportation. In addition, the attackers targeted sites that had a high probability for 
causalities, such as a synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood and 
Downtown Triangle district in Jerusalem.  
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These findings were consistent with the literature as Paul and Landree (2008) 
discussed these aspects of planning involving ease of access to target location; target 
features such as exact location to launch attack, times to launch and window of 
opportunity, as well as mobility of target; security issues like security measures, and 
presence of other population groups; and threats or barriers to the terrorist operation. In 
this study, the successful attackers chose accessible locations with minimum security and 
executed their attack plans when the places were heavily crowded. Perry et al. (2013) 
noted that the terrorist attacks are planned to hit target locations at times when they are 
most crowded. Due to the difficulty in knowing when the next attack will take place in 
Israel, Shaked (2016) related that counterterrorism actions involved increasing security 
personnel such as police officers, border police, and military personnel at major 
junctions, crowded places, and near Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. 
However, despite the underlying commonality of characteristics in these three 
successful attacks, the plans and executions reflect the differences in the terror attackers’ 
approach and strategies. Paul and Landree (2008) also pointed out that the methodologies 
and strategies adopted by the terrorist groups might vary to suit their individual needs and 
goals. As results indicated, for SA1, attackers targeted civilian population at a Jewish 
Orthodox community at the end of religious class conducted on Jewish Sabbath. In this 
attack, the bomber used a disguise to blend in with the Jewish population at the venue, 
thus, avoided being suspected or detected. On the other hand, SA2 was executed at a 
restaurant during the evening hours when the site was heavily populated. The attack was 
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very well-planned and even included an efficient escape plan for the handler. For SA3, 
cell members who were permanent residents and had the ability to travel to the targeted 
area of Jerusalem were used. The cell members also had the knowledge and skills to 
navigate the target area.  
Recruitment. This phase pertains to senior terrorist elements selecting and 
activating cell members for a certain terrorist operation (Freeman et al., 2010). Results in 
this study showed that the attackers came from a refugee camp and an attack was in 
response to the security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem. In addition, 
findings indicated that attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing and the attackers 
came from one neighborhood, which made recruitment easier. The finding that a suicide 
attack was in response to security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem is 
consistent with Hassan’s (2009) argument that a key role in recruiting and motivating 
potential future suicide bombers is mainly attributed to revenge, retaliation, politics, 
humiliation, and altruism. The finding that attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing 
is in line with Freeman et al.’s discussion of the radicalization process that results in a 
group committed to an attack.  
Financing. This phase pertains to funds being collected and allocated for a certain 
terrorist attack (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in this study indicated that large 
organizations funded all three attacks, such as the Fatah organization, Hamas, and Arab 
Bank. This finding is in consistent with Pearl and O’Rourke’s (2001) discussion of how 
money gets allocated for specific operations prior to the actual attacks to ensure proper 
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implementation of the plan. They provided the example of how money was allocated for 
the attack by al-Qa’ida on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000. Bob (2017) 
reported that the IDF Chief of Military Intelligence, Major General Halevi, reported 
Iran’s massive funding of terrorist groups that endanger Israel, sharing that Iran is 
funding Hezbollah $75 million a year, while paying $50 million of Hamas’s budget, and 
approximately $70 million to Islamic Jihad (para. 1).  
Operational planning. This phase pertains to selecting the specific target, 
conducting detail reconnaissance of the target, and conducting specific operation 
planning such as the delivery and procurement methods (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings 
in this study indicated that for two of the three attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the 
attack site prior to the actual implementation. In addition, the attackers planned for a 
large number of casualties at a specific time and location. The attackers also disguised 
themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed. Furthermore, the attacker and handler used a car 
that was going to the target location and security disruptions were also mitigated.  
Overall, findings are consistent with Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB first and 
second categories, approach avenues and ease of access, and target features, respectively. 
In regard to approach avenues and ease of access, Landree et al. related that well planned 
terrorist attacks require planning about how attackers will reach the target such as the use 
of scenarios about how attackers will be at a certain place at an exact time in order to 
carry out a coordinated attack or multiple attacks, or an attack against a moving target. In 
addition, Landree et al. noted that terrorists do not want to be identified; thus, planning 
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includes the exact paths they will take. The researchers noted that terrorists who plan 
overt attacks may be concerned about whether they will be seen, the presence of physical 
obstacles, and time and place of the greatest risk where they may be seen by security 
forces or pedestrians. In regard to target features, Landree et al. noted that elements of 
target features include attack and target, where attack pertains to the possible locations 
from which to launch an attack and possible times to launch an attack, whereas target 
includes the mobility and variability of the target. 
The finding that the suicide attackers scouted the attack site is consistent with 
Berman and Laitin’s (2005) theory of how adversaries select hard and soft targets. The 
authors described soft targets as those places with minimum military security or 
protection but frequented by visitors, such as nightclubs, schools, malls, and movie 
theaters. The finding of suicide attackers targeting a large number of casualties at a 
definite time and location is consistent with Ganor’s (2015) reporting that terrorists 
choose their target areas based on the potential for damage in terms of casualties, 
physical or property, economic, and related costs. Perry et al. (2013) also examined 
terrorist groups’ spatial preference patterns, which emphasized how suicide attackers 
chose accessible crowds. Perry et al. also found that several attacks correlated with 
Jewish holidays.  
Weapons procurement. This phase pertains to obtaining and receiving the 
materials for the construction of explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack, 
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in 
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this study indicated that three different successful attacks had three different methods of 
weapons procurements: (a) assembled from camp and transported to target site, (b) using 
of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to impose the most damage, and (c) 
created by a group’s chief bombmaker. The overall findings confirm researchers’ 
arguments that terrorist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to have 
the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out their 
attacks (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010). The findings lend support to 
Dolnik’s (2007) argument, which emphasized that terror organizations often carefully 
analyze the potential targets to identify the vulnerabilities and exploit those to their 
advantage for terror operations. Pape (2008) argued that what renders suicide bombing 
more lethal than other forms of terror attacks is that the attackers are ready to die on the 
mission. As such, their unique methods of attack are hard to detect and require them to 
die in order to achieve their goals. Findings are also in line with the third IPO step, which 
refers to identifying and evaluating threatening groups or people in relation to weapons 
that they may use, such as chemical weapons, small arms, and explosives; as well as the 
tactics they may use in their planned activities, such as suicide bombing (Sullivan & 
Wirtz, 2008).  
Logistical preparation. This phase pertains to logistical actions that are taken to 
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and document 
procurement, and electronics purchase (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in this study 
indicated that in two of the three attacks, the attackers reportedly used disguises that were 
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appropriate to their target demographics and location and in another attack, attackers 
formed a cell within their local target area for easier mobility. In addition, in one attack, 
the bomb was hidden in a guitar case. These findings are in line with Rudee’s (2014) 
reporting that terrorists will use disguises to carry out attacks, for example, in a foiled 
terror attack in Tel Aviv, a woman hid an explosive belt in her clothes while she was 
disguised as a pregnant Jewish woman. Hoffman (2003) reported that suicide bombers 
are middle-aged, young, married, unmarried, some of them have children, some are 
women, and even children are being trained for martyrdom. As a result, Hoffman shared 
that there is no clear profile of suicide bombers, who sometimes disguise themselves. 
Hoffman noted that as male shaheed or martyrs have worn green IDF fatigues, have 
dressed as haredim or ultra-Orthodox Jews, and have worn long-haired wigs to look like 
hip Israelis rather than threatening Arabs. Similar to Rudee, Hoffman noted that a few 
women tried to camouflage bombs by strapping them to their stomachs to fake 
pregnancy. Rudee related that addressing these lethal trends within counterterrorism is 
challenging. 
Operational preparation. This phase pertains to physical preparations for the 
imminent terrorist attack, including explosive construction, vehicle alteration, specific 
explosives training, and multimedia preparation and creation (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Findings in this study indicated thorough research and planning of target site, which was 
led by the handlers. One of the attack involved the handler and bomber moving from one 
territory to another because of minimal security barriers while traveling to the target 
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location. Emphasis was also placed on the importance for the terror groups in finding a 
crowded and packed target location. These findings are similar to those found for 
operational planning and are also consistent with Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB 
approach avenues and ease of access, and target features categories. Thus, well planned 
terrorist attacks require planning about how attackers will reach the target. In addition, 
findings pertaining to the selection of crowded and packed locations confirm Berman and 
Laitin (2005) discussion on soft target selection due little or no military protection or 
security.  
Unsuccessful Attacks 
The patterns and the major and minor themes that evolved from the three-case 
study analysis that pertained to the unsuccessful attacks are discussed. Data analysis of 
the same three sources revealed that the terrorists had very little information and lacked 
proper planning and attack strategies. The first data source, the terrorist activity data 
collection worksheet, had no information on logistical preparation. Data analysis of the 
second source, site data collection worksheet, only showed three patterns: (a) networking 
and indoctrination, (b) general planning, and (c) weapons procurement. Data analysis of 
the third source revealed only six of the categories under Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
phases of preattack phases.  
 Networking and indoctrination. Findings for this phase were similar to the 
findings for the recruitment phase, where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by 
diverse groups, specifically the Fatah organization and the Islamic Jihad network. 
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Furthermore, Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine had planned to detonate a bomb in Tel 
Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old 
Palestinian girl, who was killed during an IDF raid. Suspects in the unsuccessful attacks 
included an individual who was unemployed and a volunteer bomber from the Gaza Strip 
who had previously launched successful attacks. The findings lend support to Hassan’s 
(2009) argument that often politics, revenge, retaliation, humiliation, or altruism act as 
driving forces behind terrorist attacks rather than religious fanaticism.  
 Terrorist training. Findings indicated that for an unsuccessful attack, the Fatah 
organization handled, supported, and provided training; and for another unsuccessful 
attack, the bomber had no relevant training. The finding pertaining to the lack of training 
is unlike conventional terrorist practices that show terrorists to be very methodical and 
meticulous in selecting their target locations after spending rigorous hours in 
preoperational surveillance, training, and detailed planning of every aspect of the attack, 
including the clothes they will wear (Atran, 2006; Freeman et al., 2010). Compared with 
the three successful attacks investigated in this study, where the bombers received 
extensive training, the lack of training may have contributed to the bomber’s failure to 
successfully execute the mission.  
General planning. Findings indicated that all three unsuccessful attackers 
attempted to travel to the target site to detonate themselves and the residents. This finding 
support Pape’s (2008) reporting that the attackers do not expect to survive and often 
employ lethal methods of attack. Similarly, Paz (2005) noted that because the death of the 
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perpetrator is a desirable or acceptable outcome of the attack, more complex missions can 
be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route was needed. Thus, Paz 
(2005) related that the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the escape, 
which is unnecessary in a suicide attack. With no need for an escape plan, route, or 
means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise might be 
too difficult. In addition, in all three unsuccessful attacks, the bombers searched for a 
dense location with high concentration of religious Jews. This finding reiterates Atran’s 
(2003) argument that suicide bombers utilize terrorism and target civilians to “effect 
political change” (p. 1534). The attacks may have been unsuccessful as results showed a 
general lack of proper planning, training, or preparation for the attacks.  
Recruitment. Findings in this phase were similar to findings in the networking 
and indoctrination phase, where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by the Fatah 
organization and the Islamic Jihad network. Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine had 
planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli elections and to get 
revenge for the death of a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, a suspect was unemployed, and a 
volunteer bomber had previously launched successful attacks. In regard to these findings, 
while researchers have found that “poverty and economic conditions are not directly 
correlated with the occurrence of terrorism” (Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2012, p. 113; 
Deloughery et al., 2013). Benmelech et al. (2013) found that “high levels of 
unemployment enable terror organizations to recruit better educated, more mature, and 
more experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets” (p. 
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113). Findings are also consistent with Hassan’s (2009) reporting about revenge being a 
main reason for terrorist attacks. 
 Financing. Findings indicated that one unsuccessful attack was funded by the 
Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. However, 1 month before the 
foiled attempt, Israeli authorities were able to stop some of the money from being 
transferred into the West Bank, but not all of it. Freeman et al. (2010) discussed the 
importance of financing before a final suicide attack. The suicide attack may have been 
unsuccessful due to authorities being able to stop some of the money and possibly 
anticipating that an attack was likely to occur, which may have allowed them to use 
counterterrorism strategies.  
 Operational planning. Findings indicated the plan to tamper with border security 
fences to infiltrate Israel then proceed to a populated part of central Israel. In addition, 
operational planning included paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and the 
driver helping with the attack. These themes have parallels to some of the successful 
attacks that were investigated in this study. For example, for SA1, the bomber used a car 
to reach the destination and the handler assisted the bomber to circumvent the security 
checkpoints for leaving Bethlehem. It is unclear whether paying the driver to help with 
the attack contributed to the foiled attack. However, parallels between successful and 
failed suicide attacks show the presence of certain characteristics irrespective of the 
outcomes. This might have important implications for counterterrorism officials who can 
look at these overall cases and identify the factors that terrorists resort to or utilize for 
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their operations. Fox (2014) emphasized the need for law enforcement officials to learn 
about adversary planning so that they can predict their moves to some extent and prevent 
the attacks by adopting necessary security measures. Weinstein et al. (2009) also 
emphasized the urgency for developing tools and techniques for detecting and tracking 
terrorist organizations and networks and recognizing their potentials for terror attacks.  
Weapons procurement. Findings indicated that two unsuccessful attacks 
involved the weapons being assembled and generated in Israel and the use of 5 kg 
explosives. Even though the attacks were unsuccessful, the use of explosives is in line 
with the literature as terrorist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to 
have the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out 
attacks (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010). 
 Logistical preparation. Results showed two unsuccessful attackers attempted to 
reach their target point by foot. Dzikansky, Kleiman, and Slater (2012) noted that the 
bulkiness of explosives makes it more challenging for suicide bombers to walk normally, 
so they might arouse suspicion. Dzikansky et al. noted that due to this constraint, suicide 
bombers tend to focus on soft targets or civilian targets. To reduce the likelihood of being 
caught, suicide bombings are sometimes replaced with suicide car bombings as a larger 
amount of explosives can be placed in the vehicles.  
Operational preparation. Findings indicated the plan to detonate at a populated 
site, and paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack. Using a 
populated site is consistent with Perry et al.’s (2013) findings of suicide attacks in Israel 
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where terrorists targeted accessible crowds, which did not have to be large. Perry et al. 
noted that suicide bombers were content to target groups of dozens or even smaller. In 
addition, the researchers noted that suicide attackers were also very repetitive in target 
decisions, for example, more than 1 in 3 attacks were repeat strikes on locations 
previously targeted. 
Cross-Case Analysis 
Based on content analysis, the above sections provided a comprehensive 
exploration of the differences within and between the cases. In this section, I will identify 
some of the parallels across all the cases to provide overall patterns that are discernable in 
the nine phases of preattack adversary planning and how it relates to the conceptual 
framework and the literature. A comparison between the successful and failed attack 
cases revealed that the successful attackers’ adversary planning process more readily 
emerged in Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases than those of their failed 
counterparts’. In addition, the unsuccessful attackers failed to show similar consistency 
and many of the categories from the nine phases were absent across the three data sources 
for the unsuccessful cases.  
Within the networking and indoctrination phase, the successful cases showed the 
support of Hamas group for two of the attacks and Fatah group for one of the attacks. 
Researchers have shown how large terror organizations provide funding and support for 
suicide attacks (Pape, 2008; Kennedy, 2006). Tal (2002) discussed indoctrination, where 
some suicide bombers are put through religious indoctrination, where it is stressed that 
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their act of self-sacrifice is an act of supreme sacrifice in the name of jihad. However, Tal 
pointed out that indoctrination has become less common because the ongoing 
confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, which has resulted in causalities, severe 
economic decline, closures, curfews, and roadblock. These factors have resulted in 
increased despair and frustration, most of which is directed at Israel (Tal, 2002). As a 
result, Tal noted that this has increased people’s desire to volunteer for and carry out 
suicide attacks, thus, rendering indoctrination unnecessary. In this study, the unsuccessful 
attacks lacked information on networking and support groups who financed the attacks.  
Contrary to conventional practices amongst terrorists, two of the attacks that were 
financed by the Hamas group did not involve any training. One successful attack revealed 
that the bomber received extensive training for the suicide mission. However, the attacks, 
in general, were coordinated by skilled handlers who helped the bombers in completing 
their attacks. The successful cases also indicated that the handlers carefully scouted the 
sites prior to the attack to ensure maximum casualty. Hoffman (2003) discussed the use 
of handlers. According to Hoffman, terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Palestine 
Islamic Jihad, or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, recruited the bomber, conducted 
reconnaissance, prepared the explosive device, and identified a target. Hoffman explained 
that if the target is guarded or protected, any crowded place nearby will do. Thus, suicide 
bombers most often have a handler and in some cases, a handler has used a cell phone or 
other device to trigger the blast from a distance (Hoffman, 2003).  
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Although general planning was present in all six studies, the successful attacks 
showed more detailed planning that involved multiple factors. For instance, for SA1, the 
bomber wore a disguise to blend in with the teen students who were attending religious 
classes and who congregated at the target site at the end of their classes, SA2 bomber hid 
his explosives inside a guitar case, and SA3 attackers were deliberately chosen from a 
particular cell where the members held permanent resident cards and could access the 
target site without any hindrances. General Planning was present in all the unsuccessful 
cases, which showed important trends like how the attackers planned to arrive at their 
destinations and how they wanted to target densely populated areas with high 
concentration of Jews. One of the important themes that became evident across most of 
the studies was that the attackers targeted sites at specific times when maximum number 
of civilians were present at the locations. Coupled with the intension to inflict maximum 
damage, another theme evolved, which showed that the attackers used bombs made by 
chief bombmakers that were loaded with sharp metals to have a greater effect when they 
were detonated. Benmelech et al. (2012) claimed that in designing efficient 
counterterrorism policies, the most common counterterrorism policies aim to incapacitate 
terror organizations by cracking down on their members and enacting security measures 
that decrease the probability of success of a planned attack. 
Another theme that emerged from the analysis revealed a significant difference in 
approach between the successful and the unsuccessful case studies. The successful 
attacks demonstrated thorough planning and research, for instance, for SA1, suicide 
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bombers used a car to arrive to the location and for SA2, attackers had an escape plan for 
the handler. In comparison, two of the attackers from the unsuccessful attacks chose to 
travel to the destinations by foot. Hoffman (2013) reporting is in line with these findings 
as the author noted that the human weapons system can effect last-minute changes based 
on the ease of approach, the paucity or density of people, and the security measures that 
are in place. 
Results showed some of the motives behind the attacks. The attacks were 
conducted for drawing government’s attention to generate political changes, disrupting 
elections, or for taking revenge for atrocities that the attackers thought were inflected by 
Israelis. For example, SA2 was planned to avenge the assassination of two of the Hamas 
leaders and USA1 was planned to avenge the death of a Palestinian girl who became a 
victim of a raid in her camp. Consistent with the literature, a strong motive for suicide 
attacks is revenge, such as revenge for the deaths of friends, fellow cadres, or relatives at 
the hands of Israeli forces (Hassan, 2009; Tal, 2002).  
Limitations of the Study 
Factors that I considered in relation to the trustworthiness that arose from the 
execution of this multiple case study include the type of study, the chosen case studies, 
types of data sources, assumptions, and analysis of the results. There were several 
limitations of this study. Even though I used different kinds of cases, one possible 
limitation was generalizing the results since a maximum variation sampling and 
purposeful random sampling of only six Israel suicide bombing cases were used and the 
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results of the study were limited to suicide attacks cases in Israel. Therefore, the results of 
the study may not be generalizable to other forms of terrorist attacks or to terrorist attacks 
in other countries as the majority of the cases were targeted towards locations in and 
around Jerusalem. Yin (2012) related that a single or small set of cases cannot be 
statistically generalized as that is not the aim of such studies. Instead, Yin noted that case 
studies tend to generalize to other situations based on analytic claims. Yin discussed a 
conceptual claim where researchers show how the findings from their study have 
informed the relationship among a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, or 
sequence of events. Yin related that the second step pertains to researchers applying the 
same theoretical propositions to implicate other situations outside the completed case 
study where similar concepts, constructs, or sequences might be relevant. Hence, 
although the findings from this multiple case study cannot be statistically generalized, 
they could have implications for other situations based on analytical claims.  
A second possible limitation was issues of missing or incomplete data on the 
suicide bombing cases. However, this possible limitation was addressed by only 
including cases that had sufficient data available from multiple sources so that I was able 
to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine phases. A third limitation pertained to bias in 
the selection of the suicide bombing cases. I am CEO of the private intelligence company 
in Israel where the case study data were obtained. I addressed this limitation by obtaining 
the community partner’s cooperation and data use agreement. I used purposeful random 
sampling in selecting the three successful and three failed suicide attacks. I also used 
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specific strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed any experiences, biases, and values 
pertaining to the adversary planning process for each adversary success or failure in the 
Israel suicide bombing cases.  
A fourth limitation was the difference in timeframe for successful suicide attacks 
and unsuccessful suicide attacks. As noted in Chapter 4, the successful attacks occurred 
in 2001 and 2002, whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The 
differences in years might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators 
having a better understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their 
counterterrorism strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the 
successful and unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes, 
such as suicide attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but 
a barrier or wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when 
major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012; 
Zonszein, 2014). Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as 
a measure to protect Israelis from Palestinian suicide bombers. Thus, future research 
could focus on factors that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening 
years that may explain the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases. 
A fifth limitation was related to the assumption that the adversary was targeting 
only civilians and not the property. As such, the results only focused on the casualties and 
did not discuss damages to property. Hence, future research could focus on the aftermath 




Seven recommendations for future research arise based on the strengths and 
limitations of the study as well as the literature review. First, in this study, I focused on 
six suicide bombing cases in Israel; thus, filling in a gap in the literature by exploring 
specific patterns that consistently emerged within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine 
preattack phases. However, the scope of this study is limited to suicide bombing attacks 
in Israel. Thus, in future studies, researchers could expand the cases by exploring other 
suicide bombing cases in other countries while using Freeman et al. nine preattack 
phases. Findings could be compared to those found in this study and the results could be 
used to assist counterterrorism and COIN professionals in their efforts to prevent suicide 
attacks from taking place and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks.  
Second, in this study, I explored the specific patterns within each of Freeman et 
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning 
process for each of the suicide bombing cases; however, I did not specially focus on the 
timing of these specific patterns, such as the months or years between the different phases 
before the attacks or attempted attacks occurred. Freeman et al. investigated whether 
terrorist attackers follow an observable pattern in their preattack activities, whether the 
patterns could be used as an indicator or warning of imminent terrorist activity, and 
whether the indicators and warnings could be used to predict the timing of a future 
terrorist attack. Based on the findings from the Freeman et al. study, they found that the 
nine phases fell into three stages and these stages took place at a specific time. 
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Specifically, the researchers found that Stage 1 consisted of the first three phases and 
took place a year or more in advance of the attack. Stage 2 included the fourth and fifth 
phases and took place 6 months to a year in advance of an attack. Stage 3 consisted of 
Phases 6 through 9 and took place a few months before the attack. Thus, future research 
on suicide attacks could also add to the literature by focusing on the specific timing of 
when each phase takes place before an attack and results could be compared to Freeman 
et al.’s findings; thus, adding more knowledge in this area. Freeman et al. reported that 
understanding the general pattern of preparation before a terrorist attack is helpful, but it 
is most valuable if it could be used as an indicator of an upcoming attack. Thus, 
counterterrorism and COIN professionals could use the results to predict the specific 
timeframe when the actual suicide attack may occur.  
Third, the suicide bombing cases in this study focused on terrorists who were part 
of a terrorist organization and had support from other people. Zeirhoffer (2014) presented 
the difficulty of tracking lone wolf attackers who operate without any supporting 
organization. The researcher noted the lack of research on lone attackers because most 
researchers focus only on terrorist organizations. Shaked (2016) reported that the recent 
terrorist attacks in Israel have been mostly carried out by lone wolves who are not 
affiliated with any terror groups. Thus, future research could focus on using Borum et al. 
(1999) threat assessment model to examine the demographics or characteristics of 
potential lone wolf terrorists, behaviors that could indicate the movement of individuals 
toward achieving a goal, and how the model could be used to prevent lone wolf terrorism. 
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Fourth, as noted in the limitation of the study section, this study was limited in its 
focus on civilian casualties and not property damage. Therefore, future research could 
focus on the aftermath of terror attacks to gain a better understanding of how to prepare 
against serious damages.  
Fifth, Shalev et al. (2006) evaluated the effects of continuous terror by examining 
the prevalence of PTSD, PTSD symptoms, and symptoms of general distress in 
individuals who lived in two different suburbs in Jerusalem, Israel, a directly exposed 
community and an indirectly exposed community. The researchers found that disruption 
of daily living significantly contributed to PTSD symptoms. Future research could further 
delve into the effects on people after suicide attacks, which might further help emergency 
management groups or first responders, health care providers, and law enforcement 
officers in their response and treatment of suicide attack victims.  
Sixth, Greenhill and Staniland (2007) recommended that individuals conducting 
counterterrorist activities should consider an underlying premise, namely the in-depth 
study of the nature and results yielded by COIN operations as such detailed research is 
indispensable for possibly preventing future incidents involving suicide terrorism. Thus, 
future research could add to this effort by focusing on how to decrease heightened 
extremist ideals and prevent future terrorist attacks. Seventh, as noted in the limitations of 
the study section, the successful attacks occurred in 2001 and 2002, whereas the 
unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. Future research could focus on factors 
180 
 
that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening years that may explain 
the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases. 
Implications 
Israel is one of 13 countries at risk for increased terrorist activity (IEP, 2014). The 
biggest threat to peace in Israel and other countries is terrorist groups such as ISIS, Boko 
Haram, Hezbollah, Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (Fox, 2014; IEP, 2014). Tal (2002) reported 
that suicide attacks result in casualties, fear, and anxiety for the public and present 
difficult challenges to State of Israel officials (Tal, 2002). Fox (2014) emphasized that the 
detection of terrorist attacks before they occur is critical, but difficult when efforts are 
unfocused and misaligned. Fox related that law enforcement officials should increase 
their knowledge about adversary planning so that they can predict suicide attackers’ 
moves to some extent and prevent the attacks by adopting necessary security measures. 
Similarly, Paul and Landree (2008) argued that it is imperative to study the planning 
process involved in an attack because it will provide insights into various segments of the 
attack such as selecting a target, selecting the mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist 
operatives, and developing an operational plan. Weinstein et al. (2009) emphasized the 
urgency for developing tools and techniques for detecting and tracking terrorist 
organizations and networks and recognizing their potentials for terror attacks. Freeman et 
al. (2010) postulated that focusing on the early phases of adversary preattack planning 
could provide valuable information about how terrorists prepare to execute an attack.   
181 
 
The patterns that evolved through content analysis have important implications 
for law enforcement, military, counterterrorism, and COIN officials as understanding the 
general pattern of preparation before a terrorist attack is useful in preventing future 
suicide attacks (Freeman et al., 2010; Tal, 2002). Thus, the findings from this study may 
assist CTOs to further focus on patterns that are helpful in detecting suicide attacks prior 
to execution. In addition, findings in this study could be used to assist counterterrorism 
decision makers in creating policies to arrest those suspected of plotting an attack as soon 
as their activity is noticed. Paul and Landree (2008) noted that the more individuals 
involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand adversary strategies, the 
better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive strategies. 
The investigation of the suicide cases with respect to Freeman et al. (2010) nine 
preattack phases revealed interesting patterns of terrorist behavior that could be used to 
predict their actions, such as general planning, financing, and operational preparation, 
which received the most occurrences in the successful attack cases. Paul and Landree 
(2008) related that when defenders control the attack planning process by protecting 
essential information concerning the infrastructure or the target, individuals and 
governments combating terror attacks can gather a more concrete set of parameters 
regarding what terrorists are likely to search for; hence, they are better able to identify 
targets that may be at risk and adjust their defenses accordingly. 
The implications for positive social change stemming from this study are directed 
at counterterrorist decision makers and operators, such as Israel Security Agency and 
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defense establishments, as focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack will 
help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from 
occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This knowledge and action 
will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law enforcement officials. Findings 
from this research study added further knowledge to the public policy and administration 
literature on patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases prior to 
suicide attacks. Along with the public policy and administration field, a wide array of 
other fields might be interested in the study’s findings, to include the fields of criminal 
justice, public safety, and emergency management. The findings from the study are also 
applicable to many public and private agencies and organizations to include Israel 
Homeland Security; federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and intelligence 
centers. By better understanding patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack 
phases, counterintelligence and COIN professionals can implement COIN measures that 
may be able to detect and combat terrorism threats. 
Conclusion  
To help CTOs narrow the field of options while filling the operational need to 
detect terrorist attacks before they occur, I added new knowledge to the literature by 
exploring specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases 
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed 
suicide bombing cases in Israel. Wigle (2010) explained that compared to other types of 
terror attacks, suicide attacks are fewer, but results in a higher casualty rate. Kaplan et al. 
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(2006) noted that suicide bombings were the leading cause of death from terrorism in 
Israel. Ganor (2015) noted that although terrorists often choose symbolic targets, they 
target high trafficked areas when the opportunity arises. Ganor argued that terrorists often 
select their targets based on their assessment of potential attack consequences in terms of 
loss of life, injuries, economic, and other costs. 
Data analysis showed consistent patterns emerging across Freeman et al. (2010) 
nine phases that revealed how terrorists selected target locations, recruited and provided 
training to bombers and other members, developed a plan, and prepared for the actual 
attack. Some of the major patterns that emerged revealed that large terror organizations 
such as Fatah organization and Hamas supported and funded terrorist attacks, suicide 
bombers targeted locations that had large number of people at specific times to get a high 
number of casualties, attackers disguised themselves so that they could avoid being 
suspected among the target population, and they develop efficient plans for traveling to 
the site as well as plans for handlers to escape from the target location. Based on these 
findings, it is important that decision makers and CTOs focus on the early planning 
phases of a terrorist attack so that they are better able to identify essential opportunities to 
prevent suicide attacks from occurring (see Fox, 2014). Paul and Landree (2008) related 
that the more individuals involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand 
adversary strategies, the better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive 
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Appendix A: Case Study Selection Worksheet 
Categories 
 
Selection Criteria Details 
 

















Data sufficiency on each 
of Freeman et al. (2010) 
nine phases: 
 
   Networking and    
   indoctrination  
   Terrorist training 
 
  
   General planning 
 
  
  Recruitment  
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   Financing 
 
 
   Operational planning 
 
  
   Weapons procurement 
 
  
   Logistical preparation 
 
  






Appendix B: Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet 
Phases 
 
Descriptive narrative data related to this phase 
 




Phase 2: Terrorist training 
 
  




Phase 4: Recruitment 
  
































How many blocks can 
you see along each 
street? If no streets 
visible, use cardinal 
directions and meter 
estimates. 
Street name/direction:                                                            
No. of blocks / meters: 
  
Street name/direction:                                                            
No. of blocks / meters: 
  
Street name/direction:                                                            
No. of blocks / meters: 
  
Street name/direction:                                                            
No. of blocks / meters: 
  
Were stationary police 
and or security guards 
visibly present? (Y/N) 
  
Were there routine 
security patrols? (Y/N) 
  












How difficult was it to 
approach the target on 
foot? Were there 
significant obstacles? 
Is the site located on a 
1-way street? 
  
1 - direct, no obstacles    2 – some barriers, not direct    
3 – significant obstructions 
  
Notes: 
How close is the site to 
the West Bank and 
major thoroughfares? 
Proximity to West Bank: 
Proximity to major thoroughfare: 
  
How can the site be 
accessed? 
By bus (Y/N)                     By foot (Y/N)                      
 By Private car (Y/N) 
SITE & IMMEDIATE 
SURROUNDINGS 
  
SME opinion: What is 
the primary reason the 




What are immediate 
surroundings of the 
detonation site? 
Consider the same 
block or complex. 
Is location in a mall? Street filled with other bus stops? 
Etc. 
Is there anything 
notable about the key 
Core constituency: e.g., university students, 




frequents the site and its 
immediate surroundings 
(or rides the bus)? 
What are the local 
points of interest (POIs) 
in the immediate area? 
For example, religious 




Rate and explain the 
political, religious, 
commercial or other 
significance (symbolic 
or strategic) of the site, 
immediate 
surroundings, and local 
POIs (1-5) 
1 – none   2 – possible /low impact   3 – likely   4 – 
high likelihood   5 – definite / high impact 
  
  
Political _____     Religious ______ 









l 2000+ PEOPLE) 
  
What is the 
neighborhood called? 
  
What are the local 
socioeconomic 
conditions and class 
composition of the 
neighborhood? 
1 – working class   2 – middle class 3 – upper class 
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What is the religious 







                                                                        
What is the ethnic 
composition of the 
neighborhood? 
  
What is the daily influx 
of Palestinians into the 
site and surrounding 
neighborhood for 
employment or other 
purposes (1-5)? 









Daily and weekly 






Daily and weekly 
schedules of leisure 
patterns, including 




Daily and weekly 
schedules of transit as 






Did bombing co-occur 
with religious 
observance or holiday 
(Muslim or Jewish)? 
(Y/N) 
Is observance related to the site? I.e., major 
synagogues, shopping areas for Sabbath? 
  
  
Did bombing co-occur 
with date of political 
commemorations or 
negotiations? (Y/N) 
Were they related to the site? Proximity of 
negotiations, public statements, government buildings? 
  
Did bombing co-occur 
with significant changes 
in security situation, or 
with armed operations 
in territories? (Y/N) 
Include IDF activities, political infighting in territories. 





Appendix D: Questionnaire Into Suicide Bombing Events 
Target Code Site Specific Target site 
selection 
Neighborhood Regional  
 
Why was the 
target site 
selected (see 
next section of 







Was it a group 
decision or 
individual 
decision on the 
site selection? 












Is there any 
significance to 









into the attack? 
Was the site 
or bus known 














in the decision? 
What do they 








Did it border 
similar areas? 
Was there a 
trigger event 









the attack to 
take place? Was 






was the event 
to as much 
detail as 
possible? 
How far did one 
travel to the site 
at the day of the 




to get to the 
site?  
Is there any 














 In what ways 
can the target 
site be 
characterized 
How did the 
bomber arrive 
at the site 
(e.g., walk 
Did one scout 
the site prior to 
the event? If so, 
how far ago 
Did any 
bombers live 
and bomb in 














from a local 
apartment, 
take the bus, 





What did the 
person look for 
at the site? Did 
one look for 
different things 
each time when 
one scouted the 
site? What was 
the site scouting 
strategy? Were 




If so, what were 
these sites and 
what were the 
reasons or 
rationale? 
It what ways did 










the site if it 
was not a bus.  
Was it a bus 









How did the 
person decide a 
particular spot 
at the site to 
trigger the 
event? 













What has been 
done to mitigate 
risk of attacks? 
Where are they 
If it was a bus, 
did the 
bomber get on 
the bus and 
How important 
is choosing the 
time of 
triggering the 


















quickly or ride 
the bus for an 
amount of 
time. Do they 
think the 
intention was 
the bus or the 
location of the 
bus or both? 
event? How is 
the time factor 
considered? 
How was the 
site selection 
influenced by 
recent news or 
political 
situations? 
the area? organized?  
Once central 
group or a few 
dispersed 
cells/cliques?  







What has been 
learned? What 
has been done 
to protect? What 




the site related 





How did one 
travel to the 
site? Did one 
detour en route 
to the site? If so, 
where did the 
person stop? 
How far was the 
site from one's 
origin location 
(i.e., where did 
the person start 
the journey to 
the site on the 
day of the 
event?)? 
  
 If the event 
was on a bus, 
what are the 
details of the 
bus line? To 
and from what 
areas and 
what is special 
about the 





What did the 
person see on 











   
 Was site 






   
 Cultural 
insight 
relating to bus 
attacks: 
  
Is there a 
demographic 
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moving bus in 
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